“For months, analysts of the Syrian conflict have spoken of a “race” for the province of Deir al-Zor in eastern Syria and of what they describe as a carving out by external powers of competing zones of control around the country. Many assume that the U.S. administration intends to use territorial gains by the local armed groups it supports as leverage to extract a more favourable political deal from Russia and the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Others have less faith in the U.S. administration’s intentions, but seek nonetheless to persuade it that using leverage is feasible, albeit in pursuit of more modest political objectives such as bolstering what is left of the moderate Syrian opposition ahead of a peace deal they assume will eventually be reached.
But there is no evidence that the U.S. has any residual commitment to engineering political change in Syria, or indeed has a Syria policy at all. In its absence, Syria’s coming battles will lead to a very different kind of outcome than the one envisaged in the Geneva communiqué of June 2012, or even in the Vienna framework of November 2015. Despite certain differences, both envisaged a diplomatic process leading to formal power-sharing between the Syrian government and opposition under international auspices. But there will be no power-sharing or political transition in Damascus, nor will Assad leave office.
Rather, the main impact of the Astana talks sponsored by Russia, if not their deliberate design, has been to draw substantial parts of the armed opposition – reluctantly, but ineluctably – onto a path culminating in reintegration within the Syrian state – under its present management. Speaking at an international forum on October 19, Russian President Vladimir Putin was frank: “once the de-escalation zones are in place, the people who control these zones would start making contact with Damascus, with the government.”
These bridges have already been crossed. Instead, Syria’s coming battles will determine the final relationship between the central government in Damascus and the Syrian Kurds, even when this is not their immediate or sole purpose.
The first battle is already underway, to expel the Islamic State from its remaining strongholds along the middle Euphrates River valley in Deir al-Zor. This is where many observers believe a race is on, as the U.S. supposedly seeks to control the border region in order to prevent Iran from building a much-hyped, but bogus, “land corridor” to the Mediterranean. Certainly, the U.S. is supporting the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces to advance in this region, following the failure of its earlier attempt to build a viable opposition force that could attack the Islamist State from bases in Syria’s southern desert. But the regime’s capture on October 14 of al-Mayadin to the south of Deir al-Zor city blocks the Syrian Democratic Forces from advancing further, while positioning its own forces to fight their way, with Russian air support, to Albu Kamal at the southern end of the Euphrates valley over coming weeks and months. The U.S. will not contest the outcome.
Second is the deferred battle for Idlib province in northwest Syria, which has been proclaimed repeatedly but has yet to take place. Clearly paramount here is the Turkish government’s determination to prevent the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party, an affiliate of the banned Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), from creating what President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan calls “a terror corridor that begins in Afrin and goes to the Mediterranean.” But speculation that Turkey will take on the mission of pacifying Idlib, where the jihadist coalition Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham mostly holds sway, in return for being granted a free hand to eliminate the Kurdish enclave in Afrin is misplaced.
Despite talk by Erdoğan of a “serious military operation” in Syria, the Turkish armed forces will not undertake major ground combat against entrenched adversaries in either Idlib or Afrin without close air support, the lack of which resulted in heavy casualties among their troops during the advance to al-Bab north of Aleppo earlier this year. But while Russia has offered to use its air power to protect Turkish truce observers deploying to Idlib, it does not allow the Turkish air force to fly combat missions in Syrian air space. In any case, by deploying in Idlib under the Astana de-escalation agreement Turkey has effectively ceded the option for unilateral military intervention there. In any case, with Afrin fully encircled by Turkish or allied Syrian opposition forces, Turkey can postpone major action, including against Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which will be contained rather than confronted until further notice.
The timing and direction of military operations in Idlib now hinges on the unfolding of Syria’s third battle: the inevitable struggle between the regime and the Kurds over the degree of political autonomy they may enjoy once the Syrian conflict ends. Certainly, the success of the Syrian Democratic Forces in wresting Raqqa and territory further east from the Islamic State strengthens the hand of the Democratic Union Party, which directly controls their large Kurdish component. But its ability to bargain is severely constrained by an unfavorable geopolitical landscape. The independence referendum held on September 25 in neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan has only heightened Turkish threat perceptions of Kurdish intentions in Syria, while making it harder for Western governments to espouse their cause. Tellingly, Syrian government officials condemned the referendum as a “separatist” act and congratulated the Iraqi government and armed forces for seizing control of the disputed city of Kirkuk from the Kurdish Regional Government on October 16-17 and thus “preserving the unity of Iraq’s territory and people.”
The implicit threat to forcibly reassert Syrian government control over areas currently held by the Syrian Democratic Forces is unmistakable. The regime may only demand the handover of Raqqa and other non-Kurdish areas initially, but could easily expand this to include Qamishli and the provincial capital of Hasakeh, and border crossings such as Tal Abyad in the heart of the Kurdish region. The threat will not materialize so long as the U.S. is still working to defeat the Islamic State, but once this mission is accomplished it will not step in to protect former allies. In a recent op-ed, former U.S. ambassador to Syria Robert Ford was blunt: the U.S. “will have to abandon any hopes of supporting a separate Kurdish region” in the face of government determination “to take back the entire country.”
Rojava – western Kurdistan – will be largely on its own. Military confrontation between the Assad regime and the Kurds is not inevitable, but a peaceful outcome depends largely on Russia’s ability to bridge the gap between the maximum administrative autonomy the regime is willing to grant the Kurds, and the minimum political autonomy they demand. This is a tall order, given the regime’s hostility to decentralization, which Russia has advocated since early 2016 as a framework for resolving such differences. Any formula reached must also allay Turkey’s fears of Kurdish autonomy, if it is to acquiesce in the elimination of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib, encourage the Syrian armed opposition to pursue the Astana process to its logical conclusion of reintegration within the central state, and pull out of Syria.
These challenges may be why Putin announced a “rough plan” in his speech of October 19 to convene “a congress of the Syrian people, bringing together all ethnic and religious groups, the government and the opposition.” By framing a political settlement as the result of a national accord reached among Syrians, his proposal adopts a central narrative of the regime, which has consistently disputed the need for UN mediation and a diplomatic solution to the conflict. At the same time, Putin’s reference to the “positive impact” of countries such as Saudi Arabia suggests he hopes to use economic incentives to make it easier to square the difficult circle of Kurdish political autonomy. Lending credence to this interpretation, a Saudi minister met Syrian Democratic Forces officials immediately after the liberation of Raqqa to discuss reconstruction of the city.
These various battle scenarios will not unfold neatly or in clear sequence. Russia lacks the leverage to compel the Assad regime accept a political settlement on terms it fundamentally opposes, but will seek to restrain it from going to war with the Syrian Democratic Forces for as long as possible. This will be easy so long as the regime is still fighting to retake the Euphrates Valley from the Islamic State, after which it may pivot to confronting Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib. But at some stage in the coming year it will resort to its familiar tactic of conducting political dialogue through direct military pressure in relation to Rojava. At that time the Syrian Democratic Forces may find themselves over-extended geographically. As seriously, they will likely face challenges to their internal cohesion from Arab components or the Democratic Union Party’s Kurdish rivals as the de facto convergence of anti-Kurdish interests between Turkey and the regime prompts political realignments across Syria’s north.
The risk is high. The Democratic Union Party must learn from the mistakes of the independence referendum in neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan if it is salvage hope of winning meaningful autonomy in Syria.
“A US-backed alliance of Syrian fighters says it has taken full control of Raqqa, ending three years of rule in the city by so-called Islamic State.
Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) spokesman Talal Sello said the fighting was over after a four-month assault.
Clearing operations were now under way to uncover any jihadist sleeper cells and remove landmines, he added.
However, a US military spokesman later said he could only confirm that about 90% of the city had been cleared.
Islamic State (IS) made Raqqa the headquarters of its self-styled “caliphate” in early 2014, implementing an extreme interpretation of Islamic law and using beheadings, crucifixions and torture to terrorise residents who opposed its rule.
The city also became home to thousands of jihadists from around the world who heeded a call to migrate there by IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
How did the Raqqa offensive unfold?
The SDF was formed by the Kurdish Popular Protection Units (YPG) militia two years ago along with a number of smaller, Arab factions. It says it is not aligned with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad or the rebels seeking to overthrow him.
With the help of US-led coalition air strikes, weapons and special forces, SDF fighters have driven IS out of more than 8,000 sq km (3,100 sq miles) of territory.
Last November, they began a major operation to capture Raqqa. They slowly encircled the city before breaking through IS defences on the outskirts in June.
On Tuesday morning, the SDF cleared the last two major IS positions in Raqqa – the municipal stadium and the National Hospital.
Reuters news agency reported that fighters raised the YPG flag inside the stadium, celebrated in the streets and chanted slogans from their vehicles.
Dozens of foreign militants were believed to have made their last stand in the stadium, while 22 were reportedly killed in the final attack on the hospital.
Up to 300 militants were thought to be holding out on Sunday, after Syrian jihadists and their families were evacuated along with 3,500 civilians under a deal negotiated by the Raqqa Civil Council and local Arab tribal elders.
“Everything is finished in Raqqa, our forces have taken full control of Raqqa,” Mr Sello told AFP news agency on Tuesday afternoon.
“The military operations in Raqqa have finished, but there are clearing operations now under way to uncover any sleeper cells there might be and remove mines.”
Mr Sello said an official statement declaring victory in the city would be made soon.
However, the coalition would only say that the battle was “near its end”, with spokesman Col Ryan Dillon estimating that about 100 militants were left in Raqqa.
What has been the human cost?
There has been a “staggering loss of civilian life” in Raqqa, according to UN war crimes investigators.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, a UK-based monitoring group, reported on Tuesday that at least 3,250 people had been killed in the past five months, among them 1,130 civilians. Hundreds more were missing and might be buried under destroyed buildings, it said.
The anti-IS activist group, Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently, said more than 1,873 civilians had been killed.
Activists said many of the civilian casualties were the result of the intense US-led air strikes that helped the SDF advance, though the coalition said it had adhered to strict targeting processes and procedures aimed to minimise risks to civilians.
IS militants also used civilians as human shields and shot those trying to flee.
The UN said last week that about 8,000 people were still trapped in Raqqa, and that almost 270,000 civilians had been displaced since April.
Air strikes, shelling and clashes on the ground have also destroyed Raqqa’s civilian infrastructure and homes. A local councillor recently estimated that at least half of the city was destroyed.
Save the Children warned that while the battle was now over the humanitarian crisis was continuing, with the displaced in critical need of aid and camps “bursting at the seams”.
“Conditions in the camps are miserable, and families do not have enough food, water or medicine. But it is not yet safe for them to go back, and many of their homes are now turned to rubble,” said the charity’s Syria director, Sonia Khush.
What is left of IS in Syria?
The jihadist group still has a number of footholds, the largest of which runs along the Euphrates river valley in the south-eastern province of Deir al-Zour.
However, the SDF and Syrian government forces – which are backed by Russian air strikes and fighters from Lebanon’s Hezbollah movement – have launched separate offensives in the province with the aim of taking control of a key crossing on the border with Iraq.
IS has also suffered a series of defeats in recent months to Iraqi government forces, who are advancing along the Euphrates on the other side of the border.
The US-led coalition said on Tuesday that forces it supported had reclaimed 93,790 sq km of Iraqi and Syrian territory seized by IS in 2014 and freed 6.6 million people from jihadist control.”
[This article was originally published by the BBC.]
With Russia acting as the key broker in Syria’s reconstruction, it will inevitably position the Syrian government as the main distributor of reconstruction funds
There is a growing debate about reconstruction in Syria in Western and regional policy circles. The European Union has been closely studyingoptions for reconstruction, while some Western (and non-Western) governments are positioning themselves so that they can play a role in the reconstruction process.
Regional states are also stepping up their activities in this regard, since no one wants to be left behind when the time comes for Syria to take a step beyond the current conflict.
But this debate on reconstruction appears to be based on the assumption that the whole of Syria would be equally targeted by post-war reconstruction plans, and that all Syrians would be equitably treated in this process. The reality contradicts this assumption.
Post-war reconstruction debate
Debating reconstruction today is happening at a time when, according to a recent report by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Syria is witnessing its highest wave of violence since the fall of Eastern Aleppo. It is also happening at a time when plans for de-escalation zones have been announced while Russia continues to bombard the same areas it is supposed to be safeguarding. Meanwhile, civilians continue to be collateral damage in the international anti-Islamic State (IS) coalition’s air campaign on Raqqa.
The campaign’s military strategy is similar to that used to liberate Iraqi cities from IS control, which has led to wide-scale destruction of those cities’ infrastructures. The continuation of violence on this scale will inevitably raise the cost of post-war reconstruction even beyond the currently estimated figure of $200-$350bn.
There is a degree of consensus in international policy circles that Russia and Iran cannot bear this financial burden alone, and that international donors will have to be involved to cover the costs.
However donors’ motivations for participating in the reconstruction efforts are not just about humanitarian aid but also about politics. Funding is one way in which to retain a degree of influence in Syria.
With Russia positioning itself to play the role of key broker in Syria’s reconstruction, some regional states have taken steps to keep lines of communication with Moscow open despite political disagreements over Syria.
Individuals with vested interests from across the political spectrum in countries neighbouring Syria are also jumping on the Russian bandwagon. Recent visits to Moscow by Lebanese politicians have included rivals from both the March 8 and March 14 Lebanese political camps.
This political manoeuvring will have a direct impact on how reconstruction plans will be implemented inside Syria. Russia will inevitably seek to have the Syrian government be the key distributor of reconstruction funds.
Although regime-controlled areas have been less affected than opposition-controlled areas in terms of material destruction, it is likely that the Syrian government will funnel most funding to areas considered to be loyalist.
Rewarding loyalists
Foreign individuals with vested interests are likely to turn a blind eye to inequalities of reconstruction fund distribution in order to protect their business interests. Regional actors will follow a similar path in order to remain political stakeholders in the process.
Syrian businessmen who are already part of the political elite have started forming new companies so that they can position themselves favourably in procurement processes for reconstruction projects.
All the above means that implementation of reconstruction plans will not be equitable.
The Syrian regime wants to reward its loyalists through using reconstruction funds to improve their areas, but it also wants to punish those areas whose residents rose against the regime. Continuing to bombard these areas is likely to be followed by denying them access to reconstruction funds.
Neglected areas
With foreign donors and actors having to adjust their political positions in a bid to remain relevant, it is likely that these neglected areas will be left with no one advocating on their behalf.
This is likely to keep thousands of refugees, who had fled these areas to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, abroad as they will have no homes to return to and no realistic prospects of restoring their livelihoods inside Syria. Fewer residents in these areas make them easier for the Syrian government to control, offering another incentive for the government not to make the areas desirable for living.
The debate on reconstruction in Syria has been dominated by the issue of whether or not the West will be able to use reconstruction as leverage over the Syrian regime. But the key underlying issue is that with or without the West, the Syrian regime – and its Russian and Iranian patrons – will be concentrating on reviving loyalist areas and not areas that the regime currently has no control over.
Syria’s demographic composition will be affected by this process, as will the situation of refugees in neighbouring countries.
European countries are considering offering Turkey incentives to keep Syrian refugees on its soil to deter them from crossing into Europe. Meanwhile Lebanese stakeholders are trying to present Lebanon as a platform for Syrian reconstruction, while continuing to benefit from foreign aid sent to Lebanon to alleviate its Syrian refugee situation.
These factors mean that both Syrian loyalist elites and non-Syrian actors are set to gain from the iniquities of implementation of reconstruction plans.
– Lina Khatib is the head of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. You can follow her on Twitter @LinaKhatibUK.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.”
Two days later the situation took dramatic turns. First, news emerged on Monday that Hayat Tahrir Al Sham escorted Turkish forces inside the rebel-held north west, as part of an effort by Turkey to establish monitoring sites for a ceasefire between the rebels and the regime. Then, a day later, an Islamist group ceded administrative control of a Syria-Turkey border crossing to the Syrian opposition’s interim government, in the zone that Turkey established last summer in northern Syria, further east.
The Turkish entry is supposed to be part of the Astana process’s de-escalation plan, agreed with Russia and Iran. De-escalation zones are designed to exclude Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, and only apply to non-jihadi rebel groups. Also, the Russian-sponsored process is envisioned as a way to temporarily de-escalate the conflict, rather than a way for the opposition to build political and governance structures.
But events since the weekend speak of different dynamics at play. In the space of two days, Hayat Tahrir Al Sham turned from being the subject of an imminent military campaign to practically being a partner, in a zone that Russia and Iran want to be free of the former Al Qaeda franchise. The breakthrough for the opposition’s interim government, even though not directly related to the de-escalation zone in Idlib, is relevant to the Turkish campaign in the north west.
The offer was declined, but the opposition continued to push for a way to spare Idlib possible destruction if the regime and its allies turned to it next. Especially since the regime’s recapture of eastern Aleppo, the possible fate of Idlib came to be the centre of speculation. Jabhat Al Nusra increasingly tightened its control over the rebel stronghold, using a combination of clashes and coercion to weaken and subdue its rivals. By July, the group emerged as the unrivalled dominant force in Idlib and surrounding areas.
The Idlib conundrum became even more complex. On the one hand, any offensive against the rebels in Idlib would cause a humanitarian disaster for the two million civilians living there. It would increase pressure on Turkey as a new wave of refugees would head to its borders. On the other hand, the growing presence of what many view as an Al Qaeda organisation troubled Syrians as well as outsiders.
Something had to happen to reverse the influence of Hayat Tahrir Al Sham. Increasingly, it became clear that only Turkey had the leverage to oversee such a process. A Turkish-backed offensive, though, seemed far-fetched: the rebels were too weak to dislodge the group, Turkey was too distracted by the expansion of Kurdish interests inside Syria, and the United States had no partners to carry out such a task. Meantime, Hayat Tahrir Al Sham counted on the brotherly jihadi sentiments within groups like Ahrar Al Sham to prevent a rebel alliance backed by a foreign country.
Against this backdrop, Turkey’s establishment of a protected zone in that region in coordination with Hayat Tahrir Al Sham seemed inescapable. Despite reports of a Turkish intervention, it was clear from the outset that neither Turkey nor Hayat Tahrir Al Sham was interested in a fight. The group quickly established contacts with Turkey and appointed a new coordinator with Turkish officials to ensure continued lines of communication.
In theory, the Turkish presence provides an opportunity to work closely with the group’s rivals to slowly create an alternative, something that never materialised with remote support. Multiple well-placed sources assert that Hayat Tahrir Al Sham is keen to persuade foreign countries that it has indeed abandoned Al Qaeda. One of the its top officials recently revealed that the group dispatched representatives to regional countries in a bid to build friendly ties with them, naming Turkey as one of those countries. This means that Turkey might be in a position to change the group’s behaviour with time.
But the Turkish model in the other zone to the east provides little room for optimism. Warlordism and thuggery continue unabated there. Turkey failed to centralise the operation to prevent the emergence of ragtag militias that extremists could exploit. Talk of armed groups releasing ISIL members for money is all too common in that area. Additionally, that the interim government was willing to leave Jabhat Al Nusra in control of the police and courts does not bode well for the effectiveness of such an effort.
In this context, the Turkish intervention is an opportunity since it promises to ensure the safety of two million people. But it does not solve the issue of Hayat Tahrir Al Sham’s dominance. It only kicked the can further down the road, if not worse.
Hassan Hassan is a senior fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy”
[This article was originally published by The National.]
“Like the country itself, feelings about Syria’s national football team, who play Australia tonight, are complex.
When the Syrian national football team walks onto the pitch in Sydney tonight , Obay Al-Akul won’t be inside the stadium cheering but outside protesting.
For many, the national side’s unlikely progression to the playoffs for 2018 World Cup qualification is less a fairytale and more a continuation of the nightmare that has seen more than 400,000 people killed since the Syrian uprising began in 2011.
“How can I support this team when so many civilians have been killed in Syria,” Al-Akul said on Tuesday. “How can I when too many athletes have been arrested and some of them killed by the regime because they supported the Syrian revolution.”
The result seemed so unlikely for a team ranked 75th in the world from a country ravaged by civil war, that many, like George Salloum from Granville in Sydney’s west, saw it as a rare reprieve from all the “bad news” the country his family migrated from faces.
Salloum was born in Australia, but many of his family still live in Zweitina, a Greek Orthodox Christian village near Homs in the country’s west.
“It’s good for Syria – with what’s happening there you’d think there would be no soccer team,” he said.
“People think the whole country is in ruins, but it’s showing the world we’re still up there and thriving. The country is still up and running, and people are so proud of Syria.”
But is Syria an example of triumph over adversity, or a cynical propaganda display from a despot?
After the Iran match, in an eerie demonstration of the cult of personality that surrounds the Assad regime, the players assembled on Syrian television to praise the dictator.
Among them were Firas al-Khatib and Omar al Somah, two players who before the Iran match had not played for Syria since 2012 in a boycott of the regime.
“First, we thank president Bashar al-Assad for honouring all the players,” al-Khatib said in a broadcast translated to English on Youtube. Al Somah mimicked him: “I thank president Bashar al-Assad for his support of sports and athletes,” he said.
Anas Ammo, a Syrian sports writer who has lived in Turkey for the past five years after fleeing the civil war, said the staged press conference was a display of how the national side has been co-opted by Assad.
“All the people in Syria love football, and six years ago we would be celebrating,” he said. “But this team – this is not a football team – this is a political team. This is a dictator’s team.”
Ammos, who says he’ll be supporting Australia, said the reasons for the player’s support for the national team were also varied and complex.
Some genuinely support Assad, while he believed others, such as al-Khatib, faced political pressure.
“Whatever happens, 12 million Syrians will love me,” he told Fainaru. “Another 12 million will want to kill me.”
Like many, al-Akul, who now lives in western Sydney, believes Assad is using the national team to project an image of normality to the international community.
“He didn’t care about football or sport before this – in Syria we had bad teams, bad funding, now all of a sudden he supports all of that?” he said.
“He wants the propaganda to show the world ‘look, after seven years of war we don’t care, we go to the World Cup qualifier’.”
It’s certainly true that the regime’s support for its athletes is newly found. Ammos believes at least 13 league football players are missing or in government detention. Almost 50 have been killed by government forces. And many have come up against the regime since the 2011 uprisings.
This week the website of the Asian Football Confederation published an interview with Syria’s most capped player, goalkeeper Mosab Balhous, on the country’s unexpected success.
Balhous, 34 and now based in Omar as a coach for Dhofar, predicted the team would beat Australia on the back of the “spirit, desire and determination of the players”.
Jihad Qassab, a former Syria captain who led his club al-Karama to the 2006 Asian Champions League final, died inside Saidnaya military prison in Damascus in late 2016 after being accused by authorities of making car bombs, an allegation he denied.
A second person named George Salloum, this one from Avondale Heights in Melbourne’s north-west, has been watching Syria’s matches on television.
Salloum moved to Australia from Syria 45 years ago as a 19-year-old. Usually he’d be supporting Australia, but he says the sentimental pull of Syria is too great.
“I should be supporting Australia because I have been here all my life [but] it’s human nature, you always have a soft place in your heart for the place that you’re from,” he said. “Plus, Syria are the underdogs.”
But, Salloum said, he understood why many didn’t feel able to support Syria.
“What has happened is a catastrophe in any way you want to measure it, cities and villages have been destroyed and people have been killed on both sides,” he said.
“The hatred and division is so profound it will take generations and generations to heal it.
“I don’t have any grudge against anybody.””
[This article was originally published by The Guardian.]
“Turkey’s discussions with al-Qaida-linked militants ahead of its deployment in Syria’s Idlib province indicate that a wide-scale offensive against the militant group may not be Ankara’s primary objective, according to Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute.
BEIRUT– Turkey on Saturday announced the start of its second major cross-border military operation in Syria, and Turkish troops are now preparing to deploy alongside Syrian opposition groups in a province controlled largely by al-Qaida-linked militants.
The campaign aims to enforce the so-called de-escalation zone agreement in territory currently held by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) alliance in Idlib province, but phase one of the Turkish-led operation may not involve an all-out confrontation with the militant group, according to Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute. While later phases may see more concerted action against the extremists, for now, a negotiated settlement seems to have taken shape, he told Syria Deeply.
“I am told that HTS and Turkey reached a final agreement to establish a Turkish protected buffer zone from the Idlib border village of Atme through Darat Izza to Anadan into western Aleppo,” Lister said. “From what I’m told, HTS agreed at most to leave these areas and agreed at minimum not to interfere with Turkey’s operations in that zone.”
Syria Deeply spoke with Lister, who has spent the past week meeting with Syrian opposition groups in southern Turkey, about Ankara’s strategy in Idlib, the sentiment among participating rebel groups and what this upcoming operation could mean for the Syrian war.
Syria Deeply: Do we know which opposition groups are part of the Turkish-led alliance?
Charles Lister: So far, it seems to be largely a combination of Euphrates Shield forces and a collection of FSA [Free Syrian Army] groups from Idlib, who were previously victims of HTS aggression. Groups like the Free Idlib Army, the remnants of the 13th Division brigade, and potentially some former members of the Hazzm Movement. But my impression is that this is really a Turkish-led campaign and that opposition group involvement will only be secondary. They will primarily be there for support.
Syria Deeply: What is the scope and aim of the Turkish-led operation?
Lister: So far, I don’t think there is any intention to go as far south as Idlib city. I think this would require a much more significant military operation than what Turkey is able and willing to do. At the moment, I think we are looking at phase one, which is for Turkey to pursue its own interests: to protect its borders, deter Kurdish threats, minimize further refugee flows and eventually […] establish some territory in Syria that refugees in Turkey could move back into. In a sense, what we are looking at is Turkey trying to secure its own internal national security interests and to potentially contribute toward further stabilizing at least some parts of Idlib.
Turkey and some of the opposition’s secondary intention in this first phase is to establish a Turkish protected area in northern Idlib, which can be used to start a slow and gradual campaign to undermine HTS. Some of Turkey’s long-term partners in Syria, groups like Failaq al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham, are on board with this strategy. They don’t want to enter a full-scale confrontation with HTS. Instead, they want to more methodically undermine the extremist wings of HTS, particularly to try to encourage defections and divisions within HTS to make it a more manageable competitor rather than an adversary.
From what I’m told, Turkish intelligence has been working on this for some time already, in cooperation with opposition groups previously close to HTS. A spate of recent assassinations are apparently linked to this subversion campaign and, perhaps more importantly, so are a number of recent audio leaks of HTSinternal communications.
Syria Deeply: What is the sentiment among rebel groups in Idlib?
Lister: Every single group that I have met with [in Turkey] over the past week, which spans all the Euphrates Shield groups, all the main FSA groups across Syria, Failaq al-Sham, Nour al-Din al-Zinki brigades and Ahrar al-Sham, have expressed support for Turkey’s intentions in Idlib. The one key area of difference is that groups within the Euphrates Shield and within the FSA seemed more determined to initiate a conflict with HTS, whereas groups like Failaq al-Sham, Zinki and Ahrar al-Sham strongly opposed the idea of a full-scale confrontation because they thought it might potentially strengthen HTS. They advocated instead for a slow and methodical campaign of undermining HTS from the inside.
But, these groups unanimously agreed on [their] suspicion, opposition and hostility toward HTS and particularly toward [HTShead Abu Mohammad] al-Julani. Over the three or four years that I’ve met with all of Syria’s opposition, this was the first time not a single group expressed some element of defense or support of HTS.This definitely struck me over the past few days. Al-Julani appears to have burned a lot of the bridges he built earlier in the conflict but he does still hold several advantageous cards.
Syria Deeply: HTS militants allegedly escorted a Turkish reconnaissance unit into Idlib on Sunday, implying that there have been talks between Turkey and HTS. Have there been any negotiations and do we know what their focus was?
Lister: As far as I am aware, there have been around three or four meetings, including one that took place yesterday (Sunday). In yesterday’s meeting, HTS and Turkey reached a final agreement to establish a Turkish protected buffer zone from Atme through Darat Izza to Anadan into western Aleppo. From what I’m told, HTSagreed at most to leave these areas and agreed at minimum to not interfere with Turkey’s operations in that zone.The idea here would be to replicate what Euphrates Shield looked like at the beginning of the Euphrates Shield operation, which was also preceded by a full Nusra Front withdrawal from areas of Turkish operations.
Syria Deeply: Why would HTS agree to a deal with Turkey considering that it has been a vocal critic of the de-escalation zone agreement?
Lister: I think we need to draw a distinction between what HTS says for its public audience, and what is being done behind the scenes, which is much more murky and political. Al-Julani is not only fearful of an all-out confrontation with Turkey and the opposition, his biggest fear is something catalyzing internal defections from the original Nusra core of Syrian fighters now within the larger HTS alliance.
This core is almost entirely composed of local Syrians who have been recruited into the Nusra Front, which later rebranded into Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and later formed the HTS alliance. Throughout this process, the Nusra core has become even more heavily Syrian, which for al-Julani is an invaluable source of local credibility that protects his forces from attack by most rival opposition groups – as we have seen in 2017. If Turkey or any other opposition faction – working by themselves or together – managed to create an alternative reality somewhere in Idlib, I’m told al-Julani’s biggest fear is that some of those Syrians will jump ship and join them, thereby weakening al-Julani’s credibility on the ground and creating opportunities to isolate him from the revolutionary street. So his greatest fear is internal defections and I think this is why he has channeled so much energy into negotiating with Turkey to prevent a full-blown confrontation.
Syria Deeply: Reports circulated of a series of defections from HTS in the weeks leading up to the campaign, as part of a larger Turkish effort to isolate HTS in Idlib. Which groups have defected and what is the scale of defection?
Lister: The major big loss was the al-Zinki movement. I was told Turkey had some kind of role, potentially with some opposition support, in making this happen. But there have been some other smaller defections from within the HTS core – small HTS sub-factions and local units. The latter are more concerning to al-Julani than anything else, as they represent the partial or possible disintegration of Nusra’s core Syrian structure.
Syria Deeply: There has been a lot of focus on HTS being the primary target of this campaign. What about the Kurds?
Lister: For Turkey, the [Syrian Kurdish] YPG is just as much of a concern and perhaps an even more critical concern than HTS. The fact that Turkey is looking to establish a lookout post or a launching-pad base on Mount Barakat, which overlooks Kurdish-held Afrin, speaks to that.
At the moment, however, I don’t think there is a prospect for a military operation in Afrin. But there is a Turkish effort to exert some kind of influence and a potential deterrent threat on the area to discourage the YPG from moving further into opposition territories. Russia seems to have lent its support to this, which is intriguing.
Syria Deeply: Turkish officials, including the president and prime minister, said that Turkey will cooperate with Russia on the Idlib campaign. What does this mean for the FSA?
Lister: I was actually sitting with all the Euphrates Shield leadership when Erdogan gave this statement. None of them expected this apparent comment of Russian air support and they were all opposed to it. They were genuinely incensed by the idea that Russia could be providing them with support from the air. Let’s see how that plays out. If Russia does provide air support, I think that may cause some problems.
Syria Deeply: Could it be a deal breaker?
Lister: It could potentially be a deal breaker. All the armed groups, who don’t already have a presence in Idlib, would lose credibility there if they entered into an alliance with Russia. It’s pretty well known that the Russians have been bombing Idlib on and off for a long time. So I think active Russian military involvement could be a deal breaker. But I’m not sure if that is going to end up being the case.
The answers have been edited for length and clarity.”
[This article was originally published by Syria Deeply.]
