بواسطة BBC | أغسطس 23, 2017 | Cost of War, News, غير مصنف
“US-led coalition air strikes have killed dozens of civilians in the Syrian city of Raqqa over the past 24 hours, activists and state media say.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported that 42 had died in attacks on areas held by so-called Islamic State.
Anti-IS group Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently said 32 were killed in one district alone.
The coalition said it adhered to strict targeting processes and procedures aimed to minimise risks to civilians.
Its aircraft are supporting a ground assault on Raqqa by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) alliance, which is believed to have captured more than than half of the de facto capital of the IS “caliphate” since early June.
The Syrian Observatory, a UK-based group that monitors the six-year-old civil war through a network of sources, said on Tuesday that 19 children and 12 women were among those killed in Monday’s air raids on the Sukhani and Badu districts.
The figures took to 167 the number of civilians killed in coalition strikes since 14 August, it said.
‘The tolls are high because the air strikes are hitting neighbourhoods in the city centre that are densely packed with civilians,’ Syrian Observatory director Rami Abdul Rahman told AFP news agency.
Hussam Essa of Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently said: ‘Unfortunately, civilians have no way to protect themselves. All they can do is try to hide in whatever shelter they can and avoid going out into the street as much as possible.’
The coalition said it took all allegations of civilian casualties seriously and assessed those deemed credible, but that those made by the Syrian Observatory in recent days lacked ‘specificity and detail making it very difficult to properly assess.’
‘The coalition respects human life and our goal is always for zero civilian casualties,’ it added. ‘Coalition forces take all reasonable precautions during the planning and execution of airstrikes to reduce the risk of harm to civilians.’
Earlier, it said coalition warplanes had conducted 20 air strikes in the Raqqa area on Monday, engaging 13 IS tactical units and destroying 24 fighting positions, a vehicle, a logistics node and communications infrastructure.
At the start of June, the coalition said its 22,983 air strikes in Syria and Iraq since 2014 had unintentionally killed at least 624 civilians. However, human rights groups believe the true figure is far higher.
Airwars, an organisation that tracks allegations of civilian deaths, said that as of 8 August, coalition air strikes were likely to have killed at least 4,487 civilians.
On Monday, UN spokesman Stéphane Dujarric told reporters that it was deeply concerned for the safety of up to 25,000 civilians trapped inside Raqqa, many of them women and children.
Tens of thousands of people had fled the city, but those remaining faced severe restrictions of movement in and out of the city, which had dwindling food and water supplies, he said.
‘The UN stresses again that all parties to the fighting are obligated to protect civilians under international humanitarian law as well as the need for sustained and unhindered access to those who need help,’ Mr Dujarric added.”
[This article was originally published by the BBC.]
بواسطة Hassan Hassan | أغسطس 16, 2017 | News, Reports, غير مصنف
“Last week, some in the Syrian opposition were fired up by reports that Saudi Arabia asked the Syrian opposition to accept Bashar Al Assad’s survival as a fact. The alleged request took place during a meeting between the Saudi foreign minister, Adel Al Jubeir, and the opposition’s High Negotiations Committee.
The Saudi foreign ministry disputed the accuracy of the reports. According to an opposition figure present at the meeting, Mr Al Jubeir merely conveyed to the opposition that the focus of the international community has shifted away from any attempts to bring down the regime and that various opposition blocs should come together to form a broader negotiation front. Opposition members fear that a new Saudi stance would reverse an earlier opposition consensus in Riyadh in December 2015 that Mr Al Assad should leave at the start of a transitional period.
Saudi Arabia and regional allies recently moved to reshuffle the opposition’s structures, to expand the representation of the hawks-dominated and divided HNC and to stem the influence of extremists within the political and military bodies. There is also a plan to bring together the opposition blocs known as the “Cairo platform” and “the Moscow platform”.
Notwithstanding official rhetoric, though, even the most committed of the rebel backers have already moved well beyond the acceptance of Mr Al Assad as a reality. Some countries have taken steps with the assumptions that the regime is not going anywhere. The problem for the Syrian rebels is that they still fail to see the changes, especially in regional countries they consider to be their strongest backers.
When Donald Drumpf was elected the president of the United States, Gulf countries wishing to undercut the growing Iranian influence in Syria considered lifting pressure from the regime in Damascus as a way to reduce its need for Iran. The most damaging policy change to the Syrian opposition is that of Turkey, the rebels’ most critical backer. While many in the opposition continue to see Ankara as a patron of their cause, Turkey’s priorities today often run counter to their interests.
Ankara shifted its Syria policy last year, specifically after it launched an operation to fight ISIL in August. It moved from aggressively backing the rebel cause to focusing on disrupting Kurdish expansion near its borders. It has since worked closely with Russia and Iran – politically in Astana, the Kazakh capital, and militarily on the ground.
Turkey has arguably done the most to steer the conflict into the current political trajectory. Politically, Turkey enabled what can be called the “Astana-isation” of the Geneva process. The Astana Process is a Russia-led platform essentially designed to change the nature of the conversation about the future of Syria, even if the Geneva process remains in place. American officials continue to speak of the Geneva process as the main legitimate international platform. But that is largely meaningless given how the conversation has developed over time. Turkey has been a key factor in this change.
The change in Turkish policy contributed to the rebels’ loss of Aleppo in December last year. Turkey and Iran brokered a deal in four Syrian towns near the Lebanese and Turkish borders that involved relocation of demographics. Ankara also watched as Al Qaeda’s Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, formerly known as Jabhat Al Nusra, tightened its control in Idlib near its border.
Turkey also stood idly by as Hayat Tahrir Al Sham weakened and fragmented Ahrar Al Sham, a previously key Turkish proxy in Syria, and forced it to give up control of a Syria-Turkey border crossing. Turkey also pressured Syrian rebels to participate in the Russia-sponsored Astana talks.
Additionally, Turkey also opposed the participation of opposition fighters in the fight against ISIL under the umbrella of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, and continues to do in key areas like Deir Ezzor. This policy runs counter to the rebels’ interests since the United States insists on working solely with the SDF. Privately, some of these rebels understand that working under the US-backed umbrella will help them liberate and govern their own areas. Publicly, they feel under pressure to reject working with the “enemy” of their supposed Turkish ally.
Before its policy changes last year, Turkey, more than any other country and repeatedly over five years, had promised the opposition an “imminent” plan to establish no-fly zones and bring the full force of the international community to bear against Mr Al Assad. It had also focused its support to Islamist and jihadist elements within the opposition, although not exclusively. These policies raised the opposition’s expectations and strengthened extremists.
Despite such policies, most in the Syrian opposition see Turkey as an ally, mostly due to Turkey’s public support for the opposition’s cause and its commendable support for Syrian refugees. But it is time for the Syrian opposition to realise that Turkey is not in the same place today. It has been a critical enabler of the Russian strategy in Syria for at least a year.
The rebels have lost historic opportunities to expand their influence in territories previously occupied by ISIL. They are now set to lose what remains of their areas if they continue to be tools to their supposed backers in the region. Recognition of the recent policy changes in Turkey, and indeed other countries, could help the Syrian opposition think clearly about its future.”
Hassan Hassan is a senior fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy.
[This article was originally published by The National.]
بواسطة Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi | أغسطس 16, 2017 | News, Reports
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Takes Over Syria’s North
By Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi
“Most media coverage of Syria focuses on two aspects of the country’s civil war: first, the campaign against the Islamic State (or ISIS) in northeastern Syria—including the battle by U.S.-backed Syrian forces to retake ISIS’ de facto capital, Raqqa—and second, the broader Russian involvement in the country.
In northwestern Syria, however, an overlooked but important battle has been taking place, pitting Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a successor to the Syrian al Qaeda affiliate known as Jabhat al-Nusra, against Ahrar al-Sham, a rival Salafist group aligned with Turkey and Qatar. The two have been engaged in heavy fighting for control of Idlib Province, the epicenter of the remaining anti-Assad insurgency, and HTS has acquired important gains. It has seized the provincial capital, Idlib city, and forced Ahrar out of Bab al-Hawa, the main border crossing with Turkey. HTS, in other words, has already scored a major strategic victory against Ahrar and will likely dominate Idlib from now on.
HTS control of Idlib means that the province will increasingly be viewed as a pariah internationally. Although the group claims to be independent, the United States and the international community at large see it as an al Qaeda front. One result of this perception is that while HTS may claim that it can preserve NGO independence, fewer and fewer NGOs will be willing to work in Idlib, leading to a further deterioration in the province’s humanitarian situation. Moreover, the Assad regime and its allies will likely have greater international support for an offensive to retake the province.
But how did this disastrous turn of events come about, and who is to blame for it? Largely, the fault lies with Ahrar itself.
DECLINE AND FALL
With support from outside powers such as Turkey and Qatar, Ahrar has emerged over the course of the war as one of Syria’s most powerful rebel organizations. It possesses networks across the country, but is strongest in the north. Its prominence has made it the subject of polemical debate among Western commentators and policymakers, who are unsure whether to treat the group as a potential ally or enemy. Arguments about Ahrar (and Western policy toward it) have tended to focus on its internal ideological trends: although the group is commonly recognized as Salafist, outsiders disagree as to whether it is a jihadist group little different al Qaeda and ISIS or something more complex—a movement with diverse and evolving ideological strands, some jihadist, some more nationalist or moderate.
Yet debates about Ahrar’s ideology often obscure the bigger picture. The main problem with the group, from the Western perspective, has always been its role as an enabler of jihadists, whether or not its members can be fairly described as jihadists themselves or have changed their position over time. This problem was captured well in a 2014 McClatchy article in which Syrian journalist Mousab Alhamadee profiled Ahrar’s first leader, Hassan Abboud, who was killed in a mysterious explosion in September 2014 and with whom Alhamadee had had extensive interactions. Before his death, Abboud had apparently made attempts to distance the group from al Qaeda, with which it was most notably connected by way of Abu Khalid al-Suri, an Ahrar member who was appointed by al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2013 to mediate between Nusra and ISIS and who was killed in February 2014. But Alhamadee recognized that under Abboud’s leadership Ahrar had worked to bring large numbers of foreign jihadists into the country and undermine local councils and civil society. In particular, under Abboud Ahrar played a significant part in enabling the rise of ISIS in Syria in 2013—cooperating with it in Tel Abyad and Hasakah and standing by while it crushed other groups, such as Ahfad al-Rasoul in Raqqa. These problems came at a time when an early rebel mobilization against ISIS might have prevented it from seizing considerable swaths of Syrian territory.
Abboud’s death and Ahrar’s conflict with ISIS, however, did not lead the group to abandon its close working relationship with Nusra—even after the latter expelled the most important Western-backed group in northern Syria, the Syrian Revolutionaries Front, from Idlib by the end of 2014. In 2015, Ahrar and Nusra together set up and led the Jaysh al-Fatah alliance of rebel groups, which would go on to drive the regime out of all major towns in Idlib in the spring of that year. But the coalition made no further gains, and its advances in Idlib helped provoke the September–October 2015 Russian intervention that has over the last two years helped Assad win victory after victory, including the December 2016 recapture of Aleppo that dealt a major blow to the insurgency. Ahrar’s unwillingness to dissolve Jaysh al-Fatah meant that over time, Nusra was able to embed itself more deeply in Idlib society and grow in strength.Over time, certain political differences between Ahrar and Nusra—such as the former’s desire to distance itself from the al Qaeda brand—grew more pronounced, partially contributing to Nusra’s rebranding, first as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS) and later as HTS. For example, in early 2016 Ahrar rejected the idea of a merger with Nusra on the grounds of the latter’s al Qaeda affiliation, but even after that affiliation was officially dropped (and despite some support for the move within Ahrar) the group’s leadership feared that a merger would hurt its relations with Turkey, its main external backer.The fall of Aleppo, however, put further pressure on Syria’s remaining rebels to unify against the regime. Again, a merger between Ahrar and JFS was floated, but didn’t work out because of Ahrar’s fear of alienating Turkey. Infighting subsequently broke out among the Idlib rebels, leading several smaller groups to seek protection in Ahrar. Meanwhile, JFS, groups that had a close working relationship with JFS, and a pro-JFS faction from Ahrar came together to merge into HTS at the end of January 2017.AFTER AHRARAt the beginning of this year, it seemed as though Ahrar and HTS held roughly equal power in Idlib—a view I myself held at the time. In reality, HTS was strengthening its hand, gaining control of some important supply routes near the Turkish–Syrian border despite Ahrar’s control of the Bab al-Hawa border crossing. HTS, it turns out, was invigorated and determined to expand its administrative capabilities. Ahrar, although it knew it wished to maintain ties with Turkey, was indecisive, unable to formulate a clear stance against HTS. Indeed, it maintained the broader Jaysh al-Fatah alliance thanks to fears of further conflict. As Syria analyst Aron Lund wrote in early February, “The balance of power has now visibly tilted in favor of the jihadis”—that is, HTS and its allies.
Since then, a new round of infighting has begun in which Ahrar has suffered major losses. Conflict between HTS and Ahrar, as noted by Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir, an independent Australian jihadist previously involved in Nusra and JFS, was likely inevitable. The two have been running incompatible projects: both established their own administrative systems in Idlib, including governmental institutions such as courts, which could not coexist in the long run. And between them, HTS is clearly winning. Whatever words Ahrar’s leaders might utter against HTS are now of little use—the group allowed HTS to fester and grow for too long. Recently Ahrar, long one of the dominant groups in northern Syria, has even seen many defections from its own ranks to those of its rival.HTS’ ascendancy in Idlib can only be described as a major jihadist victory in northwestern Syria. That will lead to international pariah status for the province and increase the chances of a new regime offensive. At this stage, the only viable option for reversing this victory would be a direct Turkish military intervention in favor of Ahrar and other rebel factions in Idlib, although there is little incentive for Turkey—which does not see HTS as a direct threat to its territory—to do so. Absent that intervention, the most likely alternative is an ugly regime-backed offensive to retake Idlib, prompting greater refugee flows into Turkey.Such an offensive into Idlib is not necessarily imminent. For now the regime and its allies will still focus most of their firepower on ISIS in the east, hoping to outcompete U.S.-backed forces for valuable natural resources and control of the border with Iraq. In the long run, however, a negotiated compromise between Assad and HTS is unlikely: the latter clearly affirmed in a recent statement that “the revolution continues.” Eventually, however, Assad will attempt to take Idlib, and Turkey and the West may have to prepare for a new wave of refugees.”
[This article was originally published by Foreign Affairs.]
بواسطة Salon Syria Team | أغسطس 12, 2017 | Cost of War, News
علاء حلبي – سوريا
“على الرغم من صعوبة إحصاء عدد ضحايا الحرب المندلعة في سوريا منذ عام 2011 وحتى الآن، إلا أن مؤشرات رقمية دلالية يمكن أن تعطي صورة تقريبية لحقيقة هذا الرقم، الذي دخل المزاد الأممي، ودعايات الناشطين، بين من زاد العدد على مليون ضحية وآخرين قاموا بتحجيمه بدرجات كبيرة.
رئيس قسم الطب الشرعي في كلية الطب في جامعة دمشق الدكتور حسين نوفل قام بتنفيذ إحصاء تقريبي يوضح حقيقة هذا الرقم معتمداً على عدد الضحايا المسجلين في المستشفيات السورية بشكل رسمي، في المناطق الخاضعة لسيطرة الحكومة، حيث قام بإحصاء أكثر من 400 ألف ضحية تم تسجيلها في المشافي السورية.
وقال الدكتور نوفل لموقع قناة ‘الجديد’ إن ‘هذا الرقم هو تقريبي، حيث يصعب تحديد الرقم الدقيق بسبب طبيعة الحرب في سوريا وصعوبة الوصول إلى ارقام موثوقة من المناطق الخارجة عن سيطرة الحكومة’، وتابع: ‘طبعاً إذا حلنا على أرقام دقيقة من تلك المناطق فإن الرقم سيكون أكبر من هذا الرقم بكثير.’
وأشار رئيس قسم الطب الشرعي في جامعة دمشق إلى أن مستشفيات دمشق وريفها تشيع يومياً نحو 40 إلى 50 ضحية، وأنها تستقبل نحو 150 مصاباً، وأضاف ‘ عدد المصابين يكون بنحو 10 أضعاف الضحايا ما يعني أن عدد المصابين جراء الحرب السورية يبلغ نحو 4 ملايين مصاب’
وتقترب هذه الأرقام بشكل كبير من الأرقام التي ذكرها ‘المرصد السوري لحقوق الانسان’ المعارض الذي ينشط من بريطانيا، والذي قدر في آخر إحصاء له عدد ضحايا الحرب بنحو 460 ألف ضحية، إلا أنها تبتعد بشكل كبير عن إحصاءات الأمم المتحدة التي أصدرتها العام الماضي والتي قدرت عدد الضحايا بنحو 250 ألف ضحية.
الأرقام الرسمية الجديدة التي قدمها الدكتور نوفل لا تتضمن تحديد نسب واضحة للضحايا من النساء والأطفال بسبب “صعوبة الحصول على أرقام دقيقة في هذا الشأن”، وفي الدكتور نوفل، إلا أن ‘قسم كبير من الضحايا تم تسجيلهم في مواقع التماس والمناطق التي شهدت أعمالاً قتالية.’
وخلال حديثه، كشف الدكتور نوفل عما أطلق عليه اسم ‘البرنامج السوري’ للتعرف على هوية الضحايا، وأوضح ‘ بداية الأحداث حاولنا تطبيق البرنامج الأميركي الذي تم اعتماده بعد حادثة برجي التجارة العالميين، للتعرف على هوية الضحايا، خصوصا الذين تعرضوا للتشويه بسبب التفجيرات وغيرها، إلا أن البرنامج الأميركي اعتمد على بيانات شركات التأمين، وهي بيانات غير موجودة بالشكل الكافي في سوريا، كما حاولنا تطبيق برنامج تسونامي، إلا أننا واجهنا ذات المشكلة وهي عدم وجود بيانات كافية، لذلك قمنا بدراسة الوضع في سوريا بشكل كامل وقمنا بتصميم برنامج يتناسب مع شكل البيانات المتاحة في سوريا الأمر الذي سهّل بشكل كبير من عملية التعرف على هوية الضحايا.’
في السياق ذاته، اشار الدكتور نوفل إلى أن عدد الضحايا الذي تم جمعه من المستشفيات السورية، يتضمن ايضاً جثث المسلحين والارهابيين الذين قاموا بتفجير أنفسهم، و أوضح “مثلاً في التفجير الأول الذي وقع في دمشق، تم إحصاء وجود 6 جثث لأشخاص مجهولي الهوية لم يتم التعرف عليهم، ولم يتقدم أي أحد للتعرف عليهم فتم أخذ عينات من الحمض النووي لهم، وهم من المسلحين الذين قاموا بتنفيذ الاعتداء وتفجير أنفسهم.’
يذكر أن عدد الضحايا الناجم عن الحرب في سوريا يأتي ضمن سلسلة أرقام توضح حجم “الكارثة” الانسانية التي حلت بسوريا جراء اندلاع الحرب، فبالإضافة إلى هذا الرقم الكبير، تشير إحصاءات وكالة شؤون اللاجئين التابعة للأمم المتحدة إلى أن الحرب خلفت نحو 3 ملايين معاق، و 4 من كل 5 أطفال سوريين لاجئين فقدوا فردا واحدا على الأقل من أسرهم، بالإضافة لأرقام أخرى تتعلق بشكل الحياة في ظل الحرب منها أن 7 ملايين سوري يعانون من انعدام الأمن الغذائي، و 85 % من السوريين يعيشون في فقر.”
قناة ‘الجديد’
بواسطة BBC | أغسطس 9, 2017 | News, Reports
“Former war crimes prosecutor Carla Del Ponte has announced she is quitting a United Nations commission investigating human rights abuses in Syria because it ‘does absolutely nothing’.
She has served on the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria for nearly five years.
Syria’s civil war has left more than 300,000 people dead and displaced millions.
Ms Del Ponte, a former Swiss attorney general, made her name probing war crimes in Rwanda and the ex-Yugoslavia.
‘I am frustrated, I give up,’ Ms Del Ponte told the Swiss newspaper Blick. “I have written my letter of resignation and will send it in the next few days’.
She added that “everyone in Syria is on the bad side. The [Bashar al-] Assad government has perpetrated horrible crimes against humanity and used chemical weapons. And the opposition is now made up of extremists and terrorists”.
Later, she told a panel discussion at the Locarno Film Festival: ‘I am quitting this commission, which is not backed by any political will.
‘I have no power as long as the [UN] Security Council does nothing. There is no justice for Syria.’
The brief of the commission is to investigate human rights violations and war crimes in Syria since the conflict began in March 2011.
It has released about a dozen reports but investigators have never gained access to Syria itself, instead relying on interviews, photos, medical records and other documents.
Ms Del Ponte says she has never seen such crimes before, not in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda.
She and the other commission members have repeatedly called on the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court.
In a statement, the commission thanked Ms Del Ponte for her contributions to its work “and for her personal efforts and interventions to support the cause of justice”.
It wished her well ‘in all her future endeavours, particularly as a tireless advocate for the cause of accountability and bringing perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity to justice’.”
[This article was originally published by the BBC.]
بواسطة Michael Young | يوليو 31, 2017 | News, Reports
[Journalist Ibrahim Hamidi examines how the conflict over Syria’s borders is being shaped by outside powers.]
“Ibrahim Hamidi is a senior diplomatic editor covering Syrian affairs at the Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper in London. For a long time, he was the Damascus bureau chief of the Al-Hayat newspaper, before leaving Syria after the outbreak of the uprising in 2011. Hamidi has considerable experience in Syrian affairs, and has broken a number of highly significant stories on the conflict there. Diwan met with him in early July to discuss the ongoing tensions in Syria for control over the country’s borders, in particular the growing regionalization of the conflict. This led Hamidi to describe the war as ‘no longer a war by proxy, but a direct one between regional and international powers on Syrian territory.’
Michael Young: Recently, an understanding was reached involving the United States, Russia, and Jordan for the creation of a safe zone in southern Syria, near the border with Jordan. This was confirmed by the United States and Russia at the G20 summit last week. You recently wrote an article underlining that Iran, which has allied militias in the area, was excluded from the understanding. Where is the understanding now, and how likely is it to be implemented over Iranian opposition?
Ibrahim Hamidi: Everybody who has met officials from the Drumpf administration has came out with the assessment that Washington’s priority in Syria is combating the Islamic State and reducing the influence of Iran. When chemical weapons were used in Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib governorate last April, the administration said that the Syrian regime was responsible and stressed that it would never work with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
A statement by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on July 5 outlined Drumpf’s goals in Syria very clearly: “First, parties in Syria must ensure stability on the ground … Secondly, parties must work through a political process to achieve a settlement that charts a way forward for the Syrian people. Lastly, Russia has a special responsibility to assist in these efforts.” Tillerson called on all sides, “including the Syrian government and its allies, Syrian opposition forces, and Coalition forces carrying out the battle to defeat [the Islamic State], to avoid conflict with one another and adhere to agreed geographical boundaries for military deconfliction and protocols for de-escalation.”
Washington informed the Russians that it was not concerned with the Astana agreement for establishing deconfliction zones in Syria, or even with the Geneva process on Syria. It stressed that the American concern was purely military—gaining control of territory in eastern Syria and cooperating with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to expel the Islamic State from Raqqa, and with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to do the same in Syria’s south.
Washington was seemingly convinced that its two objectives—the defeat of the Islamic State and the reduction in Iranian influence—could be achieved through military control over southern and eastern Syria. This is where Moscow came in to suggest cooperating with the U.S. in southern Syria in the creation of a deconfliction zone there, especially that President Donald Drumpf was also interested in creating “safe zones” in that part of the country aimed at reducing the refugee problem and combating terrorism. Talks ensued between Russian and U.S. officials in Amman, Jordan, and one of Washington’s conditions for cooperation was pushing Iran and its Revolutionary Guards, along with Hezbollah, away from both the Jordanian-Syrian and Israeli-Syrian borders, to a distance of 30–50 kilometers.
The Americans set up a military base in Tanf, close to the intersection of the Syrian, Iraqi, and Jordanian borders, infuriating the Iranians and prompting them to increase pressure on both the U.S. and Russia by sending more pro-Iranian militias to Deraa in southern Syria. Not only that, but the Iran-sponsored militias went into the countryside of Quneitra, the principal town on the Golan Heights, and starting fighting at a distance of 3 kilometers from the ceasefire line between Syria and Israel.
MY: The United States blocked the advance of Syrian regime forces and allied Shi‘a militias toward its positions in Tanf in May. However, that did not prevent pro-Iran militias from reaching the border with Iraq. Do you feel that the incident showed a U.S. desire to prevent a land connection between Iraq and Syria, or was it simply a limited effort by the U.S. to defend its troops and allies in and around Tanf?
IH: Iran ordered its militias to maneuver around the U.S. base in Tanf, connecting with Syrian regime troops to its north, toward Albukamal, while the Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq did the same in Mosul, connecting with the Iraqi army. This is where Russia started to play a mediating role between Iran and the United States, setting up a new base for itself east of Damascus. When the U.S. bombed pro-Iran militias in the desert in May, Moscow hammered out an agreement between Washington and Tehran, specifically outlining the spheres of influence of each party. The U.S. subsequently withdrew from the Zakf base north of Tanf and Iran responded positively by dismantling some of its military checkpoints from the vicinity of the border town, to a distance of 55 kilometers. This was the first real territorial swap, or agreement, between the Americans and Iranians in Syria, brought about through direct Russian mediation.
MY: Recently, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah said in a speech that a future war with Israel could draw in fighters from Iran, Iraq, and elsewhere. Wasn’t this acknowledgment that Iran seeks to create a land connection between Iran and Lebanon. And, if so, how will this play out against a U.S., Jordanian, and Israeli refusal to see pro-Iran groups deployed near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights?
IH: I agree with you. Clearly Iran wants to preserve its lifeline to Hezbollah, via Iraq and Syria. There are three such vital lifelines for Hezbollah: one runs through the Damascus-Baghdad highway, the second through Damascus International Airport, and the third through the port of Tartous, which is used to transport Iranian arms to Hezbollah.
Some in the West believe that Iran will accept foregoing the Damascus-Baghdad highway and surrendering its presence in the Golan in exchange for accepting an Iranian sphere of influence that stretches from Damascus to the Syrian-Lebanese borders. I see the recent statements of Hassan Nasrallah as testimony of a readiness to accept territorial swaps in principle, in exchange for spheres of Iranian influence, in the hope that this would guarantee Hezbollah’s political and geographic presence in Syria’s future.
MY: Will the U.S. seek to use its forces and allies in Tanf to eventually push the Islamic State out of Deir Ezzor, Albukamal, and Mayadin? Or is this unrealistic?
IH: A race is underway to overrun the Islamic State capital of Raqqa, carried out on the one side by the U.S.-led Coalition and the SDF, and on the other by Syrian government troops and the Russians. The ancient city on the Euphrates would represent the jewel in the crown of the war on terror, which each party is trying to claim for itself.
For now, the Coalition and the SDF have the advantage after U.S.-backed forces took the nearby city of Tabqa and its military base, and are now positioning themselves to march on the oil-rich city of Deir Ezzor on the Euphrates. The U.S. set up the Tanf and Zakf military bases for that purpose, and it is probably thinking of establishing a new one in Shadadi in the countryside of Hasakeh, east of the Euphrates. It hopes to mount an attack against Deir Ezzor with the help of the SDF and the FSA after securing Raqqa. Meanwhile, Syrian government troops, backed by Iran and Russia, seek a similar victory in Deir Ezzor. A quid pro quo might emerge between all sides: the U.S. would be allowed to take Raqqa in exchange for allowing the Russians to take Deir Ezzor—but without pro-Iran forces involved.
MY: If you had to compare Iran’s and Russia’s influence in Syria, which of the two has the greater influence?
IH: The Russians currently have three military bases in Syria—in Tartous, Latakia, and now in the countryside around Damascus. They also have military police stationed in Aleppo, in addition to advisers and experts working with the regime at government headquarters in the Syrian capital. Iran has militias spread all over the country and has already succeeded in creating a “shadow regime” in Syria. For now the Iranians and Russians depend on each other. Moscow is not prepared to send more troops onto the battlefield so long as Iran is doing the job. And even when it did so in Aleppo, it handpicked them from Chechnya rather than Russia proper. It will tap into other resources in the future, perhaps bringing in troops from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The Russians have tried, however, more than once actually, to distance themselves from Iran. But that is easier said than done.
One of the reasons why the U.S. suggested a “safe zone” in southern Syria was to test Russia’s willingness and ability to distance itself from Iran. There is little doubt that the longer the battles continue, the greater Iran’s influence will become. Iran is so entrenched in the Syrian battlefield that it could still wield tremendous influence, whether the war continues or whether a political settlement is reached. Even if a joint military council were created between the regime and the armed opposition, Iran would still have a say in what happens through the participation of the militias it controls.
MY: Some have assumed that Russia can be used to limit Iran’s reach in Syria. Is this realistic?
IH: I know that some people are betting on a “Russian Syria” rather than on an Iranian one, but I think this is difficult to achieve. The Iranians have invested plenty of money, arms, and manpower in Syria, and will not walk away so easily. Some are speculating that the Iranians will milk the Russian presence in Syria, just as they did that of the Americans in Iraq. This is something else that would be difficult to achieve, due to the different nature of the two conflicts. However, it is worth keeping an eye on such a possibility.
MY: How do you see the struggle for influence over Syria’s borders playing out in the coming six months?
IH: As the war approaches its seventh anniversary next March, I think that the country that many Syrians hoped to create when they took to the streets—one that was secular, united, and democratic—has become an illusion. The Syrian people no longer are deciding on their own future. Their fate is fully in the hands of others. There are eight U.S. military airports and bases in Syria at present, and these are likely to increase, in addition to three major Russian military airports. The Turkish, Jordanian, and Israeli armies are all present in Syria today, in addition to the U.S.-led Coalition against the Islamic State. This is no longer a war by proxy, but a direct one between regional and international powers on Syrian territory. Having said that, neither side will be able to turn the military situation fully to its advantage, but each is capable of preventing the others from a full and clean victory.
Tillerson said something notable on July 5, following a cabinet-level meeting on Syria at the White House on June 30. He called upon all parties “to adhere to agreed geographical boundaries.” Therefore, effectively, we are seeing the rapid transformation of Syria into pockets of foreign influence—American, Russian, Iranian, Jordanian, Turkish, and Israeli. Iran has secured its share stretching from Damascus to Lebanon, and through a security and military belt around the Syrian capital. The Russians control a zone in western Syria, as well as the skies west of the Euphrates, while the Americans control everything east of the river. These zones of influence will remain, although we hope that their status remains temporary until a comprehensive accord is reached—a Dayton Agreement for Syria.”
[This article was originally published by Carnegie Middle East Center.]
