During a misty summer dawn, on Friday 30 June 2017, Lebanese Army Forces (LAF) troops—reinforced with several tanks—stormed two Syrian refugee camps located on the outskirts of Arsal, in northeast Lebanon. The first, al-Nour Camp, is located in Jafar. The second, Qara, is located in Wadi al-Hosn. That dawn, LAF soldiers took their positions surrounding each of the camps and waited for the zero hour. Once the time came, around six o’clock in the morning, the troops began moving into the camps. As the soldiers combed through the tents that made up the refugee camps, they came under attack from unidentified armed men. According to reports, the armed men who shot at the LAF soldiers were affiliated with either Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formally known as Jabhat al-Nusra) and the Islamic State—both sets of whom infiltrated the camps. Seven LAF soldiers were wounded and another was killed during these military raids.
Details Emerge
During the clashes between the army and gunmen, the troops continued to comb the tents. In some instances, they tossed hand grenades into tents—resulting in severe human casualties and material damage. By the end, the LAF had demolished approximately thirty housing units in the camp, while damaging dozens of other housing units and killing nineteen people. According to local sources, “it was the army that launched an attack using heavy weapons that caused one wall to fall on a girl, killing her, and another that killed a handicapped man—whose corpse was confiscated and handed back for burial days later.” After the battle was over the army arrested 356 Syrian men. Several estimates put the number of people injured during the raid at over three hundred. According to both Lebanese and Syrian sources on the ground in Arsal, there were no suicide bombers during the raid.
Yet the above details were not necessarily those announced by the LAF in its communications with the public in general and the media in particular. According to Reuters, the LAF claimed “five suicide bombers attacked Lebanese soldiers as they raided two Syrian refugee camps in Arsal at the border with Syria.” The news agency went on to report that the LAF “said seven soldiers were wounded and a girl was killed after one of the suicide bombers blew himself up in the midst of a family of refugees. It did not elaborate.” To Syrians, and some Lebanese, this particular set of raids was considered a most brutal military operation against the most destitute Syrian refugees in Lebanon. More importantly, the events ushered the beginning of a new manufactured discourse about the LAF, Syrian refugees, and alleged terrorist threats.
Following the raids, images circulated on social media showing hundreds of Syrian men handcuffed. Most were topless, tagged with spray paint on the backs of their naked bodies. Many of these Syrian bodies show signs of recent severe beatings. Some of the residents of the two camps managed to escape to other neighboring camps. Many others were detained by the LAF. As the day came to an end, a hashtag in support of the LAF began trending across social media: #Purge_the_hills of_Irsal.
In the days that followed the raids, the living conditions Syrians in their ransacked camps deteriorated to a point beyond the capacity of local relief organizations to address. Remarkably, the UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR)—which is the international body tasked with overseeing assistance to Syrian refugees and which has facilitated the establishment of several camps around Arsal—was absent and provided no protection to refugees during this disaster. In the weeks that followed the raids, thousands of Syrian refugees in Arsal returned to Syria as a function of the deteriorating conditions. It merits considering the fact that the situation deteriorated so much in Arsal that these refugees preferred to return to what they had originally fled from in Syria. Those Syrian refugees that remained in Arsal, continue to be terrified by random arrests. Many of them spend their nights in hiding on side roads and in between graves of the village’s main cemetery.
Framing the Narrative
As the dust settled on that day of the raids, there appeared to be two very different yet complimentary operations at play. The first was a military operation to “cleanse” the camps from the alleged presence and threat of dangerous militants. The second was public relations campaign to establish hegemony over how the raids were represented, which include celebrating the idea and concept of “cleansing.” Despite initial confusion by residents of the camps and those that followed the conflicting news that emerged, the end of the day featured a specific set of facts and framing of the facts that dominated the public sphere. There were now two narratives of what transpired: one that was fed to and disseminated by Lebanese media outlets; and another that was only whispered among those left alive in Arsal.
The production of the official narrative of what transpired in Arsal was very clearly intended to compliment the military operation from the start. The Lebanese minister of defense was quoted as saying the “incident showed the importance of tackling the refugee crisis – Lebanon is hosting over 1 million refugees – and vindicated a policy of ‘pre-emptive strikes’ against militant sleeper cells.” The crucial question that remains unanswered is how was brutalizing the bodies of Syrian refugees supposed to solve the refugee crisis?
In the Beqaa Valley, three refugee camps were burned down in the day immediately following the raids in Arsal. The fires killed at least three people and left hundreds homeless (or tentless) with severe burn injuries. There were conflicting reasons for the alleged arsons that began to spread. The inhabitants of the camps insisted that there were unknown assailants who set fire to the camps. They also claim that the nearby local police did not take their pleas seriously when reporting the men or the fires. Alternatively, the mainstream media reported that the reasons for the arson remained unknown. Some hinted that the cause of fires was high summer temperatures. Furthermore, the army raided refugee encampments in different areas of Beqaa, detaining many Syrians for entering Lebanon illegally or not having residency permits.
Destroying the Evidence
It was not enough for officials to frame the narrative and feed it to local and international media outlets. They went so far as to destroy evidence which contradicted their narrative. Diala Shehadeh is a lawyer representing families of the Syrian men who the LAF arrested in Arsal and later died in custody. She gave a written account on her Facebook page of how the attempt to establish credible autopsy reports of the men’s bodies undermined. She accused military intelligence of seizing the samples she was transporting for independent autopsies, and then sending those samples to the governmental hospital. Shehadeh’s Facebook account included a video of this encounter.
As her account began to spread on social media, the Beirut Bar Association issued a directive preventing Shehadeh from appearing in the media pending a decision by Antonio Hashim, the head of the Beirut Bar Association. Shehadeh’s potential testimony was an inconvenient truth that had to be censored before it could have undermined the official framing of events. On 4 July 2017, the military issued a statement stating the cause of death for the four detained Syrian men. It “said that four detainees who ‘suffered from chronic health issues that were aggravated due to the climate condition’ died before being interrogated. It identified them as Mustafa Abd el Karim Absse, 57; Khaled Hussein el-Mleis, 43; Anas Hussein el-Husseiki, 32; and Othman Merhi el-Mleis. The army did not specify where it had detained them.”
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), “On July 4, 2017, the Lebanese military issued a statement saying four Syrians died in its custody following mass raids in Arsal, a restricted access area in northeast Lebanon where many Syrian refugees live. On July 14, Human Rights Watch received credible reports that a fifth Syrian detainee had also died in custody.” HRW went further to state that on “July 15, the army released a statement saying that it detained 356 people following these raids. It referred 56 for prosecution and 257 to the General Security agency for lack of residency. A humanitarian organization official told Human Rights Watch that children were among those detained.” HRW concluded that “any statement that the deaths of these individuals was due to natural causes is inconsistent with these photographs.”
Stimulating a Nationalist Mania
As time passed and more information from Arsal emerged, it became clear that the official framing of the Arsal raids and their aftermath was meant to justify the military operation while at the same time delegitimize efforts at solidarity with Syrian refugees in Lebanon. As the propaganda became ubiquitous, an ultra nationalist sentiment turned Syrians in Lebanon to an enemy within. They were rapidly dehumanized.
In response, the Socialist Forum called for a sit-in in solidarity with Syrian refugees to take place in downtown Beirut on Tuesday 18 July. The organization applied for and received official clearance from the Municipality of Beirut for the sit-in. This initiative challenged the dominant discourse and threatened to obstruct the systematic campaign to rally public opinion around the LAF. In order to undermine the initiative, apologists for the raids took to social media and created or shared a Facebook page titled the “Syrian People’s Union in Lebanon.” This page hijacked Socialist Forum’s call for a solidarity sit-in and sought to incite (or act like it was inciting) the public against the army. Yet several people noticed the use of Lebanese dialect in these posts, which led many to wonder which intelligence branch was operating the page. It was then that the Socialist Forum’s permit for the sit-in was leaked from inside the municipality, which then threatened the safety of organization’s members whose names were on the permit. In an atmosphere of extreme fear and intimidation, the Socialist Forum decided to canceled the sit-in.
Surrounding these developments was intensity of rumor production and circulation, primarily through social media (Facebook and WhatsApp in particular). What was effectively fake news regarding the intended sit-in by Socialist Forum was mobilized into a heightened sense of Lebanese nationalism. By the climax of the circulation of these rumors, the sit-in was framed as a call by Syrians to publicly insult the LAF. What followed was a literal festival of publically bashing Syrians. This in turn further stimulated the nationalist sentiment as violent images and videos went viral on social media. Several videos showed euphoric mobs of Lebanese men beating up Syrian boys and men.
In one video, a group of five Lebanese men grabbed a young Syrian man by the arm and led him around. One sees a bewildered victim being slapped around by a man who is also filming the act. The cameraman then invites his friends to partake in the beating of the trapped Syrian man as they shout, “Where are your papers?” A slap on the Syrian man’s head is followed by his timid replies of “my papers are at home, master. By god I didn’t do any thing, master.” The fact that this man had no papers on him was reason enough for this Lebanese mob to attack him, kicking and beating him, while shouting at him, “What are you doing out on the street at night? Fuck your sister . . . Do you support ISIS you fucking pimp? Fuck you and fuck ISIS. Are you going to protest tomorrow you pimp?” And another slap. At this point in the video, the Syrian man starts attempting to use his free arm to block the punches from different directions. The video ends with men shouting at their captive, summing up the essence of the nationalist hysteria that swept the country: “Say God and the Lebanese Army! Say fuck ISIS! Say fuck the most important person in Syria!” The insistence on the evocation of the Lebanese army’s superior status by these Lebanese men portrayed the transcendence of the army into a divine savior and sacred cow in the many of the public’s imagination.
This was not the first time Lebanese men mob Syrian men in Lebanon. Bursts of violence against Syrian men can be traced back to 2005, following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and the subsequent withdrawal of the Syrian military from Lebanon. This was also the year that ushered in the wave of political polarization and attendant socioeconomic breakdown in Lebanon which has now reached a critical stages. Yet the Syrians are certainly not the first group to experience the lash of intentionally mobilized Lebanese hyper nationalism. Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have had their share of violence since 1948. It is a kind of violence that is literally pumped into the psyche of resentful Lebanese citizens, diverting their anger toward the other, the “stranger.”
The Intimacy of Nationalist Frenzy
On the morning of Monday 17July, there was Lebanese wartime music playing on the street in our neighborhood. The unusual calm that overtook a weekday morning in Ras Beirut felt like the same kind of quiet the city exhibits in times of war. On the street below the apartment, there was a neighbor’s car blasting the music. The sky blue Kia had one of its front doors wide open. Around it stood men from the neighborhood who had flocked to the music. There they were: the barber, the butcher, and the taxi driver, along with three other men sipping coffee and blowing smoke in silence and anticipation. All six men had their heads craned in one direction, waiting to catch every soundbite of breaking news about the topic that the country was gripped by. The scene did not bode well. I quickly had a flash back to previous periods of war in Lebanon, when the intensity of events overtook the daily routines and their chaotic noise. War—and there was talk of war—certainly unites. However, that particular type of Beirut moment corresponds to particular wars: when Israel attacks Lebanon; or at times when the Lebanese army attacks non-Lebanese residents of the country. People had literally taken the bait and began feeling like and thinking of the country was being at war.
It is worth noting that the Monday I am describing was that which followed the cancellation of the Socialist Forum sit-in, which was originally planned for Tuesday of that same week. It was during the weekend before these two days that we can identify the consolidation of an official narrative that succeeded in diverting peoples’ frustrations and directing it toward the “stranger” within. Then, the minister of interior announced a total ban on demonstrations throughout the country. He asserted that he has given instructions to reject all protest permit requests in order to preserve security and peace. It is worth noting that was all happening at the same time the other protests were planned against the government’s planned increases to various taxes and fees.
On Friday 21 July, I was chatting with the manager of a construction site in one affluent Ras Beirut neighborhood. Being much older than the twelve builders on the site, and the one who had been in Lebanon the longest, Abu Ahmad makes sure each worker is doing his assigned job from seven in the morning until five in the afternoon. As we spoke, Beirut’s sun was hotter than usual. With Friday prayers about to begin, the street had suddenly quieted down. From a distance, I could hear the imam of the nearby mosque. It was then that I realized Abu Ahmad and his team were still working on the construction site even though it was their habit to take their lunch break after coming back from Friday prayers at the mosque. I asked Abu Ahmad why he was not at the mosque for Friday prayers. He looked at me with suspicious eyes, then wiped the sweat from his forehead with the red towel on his shoulder. He went on cleaning his whole face with the towel as if trying to hide his sense of guilt for not attending Friday prayers at the mosque. “Look my brother, we don’t need the headache. May God forgive us for abandoning our duty.” I asked what he meant by not needing any headache, and since when was it a problem to go to the mosque on Friday? My question was followed by a good ten seconds of silence as Abu Ahmad started to get fidgety, moving his towel from one shoulder to another. As I stood there waiting, he said, “Can’t you see what is going on? Syrians have to be careful these days not to arouse any suspicion. Any word we say or any place we attend has to be one of the utmost necessity. It is better that we focus on making our living here.” Abu Ahmad’s sunburned wrinkled face became twitchy. He was visibly uncomfortable as he went on saying, “Look, my brother, it maybe the signs of the end of times and God only knows, a pious Syrian these days could easily be mistaken for an extremist.” Abu Ahmad walked away looking around as if to see if anyone else was listening to our conversation. As he walked away, he said, “May god keep the watching eyes away from us.” This was another indication of how fear-stricken Syrians had become in context of their intensified dehumanization following the Arsal raid.
Structural Scapegoating or Fundamental Racism?
To simply attribute what has transpired as a function of Lebanese citizens being “naturally racist,” as some activists do, is to negate the ongoing systematic campaign to produce a literally permissible body for the public to vent their outrage on. Categorizing all outbursts of violence against Syrians as a function of permanent racism is an over-simplification that overlooks the workings of this systemic campaign. Beyond being morally irreprehensible, the demonization and targeting of Syrians has effectively diverted many Lebanese citizen’s frustration at their own rulers, channeling it toward scapegoating Syrian refugees. This violence against Syrians did not simply surface, it was mobilized, encouraged, and sanctioned through the speeches of Lebanese politicians, the branding of Lebanese public relations firms, the coverage of media outlets, and the manipulation of social media networks.
The influx of Syrian refugees since 2011 has created contradictory sentiments among the broader population of Lebanon. On the one hand, there is an element of genuine human sympathy, which can be identified in numerous individual acts of kindness, generosity, and solidarity. One Lebanese mother opened up her dead son’s grave for a Syrian family to bury their son. He had died in a fire that consumed al-Raed Camp in the Bekaa Valley, and yet all the surrounding villages refused to have him buried in their graveyards.
On the other hand, political elites and forces, along with affiliated media outlets, propagate a dominant narrative that demonizes Syrians. They have actively scapegoated Syrian refugees and literally blamed them for economic, social, and security failures in the country. These discourses are then replicated echoed and contributed to through the daily politics of many individuals and groups, forging a xenophobic and racist popular culture that is anti-Syrian refugees. This scapegoating and dehumanization is not a function of some natural inclination toward racism. Rather, it signals a deep crisis that the Lebanese state and its ruling elite have been facing at least since 2005, which intensified during the 2015 garbage protests. This crisis is simultaneously political, economic, and social.
One must not lose sight of the fact that this most recent wave of anti-Syrian xenophobia has effectively diverted some of the social pressures and political frustrations that were targeting the government in particular but the political elites more generally. This is not new of course. Quite the contrary, these political forces have regularly deflected attention away from themselves, mobilizing parts of the population against the weakest bodies in the country: women, migrant workers, refugees, and the impoverished.
With the public caught up in the nationalist rhetoric of standing with the army and defending the nation, the political elite were able to use the Arsal operations and their aftermath to reset the public agenda. The elites effectively deflated significant (and angry) calls for protests against the government’s plans to pass a controversial tax bill. The public outrage against the government was, according to some analysts, poised to galvanize the public in ways reminiscent of the 2015 protests. Instead, many of those energies now took up alleged threat posted by Syrians and the need to defend the LAF against material and symbolic injury. This is evidenced by the fact that politicians convened a closed parliamentary session and indeed passed the controversial tax bill with little to no public scrutiny as to what was being plotted inside an illegitimate expired parliament. On Wednesday, 19 July, parliamentarians had passed a second legislative bill concerning taxes meant to finance the public sector wage hike. The bill was passed with some amendments. Article 11 of the bill imposed an exit travel fee for those leaving Lebanon through the airport. The new tax bill made all Lebanese citizens, independent of income levels, owe the same percentage as tax. The worker who earns a monthly salary of $400 delivering drinking water now pays the same tax rate as a millionaire who owns luxury apartment buildings on Beirut’s seafront. These new taxes were an addition to a different set of tax hikes approved in March, including an increase in the VAT tax rate to eleven percent.
Syrian and Lebanese: Victims of the Same Social Order
As the battle to “cleanse” Arsal’s hills was waged by LAF and Hizballah, all eyes were fixed on the extensive live coverage of the battle. The dominant public discourse was at its peak when centered in scenario that pitted a hero fighting a villain. The LAF was made to look like everyone’s protecting father and the “Syrians” were dressed in the role of the villain. As the battle intensified in the hills of Arsal, a public relations campaign swept the country. The LAF became a brand. Advertisement companies, who ran ads for banks, restaurants, and various economic sectors now pushed images of military men with sleazy catch phrases about protection.
One day, I was sitting and melting inside a taxi that was moving sluggishly through Beirut’s traffic. While the radio was playing nationalist songs interrupted by breaking news from the battlefield, a scene of wretchedness unfolded outside my passenger widow. In between bumpers, a frantic moth-eaten man was carrying a young girl who wrapped herself around his thin body. The man was holding a yellow money note in his other hand and anxiously waved down a woman across the street from him. His eyes were wide open in astonishment. As he shouted in the direction of the woman across the street, his voice grew more high-pitched. He beseeched her. Shuffling single-mindedly toward the man was a woman who pried herself from her shady spot under a massive rubber tree on the other side of the street from him. She began to zigzag her way between the slow-moving cars. The woman herself was holding an infant while two young boys clung to her as they tailed on her heels.
“Come over, move quickly, bring the children and hurry up. The man in the black car just gave me 10,000 liras [approximately six dollars].” This exhausted woman was merely reacting to her husband’s urgency and astonishment. “Come, come hurry up grab the bag of tissues and go to the man in the black car before he drives away. I’m telling you he gave me 10,000. Look 10,000.” The frantic husband flashed the yellow note for his wife to see. The struggling woman was clearly trying to maintain her composure, but her face failed to hide her embarrassment. Streams of sweat ran down her forehead. She pushed closer to the black car. But the traffic light flashed green and the black car drove away. As our car started to move away the husband’s voice broke out in anguish, shouting at his apparent wife who just missed their chance to perhaps score another 10,000.
While we sat in the car and watched this scene of a Syrian family struggling on the streets selling hand tissues and not yet begging, the taxi driver next to me snapped. “10,000? How nice, did you see that? The Syrians are living much better than us in our own country. Nothing is left for us.” The woman in the backseat and I both remained silent, dumbfounded by the humiliating experience that took place right next to us. After few seconds of silence, the taxi driver went on again, “I drive all day so I can take 40,000 liras home.” To this, I responded with “at least we are still sitting inside the car.” The driver, who was no older than forty, released his clinched hands from the steering wheel wiped his sweaty palms on his jeans and replied “by god you are right, may god never bring us to such disgrace. May god help them get out of the street. What a terrible situation for us all, O god forgive us”. The car drove away from the scene of human devastation and the driver took out his generic pack of cigarettes and offered me and the other passenger to join him. As he lit his cigarette, inhaling deeply, the taxi driver went back to the usual line of resentful complaints cursing and insulting Lebanese politicians: “The thieves….”
“فيما تواصل أنقرة عملها على إدخال الجيش التركي إلى محافظة إدلب، تعمل بالتوازي على استكمال فصول «تتريك» مناطق «درع الفرات» التي تحتلّها منذ آب 2016. وتسعى أنقرة إلى استكمال إجراءات سريعة لتمكين «الحكومة المؤقتة»، كما إلى تشكيل «جيش وطني» يضم مجموعات مسلحة شملتها برامج التدريب والتسليح الأميركيّة، ما يفتح الباب أمام تساؤلات عن حقيقة العلاقة بين أنقرة وواشنطن خلف الكواليس
صهيب عنجريني
بخطى متسارعة تتزايد الهيمنة التركية على مناطق «درع الفرات» التي أضافتها أنقرة قبل عام وبضعة أشهر إلى قائمة الأراضي السورية المحتلّة تركيّاً. ولا تقتصر الهيمنة المذكورة على فرض حضور عسكري، أو أمني، بل تتعدّاها إلى تكريس «التتريك» بوصفه أمراً واقعاً في المنطقة التي تناهز مساحتها ثلاثة آلاف كيلو متر مربع في ريف حلب الشمالي. ويبدو جليّاً أن السياسة التركية المتّبعة في إدارة وتسيير شؤون تلك المنطقة تعمل وفق خطط دقيقة تتوخّى السرعة في تنفيذ سلسلة من الإجراءات العميقة الأثر، في ما تمكن تسميته «تنمية تركيّة مستدامة».
ويبدو لافتاً أن الإجراءات المذكورة تعتمد منهجاً متدرّجاً، يُنتظر أن تُفضي خواتيمه إلى ربط المسارات الاقتصادية والتعليمية والخدميّة بالحكومة التركيّة. ومن بين أحدث الخطوات التركيّة يبرز افتتاح فرعٍ لمؤسسة البريد التركيّة الرسميّة في منطقة جرابلس قبل أيام. ومن المنتظر أن يُقدّم المكتب المذكور خدماتٍ مصرفيّة علاوة على الخدمات البريديّة المعتادة (برق، اتصالات، رسائل، طرود). ومن المتوقّع أن تشتمل الخدمات المصرفيّة (إضافة إلى خدمة الحوالات) على تقديم خدمات صرافة وتحويل بين العملات. وحتى الآن، ما زالت العملة السورية متداولة في مناطق «درع الفرات» جنباً إلى جنب مع الدولار الأميركي والليرة التركيّة.
وربّما كان دخول المؤسسات التركية على خط سوق العملات خطوة تمهيدية للسيطرة على هذا السوق مستقبلاً، لا سيّما في حال أقرّت «الهيئات» المعارضة التي تدير مناطق «درع الفرات» العملة التركيّة بوصفها واحدة من العملات الرسميّة. وتؤكد مصادر إعلاميّة محسوبة على «الحكومة المؤقتّة» لـ«الأخبار» أنّ «هذا الأمر هو موضع بحث من بين حزمة قرارات اقتصاديّة، لكن بتّها مؤجل إلى الوقت المناسب». وتتولّى «الحكومة المؤقتة»، إلى جانب بعض «الهيئات» الأخرى، مسؤولية الإدارة في قطاعات عدّة وبإشراف تركي مباشر. ومن المتوقّع أن تتعزّز مكانة «الحكومة المؤقتة» بفضل جهود تركيّة تسعى إلى تمكينها من الظهور في مظهر «حكومة حقيقية وقويّة». ويأتي هذا بمثابة تنفيذ عملي لمعلومات كانت «الأخبار» قد نشرتها قبل أكثر من عام حول خطة تركية لتحويل منطقة «درع الفرات» إلى «مقرّ لحكومة مؤقتة». وأكدت «الأخبار» وقتها أنّ «أوساط الائتلاف المعارض منهمكة في الاستعداد لدخول حكومة مؤقتة إلى المنطقة الآمنة»، وأنّ هذه الخطوة «جزء من سيناريو الحل السياسي كما وُعد به الائتلاف». ويتضمّن السيناريو «اعترافاً بالحكومة المؤقتة بصيغة مخفّفة، وتمكينها من إدارة المنطقة بالتوافق مع الفصائل المسلّحة المنتشرة فيها» (راجع «الأخبار» العدد 2977). وأوعزت أنقرة في خلال الأسبوع الأخير إلى المجموعات العسكريّة الخاضعة لسلطتها بتسليم بعض المهمات المفصليّة إلى «المؤقتة». ومن بين تلك المهمات مسؤولية إدارة معبر باب السلامة الحدودي (منطقة أعزاز) قبل يومين. وكان المعبر خاضعاً لسيطرة «الجبهة الشاميّة»، وقامت الأخيرة بتسليمه لـ«المؤقتة» رغم أنّ «لواء السلطان مراد» كان قد أنذر «الشاميّة» بوجوب تسليمه المعبر قبل الخميس (اليوم). وتؤكد مصادر سورية معارضة لـ«الأخبار» أنّ «أنقرة وعدت بتمكين الحكومة المؤقتة من كل المهمات الإدارية في مناطق درع الفرات خلال وقت لا يتجاوز ثلاثة أشهر». ووفقاً للمصدر، فإنّ «العمل جارٍ أيضاً على نقل تبعيّة الفصائل العسكرية للحكومة المؤقتة بشكل فعلي، لكنّ هذا الأمر يحتاج إلى وقت أطول لتنفيذه بالصورة المُثلى». وضمن هذا السياق قامت «الشاميّة» أيضاً بعملية تسليم مهمة لمصلحة «المؤقتة»، وهي تسليم «الكلية الحربية» لـ«وزارة الدفاع في الحكومة المؤقتة». ومن المنتظر أن تعلن «الشاميّة» في وقت لاحق «اندماجها الكلي في إطار الجيش الوطني»، والأخير تشكيلٌ يتمّ العمل عليه تحت إشراف تركي مباشر وبتبعية اسميّة لـ«المؤقتة». ومن المعلوم أن «الجبهة الشاميّة» هي تجمّع لعدد من «الألوية» و«الكتائب» التركيّة الهوى، وبقيادة «إخوانيّة». وتسعى أنقرة إلى تمكين «المؤقتة» وتعويمها في وقت سريع، وبالتوازي مع خطوات دخول الجيش التركي إلى إدلب، تمهيداً لضمّ مناطق الاحتلال التركي في إدلب إلى سلطة «المؤقتة» مستقبلاً وعلى نحو مماثل لما تشهده مناطق «درع الفرات». وتمثل «جماعة الإخوان المسلمين» خياراً تركيّاً «ممتازاً» للتربّع على رأس «الهرم» في ريف حلب الشمالي، كما في إدلب مستقبلاً (راجع «الأخبار»، العدد 2392).
«خلِّ السلاح صاحي»
لم تغفل أنقرة ضرورة استقطاب عديد إضافي إلى صفوف المجموعات المحسوبة عليها، كما إلى صفوف «الشرطة الحرة» التي ستعمل تحت قيادة تركية على «نشر الأمن الداخلي». ودارت في خلال الشهور الستة الأخيرة عمليات الاستقطاب والتدريب بشكل مستمر. ومن بين المجموعات العسكرية التي سجّلت نشاطاً كبيراً على صعيد استقطاب منتسبين جدد تبرز «فرقة الحمزة». وأعلنت الأخيرة قبل فترة عن «افتتاح باب التطوع في كليّتها العسكريّة في مدينة الباب». اللافت أن «الحمزة» هي واحدة من المجموعات المسلّحة التي دُعمت بشكل كبير من الولايات المتحدة ضمن برنامج «المعارضة السورية المفحوصة». وليست «الحمزة» وحيدة في هذا الإطار، إذ يحضر عدد من المجموعات التي شملها البرنامج وتعمل حالياً تحت سلطة أنقرة المباشرة في «درع الفرات». ومن بين هذه المجموعات «فرقة السلطان مراد، الفرقة 99، اللواء 51، لواء الحمزة، لواء المعتصم، أحرار الشرقيّة، لواء السلطان محمد الفاتح، الفرقة الشمالية». وتؤكد مصادر عدة لـ«الأخبار» أنّ هذه المجموعات ستكون قواماً أساسياً لـ«الجيش الوطني» الذي يُنتظر تشكيله قريباً. وكانت وزارة الدفاع الأميركية قد لحظت في ميزانيتها لعام 2017 دعم وتمويل هذه المجموعات بميزانية قدرها 250 مليون دولار (راجع «الأخبار»، العدد 2962). كذلك، لم تهمل أنقرة ضرورة تدريب وتسليح مجموعات مختارة وتفريغها لقتال «قوات سوريا الديمقراطيّة» على وجه الخصوص. وانضوت تلك المجموعات في إطار «غرفة عمليات أهل الديار» التي تم تشكيلها في حزيران الماضي، واستقطبت مسلّحين من مدينة تل رفعت وبلدات منغ ودير جمال والشيخ عيسى ومرعناز.
«تتريك» المجتمع
علاوة على كل ما تقدّم، سُجّلت في مناطق «درع الفرات»، منذ أيلول الماضي، مساعٍ ممنهجة لـ«تتريك» المجتمع بأكمله (راجع «الأخبار» العدد 3135). وبات مألوفاً أن تشرف أنقرة على كل شاردة وواردة في مناطق «درع الفرات»، وبشكل علني، عبر حضور والٍ وضباط أتراك ومسؤولين أمنيين لمعظم المناسبات وحفلات التدشين والتكريم وما إلى ذلك. وتشتمل تلك المناسبات على إلقاء كلمات باللغة التركية، كما على تقديم فقرات راقصة من الفولكلور التركي، كذلك تُكتب كل اللافتات والمطبوعات باللغتين التركية والعربيّة. واعتمدت أنقرة نهجاً يمنح المجتمع قسطاً من «التحرّر»، رغم الصبغة الإسلاميّة العامّة، في استنساخ لصورة المجتمع التركي في بعض مناطقه. وكان من شأن ذلك النهج أن يخلّف شعوراً بالراحة في المناطق التي كانت خاضعةً قبل ذلك لسلطة تنظيم «داعش» المتطرف. كذلك، أخذ الجيش التركي على عاتقه التدخل عند الضرورة لوضع حدّ لبعض سلوكيات المجموعات المسلّحة التي تثير حفيظة المجتمع. وعلى سبيل المثال، شنّ هذا الجيش قبل فترة حملة مداهمات في جرابلس وريفها استهدفت «أحرار الشرقيّة». كذلك تعمل «المجالس المحليّة» بإشراف تركي مباشر على تأمين فرص عملٍ بشكل دائم لأبناء مناطق «درع الفرات»، كما على استقطاب السوريين الموجودين داخل الأراضي التركية إلى مناطق «درع الفرات». وأصدرت وزارة التربية والتعليم التركية أخيراً قراراً أعلنت من خلاله «فتح باب التسجيل لمن يرغب من المعلمين السوريين في المدارس السورية والتركية داخل تركيا، بالانتقال للتدريس في المدارس السورية في ريفي حلب الشمالي والشرقي». كذلك حرصت أنقرة على تشجيع الاستثمارات التركية داخل الأراضي السورية، إضافة إلى عقد لقاءات مستمرّة بين وفود تجارية تركية وفعاليات تجارية محليّة. وعُقد أحدث هذه اللقاءات قبل يومين في مدينة جرابلس، بين وفد من غرفة تجارة غازي عنتاب وعدد من التجار المحليين.
تعليمٌ عالٍ وجامعات
تحضر الجامعات على جدول أولويات الخطط التركيّة. ومن بين أشهر الجامعات المفتتحة في هذا الإطار تبرز «جامعة الشام العالمية» التي افتُتحت في مدينة أعزاز بالتعاون بين «هيئة التعليم العالي» ومنظمة ihh التركية. وتضم الجامعة المذكورة أربع كليات «كلية الشريعة والقانون، كلية الهندسة، كلية العلوم السياسية، وكلية الإدارة والاقتصاد»، وتسعى إلى الحصول على اعتماد تركي رسمي. وتحرص على تقديم السكن والطعام مجاناً للطلاب، علاوة على تقديم معونات مالية شهريّة تبلغ 100 ليرة تركية للطالب الأعزب (حوالى 27 دولاراً أميركياً)، و150 ليرة (حوالى 41 دولاراً) للطالب المتزوج. ولا يقتصر نشاط «الجامعة» على الجانب التعليمي، بل تحرص على عقد ندوات ومحاضرات تتناول أهمية «الفكر الثوري» و«الصبر لجني مكتسبات الثورة». ومن بين أبرز ضيوف تلك الندوات يحضر «المنسّق العام لفصائل الثورة السورية» عبد المنعم زين الدين، الذي كان واحداً من دعائم عمليات «جيش الفتح» في حلب. وإلى جانب «جامعة الشام» ثمة عدد كبير من الجامعات والمعاهد، مثل «جامعة باشاك شهير» الخاصة، والتي افتتحت فرعاً في مدينة الباب (ريف حلب الشرقي).
عشائر «بايعت» السلطان
لم تهمل أنقرة أهمية المكوّن العشائري في عدد من مناطق «درع الفرات». وأشرف الأتراك بشكل مباشر على تشكيل هيئات ومجالس عشائرية، وعقد اجتماعات ومآدب لإعلان ولاء تلك العشائر لـ«درع الفرات». وشهد النصف الثاني من العام الحالي تكثيفاً لافتاً على هذا الصعيد؛ ففي حزيران أعلن «تشكيل مجلس ثوري» تابع لعشيرة البوبطوش في منطقة اعزاز. وفي العاشر من آب عُقد اجتماع تحت اسم قبيلة شمّر أكد «الالتزام بدعم درع الفرات»، واجتماع باسم «عشيرة الدمالخة» في الثامن من أيلول في بلدة أخترين بهدف لمّ «شمل العشائر والقبائل لتوحيدها في المنطقة». وقبل أيام أعلنت عشيرة النعيم تشكيل «مجلس شورى» لها في مناطق «درع الفرات»، وأكد الحاضرون «وقوفهم مع الثورة السورية والجيش السوري الحر، ورفضهم قوات النظام السوري وتنظيمي داعش والقاعدة، والأحزاب الانفصالية». أما الرابط المشترك بين كل تلك المجالس والاجتماعات فهو عقدها بحضور ضباط أتراك، وتحت إشرافهم.”
With Russia acting as the key broker in Syria’s reconstruction, it will inevitably position the Syrian government as the main distributor of reconstruction funds
There is a growing debate about reconstruction in Syria in Western and regional policy circles. The European Union has been closely studyingoptions for reconstruction, while some Western (and non-Western) governments are positioning themselves so that they can play a role in the reconstruction process.
Regional states are also stepping up their activities in this regard, since no one wants to be left behind when the time comes for Syria to take a step beyond the current conflict.
But this debate on reconstruction appears to be based on the assumption that the whole of Syria would be equally targeted by post-war reconstruction plans, and that all Syrians would be equitably treated in this process. The reality contradicts this assumption.
Post-war reconstruction debate
Debating reconstruction today is happening at a time when, according to a recent report by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Syria is witnessing its highest wave of violence since the fall of Eastern Aleppo. It is also happening at a time when plans for de-escalation zones have been announced while Russia continues to bombard the same areas it is supposed to be safeguarding. Meanwhile, civilians continue to be collateral damage in the international anti-Islamic State (IS) coalition’s air campaign on Raqqa.
The campaign’s military strategy is similar to that used to liberate Iraqi cities from IS control, which has led to wide-scale destruction of those cities’ infrastructures. The continuation of violence on this scale will inevitably raise the cost of post-war reconstruction even beyond the currently estimated figure of $200-$350bn.
There is a degree of consensus in international policy circles that Russia and Iran cannot bear this financial burden alone, and that international donors will have to be involved to cover the costs.
However donors’ motivations for participating in the reconstruction efforts are not just about humanitarian aid but also about politics. Funding is one way in which to retain a degree of influence in Syria.
With Russia positioning itself to play the role of key broker in Syria’s reconstruction, some regional states have taken steps to keep lines of communication with Moscow open despite political disagreements over Syria.
Individuals with vested interests from across the political spectrum in countries neighbouring Syria are also jumping on the Russian bandwagon. Recent visits to Moscow by Lebanese politicians have included rivals from both the March 8 and March 14 Lebanese political camps.
This political manoeuvring will have a direct impact on how reconstruction plans will be implemented inside Syria. Russia will inevitably seek to have the Syrian government be the key distributor of reconstruction funds.
Although regime-controlled areas have been less affected than opposition-controlled areas in terms of material destruction, it is likely that the Syrian government will funnel most funding to areas considered to be loyalist.
Rewarding loyalists
Foreign individuals with vested interests are likely to turn a blind eye to inequalities of reconstruction fund distribution in order to protect their business interests. Regional actors will follow a similar path in order to remain political stakeholders in the process.
Syrian businessmen who are already part of the political elite have started forming new companies so that they can position themselves favourably in procurement processes for reconstruction projects.
All the above means that implementation of reconstruction plans will not be equitable.
The Syrian regime wants to reward its loyalists through using reconstruction funds to improve their areas, but it also wants to punish those areas whose residents rose against the regime. Continuing to bombard these areas is likely to be followed by denying them access to reconstruction funds.
Neglected areas
With foreign donors and actors having to adjust their political positions in a bid to remain relevant, it is likely that these neglected areas will be left with no one advocating on their behalf.
This is likely to keep thousands of refugees, who had fled these areas to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, abroad as they will have no homes to return to and no realistic prospects of restoring their livelihoods inside Syria. Fewer residents in these areas make them easier for the Syrian government to control, offering another incentive for the government not to make the areas desirable for living.
The debate on reconstruction in Syria has been dominated by the issue of whether or not the West will be able to use reconstruction as leverage over the Syrian regime. But the key underlying issue is that with or without the West, the Syrian regime – and its Russian and Iranian patrons – will be concentrating on reviving loyalist areas and not areas that the regime currently has no control over.
Syria’s demographic composition will be affected by this process, as will the situation of refugees in neighbouring countries.
European countries are considering offering Turkey incentives to keep Syrian refugees on its soil to deter them from crossing into Europe. Meanwhile Lebanese stakeholders are trying to present Lebanon as a platform for Syrian reconstruction, while continuing to benefit from foreign aid sent to Lebanon to alleviate its Syrian refugee situation.
These factors mean that both Syrian loyalist elites and non-Syrian actors are set to gain from the iniquities of implementation of reconstruction plans.
– Lina Khatib is the head of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. You can follow her on Twitter @LinaKhatibUK.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.”
Two days later the situation took dramatic turns. First, news emerged on Monday that Hayat Tahrir Al Sham escorted Turkish forces inside the rebel-held north west, as part of an effort by Turkey to establish monitoring sites for a ceasefire between the rebels and the regime. Then, a day later, an Islamist group ceded administrative control of a Syria-Turkey border crossing to the Syrian opposition’s interim government, in the zone that Turkey established last summer in northern Syria, further east.
The Turkish entry is supposed to be part of the Astana process’s de-escalation plan, agreed with Russia and Iran. De-escalation zones are designed to exclude Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, and only apply to non-jihadi rebel groups. Also, the Russian-sponsored process is envisioned as a way to temporarily de-escalate the conflict, rather than a way for the opposition to build political and governance structures.
But events since the weekend speak of different dynamics at play. In the space of two days, Hayat Tahrir Al Sham turned from being the subject of an imminent military campaign to practically being a partner, in a zone that Russia and Iran want to be free of the former Al Qaeda franchise. The breakthrough for the opposition’s interim government, even though not directly related to the de-escalation zone in Idlib, is relevant to the Turkish campaign in the north west.
The offer was declined, but the opposition continued to push for a way to spare Idlib possible destruction if the regime and its allies turned to it next. Especially since the regime’s recapture of eastern Aleppo, the possible fate of Idlib came to be the centre of speculation. Jabhat Al Nusra increasingly tightened its control over the rebel stronghold, using a combination of clashes and coercion to weaken and subdue its rivals. By July, the group emerged as the unrivalled dominant force in Idlib and surrounding areas.
The Idlib conundrum became even more complex. On the one hand, any offensive against the rebels in Idlib would cause a humanitarian disaster for the two million civilians living there. It would increase pressure on Turkey as a new wave of refugees would head to its borders. On the other hand, the growing presence of what many view as an Al Qaeda organisation troubled Syrians as well as outsiders.
Something had to happen to reverse the influence of Hayat Tahrir Al Sham. Increasingly, it became clear that only Turkey had the leverage to oversee such a process. A Turkish-backed offensive, though, seemed far-fetched: the rebels were too weak to dislodge the group, Turkey was too distracted by the expansion of Kurdish interests inside Syria, and the United States had no partners to carry out such a task. Meantime, Hayat Tahrir Al Sham counted on the brotherly jihadi sentiments within groups like Ahrar Al Sham to prevent a rebel alliance backed by a foreign country.
Against this backdrop, Turkey’s establishment of a protected zone in that region in coordination with Hayat Tahrir Al Sham seemed inescapable. Despite reports of a Turkish intervention, it was clear from the outset that neither Turkey nor Hayat Tahrir Al Sham was interested in a fight. The group quickly established contacts with Turkey and appointed a new coordinator with Turkish officials to ensure continued lines of communication.
In theory, the Turkish presence provides an opportunity to work closely with the group’s rivals to slowly create an alternative, something that never materialised with remote support. Multiple well-placed sources assert that Hayat Tahrir Al Sham is keen to persuade foreign countries that it has indeed abandoned Al Qaeda. One of the its top officials recently revealed that the group dispatched representatives to regional countries in a bid to build friendly ties with them, naming Turkey as one of those countries. This means that Turkey might be in a position to change the group’s behaviour with time.
But the Turkish model in the other zone to the east provides little room for optimism. Warlordism and thuggery continue unabated there. Turkey failed to centralise the operation to prevent the emergence of ragtag militias that extremists could exploit. Talk of armed groups releasing ISIL members for money is all too common in that area. Additionally, that the interim government was willing to leave Jabhat Al Nusra in control of the police and courts does not bode well for the effectiveness of such an effort.
In this context, the Turkish intervention is an opportunity since it promises to ensure the safety of two million people. But it does not solve the issue of Hayat Tahrir Al Sham’s dominance. It only kicked the can further down the road, if not worse.
Hassan Hassan is a senior fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy”
[This article was originally published by The National.]
“Like the country itself, feelings about Syria’s national football team, who play Australia tonight, are complex.
When the Syrian national football team walks onto the pitch in Sydney tonight , Obay Al-Akul won’t be inside the stadium cheering but outside protesting.
For many, the national side’s unlikely progression to the playoffs for 2018 World Cup qualification is less a fairytale and more a continuation of the nightmare that has seen more than 400,000 people killed since the Syrian uprising began in 2011.
“How can I support this team when so many civilians have been killed in Syria,” Al-Akul said on Tuesday. “How can I when too many athletes have been arrested and some of them killed by the regime because they supported the Syrian revolution.”
The result seemed so unlikely for a team ranked 75th in the world from a country ravaged by civil war, that many, like George Salloum from Granville in Sydney’s west, saw it as a rare reprieve from all the “bad news” the country his family migrated from faces.
Salloum was born in Australia, but many of his family still live in Zweitina, a Greek Orthodox Christian village near Homs in the country’s west.
“It’s good for Syria – with what’s happening there you’d think there would be no soccer team,” he said.
“People think the whole country is in ruins, but it’s showing the world we’re still up there and thriving. The country is still up and running, and people are so proud of Syria.”
But is Syria an example of triumph over adversity, or a cynical propaganda display from a despot?
After the Iran match, in an eerie demonstration of the cult of personality that surrounds the Assad regime, the players assembled on Syrian television to praise the dictator.
Among them were Firas al-Khatib and Omar al Somah, two players who before the Iran match had not played for Syria since 2012 in a boycott of the regime.
“First, we thank president Bashar al-Assad for honouring all the players,” al-Khatib said in a broadcast translated to English on Youtube. Al Somah mimicked him: “I thank president Bashar al-Assad for his support of sports and athletes,” he said.
Anas Ammo, a Syrian sports writer who has lived in Turkey for the past five years after fleeing the civil war, said the staged press conference was a display of how the national side has been co-opted by Assad.
“All the people in Syria love football, and six years ago we would be celebrating,” he said. “But this team – this is not a football team – this is a political team. This is a dictator’s team.”
Ammos, who says he’ll be supporting Australia, said the reasons for the player’s support for the national team were also varied and complex.
Some genuinely support Assad, while he believed others, such as al-Khatib, faced political pressure.
“Whatever happens, 12 million Syrians will love me,” he told Fainaru. “Another 12 million will want to kill me.”
Like many, al-Akul, who now lives in western Sydney, believes Assad is using the national team to project an image of normality to the international community.
“He didn’t care about football or sport before this – in Syria we had bad teams, bad funding, now all of a sudden he supports all of that?” he said.
“He wants the propaganda to show the world ‘look, after seven years of war we don’t care, we go to the World Cup qualifier’.”
It’s certainly true that the regime’s support for its athletes is newly found. Ammos believes at least 13 league football players are missing or in government detention. Almost 50 have been killed by government forces. And many have come up against the regime since the 2011 uprisings.
This week the website of the Asian Football Confederation published an interview with Syria’s most capped player, goalkeeper Mosab Balhous, on the country’s unexpected success.
Balhous, 34 and now based in Omar as a coach for Dhofar, predicted the team would beat Australia on the back of the “spirit, desire and determination of the players”.
Jihad Qassab, a former Syria captain who led his club al-Karama to the 2006 Asian Champions League final, died inside Saidnaya military prison in Damascus in late 2016 after being accused by authorities of making car bombs, an allegation he denied.
A second person named George Salloum, this one from Avondale Heights in Melbourne’s north-west, has been watching Syria’s matches on television.
Salloum moved to Australia from Syria 45 years ago as a 19-year-old. Usually he’d be supporting Australia, but he says the sentimental pull of Syria is too great.
“I should be supporting Australia because I have been here all my life [but] it’s human nature, you always have a soft place in your heart for the place that you’re from,” he said. “Plus, Syria are the underdogs.”
But, Salloum said, he understood why many didn’t feel able to support Syria.
“What has happened is a catastrophe in any way you want to measure it, cities and villages have been destroyed and people have been killed on both sides,” he said.
“The hatred and division is so profound it will take generations and generations to heal it.
“I don’t have any grudge against anybody.””
[This article was originally published by The Guardian.]
“Turkey’s discussions with al-Qaida-linked militants ahead of its deployment in Syria’s Idlib province indicate that a wide-scale offensive against the militant group may not be Ankara’s primary objective, according to Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute.
BEIRUT– Turkey on Saturday announced the start of its second major cross-border military operation in Syria, and Turkish troops are now preparing to deploy alongside Syrian opposition groups in a province controlled largely by al-Qaida-linked militants.
The campaign aims to enforce the so-called de-escalation zone agreement in territory currently held by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) alliance in Idlib province, but phase one of the Turkish-led operation may not involve an all-out confrontation with the militant group, according to Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute. While later phases may see more concerted action against the extremists, for now, a negotiated settlement seems to have taken shape, he told Syria Deeply.
“I am told that HTS and Turkey reached a final agreement to establish a Turkish protected buffer zone from the Idlib border village of Atme through Darat Izza to Anadan into western Aleppo,” Lister said. “From what I’m told, HTS agreed at most to leave these areas and agreed at minimum not to interfere with Turkey’s operations in that zone.”
Syria Deeply spoke with Lister, who has spent the past week meeting with Syrian opposition groups in southern Turkey, about Ankara’s strategy in Idlib, the sentiment among participating rebel groups and what this upcoming operation could mean for the Syrian war.
Syria Deeply: Do we know which opposition groups are part of the Turkish-led alliance?
Charles Lister: So far, it seems to be largely a combination of Euphrates Shield forces and a collection of FSA [Free Syrian Army] groups from Idlib, who were previously victims of HTS aggression. Groups like the Free Idlib Army, the remnants of the 13th Division brigade, and potentially some former members of the Hazzm Movement. But my impression is that this is really a Turkish-led campaign and that opposition group involvement will only be secondary. They will primarily be there for support.
Syria Deeply: What is the scope and aim of the Turkish-led operation?
Lister: So far, I don’t think there is any intention to go as far south as Idlib city. I think this would require a much more significant military operation than what Turkey is able and willing to do. At the moment, I think we are looking at phase one, which is for Turkey to pursue its own interests: to protect its borders, deter Kurdish threats, minimize further refugee flows and eventually […] establish some territory in Syria that refugees in Turkey could move back into. In a sense, what we are looking at is Turkey trying to secure its own internal national security interests and to potentially contribute toward further stabilizing at least some parts of Idlib.
Turkey and some of the opposition’s secondary intention in this first phase is to establish a Turkish protected area in northern Idlib, which can be used to start a slow and gradual campaign to undermine HTS. Some of Turkey’s long-term partners in Syria, groups like Failaq al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham, are on board with this strategy. They don’t want to enter a full-scale confrontation with HTS. Instead, they want to more methodically undermine the extremist wings of HTS, particularly to try to encourage defections and divisions within HTS to make it a more manageable competitor rather than an adversary.
From what I’m told, Turkish intelligence has been working on this for some time already, in cooperation with opposition groups previously close to HTS. A spate of recent assassinations are apparently linked to this subversion campaign and, perhaps more importantly, so are a number of recent audio leaks of HTSinternal communications.
Syria Deeply: What is the sentiment among rebel groups in Idlib?
Lister: Every single group that I have met with [in Turkey] over the past week, which spans all the Euphrates Shield groups, all the main FSA groups across Syria, Failaq al-Sham, Nour al-Din al-Zinki brigades and Ahrar al-Sham, have expressed support for Turkey’s intentions in Idlib. The one key area of difference is that groups within the Euphrates Shield and within the FSA seemed more determined to initiate a conflict with HTS, whereas groups like Failaq al-Sham, Zinki and Ahrar al-Sham strongly opposed the idea of a full-scale confrontation because they thought it might potentially strengthen HTS. They advocated instead for a slow and methodical campaign of undermining HTS from the inside.
But, these groups unanimously agreed on [their] suspicion, opposition and hostility toward HTS and particularly toward [HTShead Abu Mohammad] al-Julani. Over the three or four years that I’ve met with all of Syria’s opposition, this was the first time not a single group expressed some element of defense or support of HTS.This definitely struck me over the past few days. Al-Julani appears to have burned a lot of the bridges he built earlier in the conflict but he does still hold several advantageous cards.
Syria Deeply: HTS militants allegedly escorted a Turkish reconnaissance unit into Idlib on Sunday, implying that there have been talks between Turkey and HTS. Have there been any negotiations and do we know what their focus was?
Lister: As far as I am aware, there have been around three or four meetings, including one that took place yesterday (Sunday). In yesterday’s meeting, HTS and Turkey reached a final agreement to establish a Turkish protected buffer zone from Atme through Darat Izza to Anadan into western Aleppo. From what I’m told, HTSagreed at most to leave these areas and agreed at minimum to not interfere with Turkey’s operations in that zone.The idea here would be to replicate what Euphrates Shield looked like at the beginning of the Euphrates Shield operation, which was also preceded by a full Nusra Front withdrawal from areas of Turkish operations.
Syria Deeply: Why would HTS agree to a deal with Turkey considering that it has been a vocal critic of the de-escalation zone agreement?
Lister: I think we need to draw a distinction between what HTS says for its public audience, and what is being done behind the scenes, which is much more murky and political. Al-Julani is not only fearful of an all-out confrontation with Turkey and the opposition, his biggest fear is something catalyzing internal defections from the original Nusra core of Syrian fighters now within the larger HTS alliance.
This core is almost entirely composed of local Syrians who have been recruited into the Nusra Front, which later rebranded into Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and later formed the HTS alliance. Throughout this process, the Nusra core has become even more heavily Syrian, which for al-Julani is an invaluable source of local credibility that protects his forces from attack by most rival opposition groups – as we have seen in 2017. If Turkey or any other opposition faction – working by themselves or together – managed to create an alternative reality somewhere in Idlib, I’m told al-Julani’s biggest fear is that some of those Syrians will jump ship and join them, thereby weakening al-Julani’s credibility on the ground and creating opportunities to isolate him from the revolutionary street. So his greatest fear is internal defections and I think this is why he has channeled so much energy into negotiating with Turkey to prevent a full-blown confrontation.
Syria Deeply: Reports circulated of a series of defections from HTS in the weeks leading up to the campaign, as part of a larger Turkish effort to isolate HTS in Idlib. Which groups have defected and what is the scale of defection?
Lister: The major big loss was the al-Zinki movement. I was told Turkey had some kind of role, potentially with some opposition support, in making this happen. But there have been some other smaller defections from within the HTS core – small HTS sub-factions and local units. The latter are more concerning to al-Julani than anything else, as they represent the partial or possible disintegration of Nusra’s core Syrian structure.
Syria Deeply: There has been a lot of focus on HTS being the primary target of this campaign. What about the Kurds?
Lister: For Turkey, the [Syrian Kurdish] YPG is just as much of a concern and perhaps an even more critical concern than HTS. The fact that Turkey is looking to establish a lookout post or a launching-pad base on Mount Barakat, which overlooks Kurdish-held Afrin, speaks to that.
At the moment, however, I don’t think there is a prospect for a military operation in Afrin. But there is a Turkish effort to exert some kind of influence and a potential deterrent threat on the area to discourage the YPG from moving further into opposition territories. Russia seems to have lent its support to this, which is intriguing.
Syria Deeply: Turkish officials, including the president and prime minister, said that Turkey will cooperate with Russia on the Idlib campaign. What does this mean for the FSA?
Lister: I was actually sitting with all the Euphrates Shield leadership when Erdogan gave this statement. None of them expected this apparent comment of Russian air support and they were all opposed to it. They were genuinely incensed by the idea that Russia could be providing them with support from the air. Let’s see how that plays out. If Russia does provide air support, I think that may cause some problems.
Syria Deeply: Could it be a deal breaker?
Lister: It could potentially be a deal breaker. All the armed groups, who don’t already have a presence in Idlib, would lose credibility there if they entered into an alliance with Russia. It’s pretty well known that the Russians have been bombing Idlib on and off for a long time. So I think active Russian military involvement could be a deal breaker. But I’m not sure if that is going to end up being the case.
The answers have been edited for length and clarity.”
[This article was originally published by Syria Deeply.]
