بواسطة Katty Alhayek | نوفمبر 21, 2017 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Katty Alhayek (KA): Recently, you published an article titled “Militias and crony capitalism to hamper Syria reconstruction,” how do you define “crony capitalism” in this context and what challenges it poses to future reconstruction efforts in Syria?
Joseph Daher (JD): Crony capitalism can be defined generally as when owners of big businesses use their links with the state and the government to gain a decisive advantage over their competitors.
In the region of the Middle East and North Africa, Crony capitalism has been strengthened by the patrimonial nature of the state in which the centers of power (political, military and economically) within a regime are concentrated in one family and its clique, just as in Syria with Assad’s family.
In Syria’s patrimonial regime, you have had the development of a form of crony capitalism in the last decades dominated by a rent seeking alliance of political brokers (led by Assad’s mother’s family) and the regime-supportive bourgeoisie. In other words, the circles close to the ruling family exploit their dominance to amass considerable fortunes. The main sectors of the economy in Syria, prior to the uprising, were dominated by businessmen with direct connections to the regime. This form of crony or mafia capitalism, in which economic opportunities were dependent on loyalties to the regime, alienated and marginalized some elements of the bourgeoisie that were not connected to the regime and therefore did not constitute a strong element of support for the regime. No deal or large venture was actually possible without crony capitalists linked with the regime.
Rami Makhlouf, the cousin of Bashar al-Assad, represented the mafia-style process of privatization led by the regime. His economic empire was vast including telecommunications, oil and gas, as well as construction, banks, airlines, retail, etc. Makhlouf was also the main shareholder of Cham Holding Company, the second largest holding company in the country, while holding more than 300 licenses as an agent for big international companies. The personal fortune of Rami Makhlouf was estimated at close to 6 billion dollars. At the beginning of 2011, the British magazine “World Finance” actually extolled Makhlouf’s visionary leadership and his outstanding contribution to the Syrian economy, calling him a symbol of the positive change at work in the country. According to different sources, he controlled directly or through indirect means nearly 60 percent of the Syrian economy, thanks to a complex network of holdings.
The Crony capitalists have been the heart of the regime coalition and its main supporters. At the beginning of the uprising, the crony capitalists first mobilized people to demonstrate in favor of the regime, and private media, owned by them, tried from the first days of the uprising to undermine the message of the protesters by defaming the protest movement and promoting the regime’s propaganda. Moreover, they played an important role in the development of pro regime militias by funding them to make up for the lack of manpower in the regime’s army.
The “business” of reconstruction is in this perspective no different from other sectors of the economy: The main contracts will benefit businessmen linked to the regime and will reward foreign allies for their assistance with a share of the market. There are already some early examples of this happening and in other sectors of the economy as well.
The reconstruction process will help the regime and crony capitalists consolidate their political and economic power, while also rewarding foreign allies for their support by granting them a sizable share of the market. As such, reconstruction will consolidate and even reinforce the patrimonial nature of the state.
The Decree 66, enforced in September 2012, allows for example the government to “redevelop areas of unauthorized housing and informal settlements [slums].” This policy will allow for the transfer of assets to private companies and regime cronies free of taxes. It will also provide the legal and financial framework for reconstruction by allowing for the destruction and expropriation of large parts of the country and the dispossession of a number of people. In addition, whenever there have been expropriation projects in Syria, compensation has been extremely low. It’s a very clear dispossession of the lower strata. This is a transfer of public assets, tax-free, to private companies and it will be a big boost to regime cronies. Secondly, the reconstruction process will also help the regime crackdown on dissent in certain areas. The government can leverage this decree to use reconstruction as a punishing measure against the part of the population known for their opposition to the regime. This is the case with the two large informal districts of Damascus (the first in the Mezzeh district and the other in a large area extending from Qadam to Daraya) and Baba Amro neighborhood in Homs, which are being rebuilt while the majority of its population is outside of Syria or in other areas of the country. In both cases, the most probable scenario is the replacement of these hostile Sunni impoverished constituencies by middle and wealthy higher classes, from various religious backgrounds, including Sunnis, less willing to oppose the government.
More generally, the regime’s continuous policies in the socio-economic and political spheres will probably strengthen social and regional inequalities throughout the country, deepening problems in terms of development that were already present before the beginning of the uprising in 2011. We could add that the absence of independent trade unions and democratic rights for workers to defend themselves will probably lead to many cases of exploitation, irregularities, and lack of good conditions on working places for workers in the reconstruction process. The increasing reliance of private crony capitalist and foreign actors in this process will reinforce these problems.
Therefore, the absence of democracy and social justice, which were at the roots of the uprising, are still very much present and were even deepened.
Unfortunately, as I mentioned in the article, the absence of a structured and independent democratic, inclusive and social Syrian political opposition, which appealed to the popular classes and social actors such as the independent trade unions will prevent or render difficult the transformations of various struggles to come into connected and organized political battles challenging the regime on a national scale.
KA: In your article, you indicate that any reconstruction efforts in Syria needs massive foreign funding. You referred that Iranian, Russian and Chinese capital might not be enough. How do you see the future of foreign investment in Syria reconstruction projects and do you think Western states and Gulf monarchies will be more involved giving the political changes regionally and internationally?
JD: The states that will benefit are definitely the countries allied to the Assad regime, particularly Iran, Russia and China. India and Brazil might also benefit from the reconstruction drive. Assad and Syrian officials have repeatedly declared that companies from allied countries will be rewarded, while European and American companies will first need to have their governments apologize for supporting the opposition before benefiting. Damascus has also adopted a similar position towards Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey for the current period. Assad in his speech in August 2017 went as far as to declare that the regime will not “let enemies, adversaries, and terrorists, through any means, accomplish through politics what they failed to accomplish on the battlefield and through terrorism”.
On the other side, the so called “Friends of Syria” group, Western countries, Turkey, and Gulf Monarchies, in a side event in New York in September during the U.N. General Assembly) declared that “recovery and reconstruction support for Syria hinges on a credible political process leading to a genuine political transition that can be supported by a majority of the Syrian people.”
The European Union had announced a similar position in April 2017, in arguing that they will be ready to assist in the reconstruction of Syria only when a comprehensive, genuine and inclusive political transition, negotiated by the Syrian parties in the conflict on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015) and the 2012 Geneva Communiqué, is firmly under way. It is therefore hard to see or expect in the near future a high involvement of these states in the reconstruction process, except funding rather small-scale, local projects in areas outside the regime’s control and without the regime’s participation or consent. This is actually already the case for Turkey in some areas controlled by its armed forces and proxies for example in Jarablus and al-Bab, and for some Western institutions and states also providing some financial assistance, including support for local governance and for the rehabilitation of basic services, to regions under the domination of the PYD or some opposition held areas. These projects are however isolated and limited and can’t replace a wide reconstruction process.
Changes on the international and regional political scenes can however occur rapidly as we witnessed on several occasions, so the doors are never completely closed one would say. For example recently, Saudi Arabia’s Gulf affairs minister, Thamer al-Sabhan, visited Raqqa on September 19 after the capture of the city by Syrian Democratic Forces (an Arabic, Kurdish and Assyrian military alliance dominated by YPG, the arm branch of the Kurdish PYD), supported by US led international coalition, to meet with the civil council established six months before under the leadership of SDF and composed of local dignitaries and discuss the reconstruction of the city. No concrete plans were however set.
KA: Last year, you wrote an article discussing federalism as a political option in Syria? What was the goal of this article? How do you see federalism as a future solution for Syria in light of recent political developments?
JD : The article had the objective to promote the idea of federalism (or decentralization) in a progressive and secular framework in order to tackle a certain number of problems within Syria, including notably the Kurdish issue, social and regional inequalities and trying to encourage self-organization from below.
The Assad’s regime and the mainstream opposition, represented by the Etilaf, oppose a federalist option, preferring a rather authoritarian centralized state.
The main opposition body today in the negotiation (and mostly linked to the Etilaf), the High Negotiations Commission (HNC) for « the Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces », has actually failed in providing any democratic and inclusive message, quite on the opposite. In Autumn 2016, its vision within an Executive Framework for the Political Solution in Syria that was far from offering an inclusive and pluralistic citizenship or of Syria as we can see in its first article:
“Syria is an integral part of the Arab World, and Arabic is the official language of the state. Arab Islamic culture represents a fertile source for intellectual production and social relations amongst all Syrians of different ethnic backgrounds and religious beliefs as the majority of Syrians are Arabs and followers of Islam and its tolerant message which is distinctly moderate”.
This is of course exclusionary for all ethnic and religious minorities in the country, in addition to all people not identifying with these identities. This is without forgetting that the Etilaf has supported and supports the Turkish intervention in Syria against the Kurds in general and not only PYD.
The Etilaf and many of the personalities linked to it have also promoted a sectarian, racist (particularly against Kurds), and authoritarian discourses and behaviors. Similarly, when it comes to women, the Etilaf has completely neglected their large participation in the uprising, providing them with only “decorative positions” without any effective role in the decision making process.
The support for a federal state is a key issue today for trying to challenge the division among Arabs and Kurds today and re-establish trust and confidence between these parties. The demand for a federal system in Syria is a demand of the quasi majority of Kurdish parties in the country, despite their political differences and rivalries. To this day, the majority of the Syrian opposition, even some democratic and leftist sectors, reject the demands of the far majority of the Kurdish people in Syria, or reduce it to a question of providing simply citizenship.
This is very problematic and unfortunately not new. We must remember that Kurds in Syria suffered decades of political, social and cultural repression and Arabization policies in the northern regions of Syria imposed by the Assad regime and other oppressive measures since the independence of the country. Not to mention the silence of a large part of the opposition during the Kurdish uprising in Syria in 2004, while accusing some Kurds of serving foreign projects to weaken Syria.
That is why we must support the right of self-determination of the Kurdish people in Syria and elsewhere, which does not mean necessarily the creation of an independent state, but that they decide their own future. Similarly, the support of the self determination of the Kurdish people does not mean being uncritical of the policies of the leadership of the PYD or any other Kurdish political party. I personally criticized the human rights violations by PYD armed forces in Syria against civilians or repressive policies against other Kurdish activists. I did the same regarding Barzani authoritarian and corrupt rule in Kurdistan in northern Iraq.
Just as when we say we support the self determination of the Palestinian People, we don’t support Fatah or Hamas. And on this issue, just few words, I have always considered the liberation and emancipation of the Palestinians as part of our struggle as well. Our destinies are linked.
As I mentioned in the article of federalism, to eliminate from the discussions the Kurdish issue, under the assumption that it allows more unity within the opposition and less problems has proven, and is still the case, a recipe for division and lack of confidence between the various components of the Syrian people.
The recent Kurdish referendum in Northern Iraq has demonstrated, once again, the failure of the models of the capitalist, chauvinist and centralized nation-states of the region, which have consistently repressed, erased, and/or denied the plurality of their societies by affirming the supremacy and/or domination of an ethnic group over others, a religious sect over others or both at the same time.
Therefore, to repeat the same mistakes of the past or present federalism (or decentralization) as division is the recipe for defeat.
In my article on federalism, I also promoted a federal system in order to provide more tools and power to local population to manage their affairs, on one side, and in trying to correct regional social injustices, on the other. For example, the Jazirah region produced two thirds of the country’s grains (and 70% of wheat) and three quarters of its hydrocarbons, but had the highest level of illiteracy rate and poverty. Such an option would also strengthen participation from local population in decision making processes.
However, the implementation of a federal state is not a guarantee per se to achieve an inclusive and democratic system. Indeed, we also need to struggle for a secular political framework encouraging the participation from below of the popular and working classes and in which democratic and social rights of all Syrians without gender, ethnic and religious discriminations are guaranteed. This means notably guaranteeing popular and working classes with the rights to organize politically in their workplaces (through independent trade unions and peasant unions for examples), society, and neighborhoods, to defend their interests.
I would therefore argue that a federalist project for Syria is a step forward and a necessary condition to build a new, progressive, secular and democratic Syria, but of course on its own its not sufficient.
KA: What other projects are you working on now, in regard to Syria?
JD: I am finishing my second PhD, but this time in History, entitled “Revolution and Counter- Revolutions in Syria, origins and developments”. It’s a holistic and materialist analysis of the roots and developments of the Syrian revolutionary process and the various challenges and counter-revolutionary actors it had to face. I hope then to publish my PhD into a book. It’s an important project for me not only on an academic perspective, but I would argue politically as well, to nurture discussions and debates among progressives and democrats in Syria and to try to learn from the lessons of the revolutionary process and the mistakes committed. In the seventies and eighties, Syria witnessed strong popular and democratic resistance with significant strikes and demonstrations throughout the country with mass followings, unfortunately this memory was not kept and was not well-known by the new generation of protesters in the country in 2011, even among leftists and democrats. The Syrian revolutionary process that erupted in 2011 is on the contrary one of the most documented. This memory will remain and will not only be there to look at the past, but seizing this past to build on future resistance. The political experiences that have been accumulated since the beginning of the uprising will not disappear.
I have also other projects relating to Syria, including issue of citizenship or the struggle against sectarianism.
Again and more generally I try through these works and projects to help as part of my effort to participate in the struggle for a democratic, secular, federal and social Syria without any discriminations and in solidarity with other people in struggles.
Joseph Daher is a Swiss-Syrian socialist activist and academic. He is the author of Hezbollah: Political Economy of Lebanon’s Party of God (2016, Pluto Press). He is the founder of the blog Syria Freedom Forever. He was awarded a doctorate from the School of Oriental and Asian Studies (SOAS) in 2015 in Development. He resides in Switzerland, where he teaches at the University of Lausanne and is finishing a thesis in history on the origins and developments of the Syrian uprising.
بواسطة Katty Alhayek | نوفمبر 21, 2017 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Katty Alhayek (KA): What are the main challenges today for reconstruction efforts and rebuilding the future of Syria?
Rabie Nasser (RN): The Syrian Center for Policy Research identifies the main challenges for the reconstruction efforts categorize as first, the surviving of political tyranny and increasing compromises that accept the hegemony of subjugating powers. The political oppression was a core root of the social movement and during the conflict the pre-conflict political oppression aggravated to political tyranny and fundamentalism. Those internal and external powers which abuse authority and violated all human and social rights and norms cannot build an inclusive reconstruction that is needed to address the Syrian catastrophe. Second, the identity politics is a major challenge to reconstruction process as it degrades the social cohesion; in this regard, justice and legitimate institutions are a core part of building the trust between people and with the institutions to create the space to social relation recovery. Third, the injustice and deprivations including deaths, injuries, torturing, kidnapping, forced displacement, poverty, difficult living conditions, among others; increased the inequity among the population which is a major and urgent challenge that need enormous institutional capacities, well designed policies, and material resources. Fourth, the expanding of conflict economy and conflict related crony elite which contribute to destruct to a large extent the economic resources, relations, and institutions; and reallocate the remaining resources to fueling conflict and subordinating society. Those four challenges form a well established system that created incentives on local, national and international levels, which makes tackling it an exceptionally difficult cause.
KA: Syrian children’s health and education were significantly affected by the ongoing war; how do you think the investments in reconstruction efforts should address children’s well being, and the so-called “lost generation,” specifically in the worst affected areas of the country?
RN: The Syrian society is young in that children below 18 years old consists almost half of the population and the conflict affected harshly their lives as around 13 per cent of the conflict related deaths is children. Since 2012 around half of the school age children did not enroll in the education system including the child refugees. Moreover, the quality of education has deteriorated in terms of quality and conditions. The dispersion of families and loss of breadwinners, in addition to poor living conditions, lack of access to health, and the suffering of malnutrition, trauma, and the loss of normal life of children are some examples of the burden on the new generation of Syrians. Furthermore, the refugee children are growing up in different environments, cultures, languages, values, living conditions which creates substantial challenges to reintegrate them in the Syrian society.
The burden of conflict is not equally distributed across the Syrian children, which increases the inequity between children in terms empowerment and opportunities. Countering the challenges, apart from the humanitarian, support needs inclusive institutions that address the deprivations of the most vulnerable groups of Syrians and this depends to a large extent on the way of exit from the armed conflict.
KA: Foreign funding and investment plays a crucial role in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. How do you see the role of foreign investments in the future of Syria and which countries do you think might be the key players?
RN: The total economic losses until the end of 2015 reached USD 255 billion, which is equivalent to around five times of the GDP in 2010. This enormous loss included the destruction of the infrastructure and reduction in the economic activities according to SCPR. The loss includes the severe deterioration of economic foundations such as population, human capital, institutions, and resources. Furthermore, the conflict economy reshaped the system of incentives and reallocated the resources and opportunities to the influential powers within the armed conflict. Therefore, the challenges of funding of reconstruction are related to the volume of the losses, and the complicated new conflict economy actors and incentives, and the hegemony of warlords over the Syrian economy.
The corner of funding is related to the shift in institutions to overcome conflict and build efficiency, just and inclusive institutions that rebuild trust between Syrians and between them and the political institutions. The space for society is crucial to participate in designing the reconstruction and the identification of the path for peace that overcomes the conflict’s impact and roots. Legitimate and inclusive institutions can create the environment to attract external funding and unitize it in line with the Syrians priorities. The other part of funding is covered by the Syrians’ participation in the process that will decrease the costs and increase the benefits for them and reduce the potential burden of depending only on the external funding.
However, if the political oppression and conflict economy elite prevail after the end of the conflict, the Syrian economy will be attracting many foreign investors due to the huge opportunities created by the destruction regardless of the inclusivity, justice, and sustainability. In this scenario, the participation of the Syrian society will be at a minimum and inequality will surge with the elite’s control of the opportunities. Finally, the countries and investors who will contribute depends on the scenarios and nature of institutions in the post-conflict period.
KA: Can you share with us what are your future projects?
RN: As a researcher in the Syrian Center for Policy Research, I am working on the Alternative Development Paradigm for the future of Syria which is an initiative by almost 50 experts who are working on developing policy options for the Syria challenges in line with the Syrian context. Additionally, the center is working on assessing the socioeconomic impact of the conflict in regular basis.
Rabie Nasser is a co-founder of the Syrian Center for Policy Research, working as researcher in macroeconomic policies, inclusive growth, poverty, and crisis socioeconomic impact assessment. He obtained a B.A. in Economics from Damascus University 1999. In 2000 he obtained a Diploma in Financial and Monetary Economics from Damascus University. He has MSc in Economics from Leicester University, UK. Before joining The Syrian Development Research Center, Nasser worked for the State Planning Commission as Chief Economist and Director General of Macroeconomic Management Directorate in 2004 and 2005. Then, he worked as an Economic Researcher in Arab Planning Institute in Kuwait. Then he was a senior researcher working between 2009-2011 for the Syrian Development Research Center that conducts studies, evaluations, and applied research.
بواسطة Katty Alhayek | نوفمبر 21, 2017 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Katty Alhayek (KA): You published recently an article titled “Will China Get the Lion Share in Syria Reconstruction?,” in which you argue that China is set to play a bigger role in the reconstruction efforts in Syria. Can you elaborate more on that and what are the opportunities that you think might help Beijing’s future involvement in Syria?
Eugenio Dacrema (ED): First of all, it must be said that the Syrian post-conflict reconstruction is emerging as a very difficult undertaking, and unfortunately not only because of the huge destruction caused by the conflict. The problem, right now, is primarily to pinpoint the sources of funds, taking into account that, depending on the estimations, from 100 to 200 billion dollars will be necessary. Furthermore, the conditions of the final settlement that are emerging (with Assad in power and no involvement of the opposition) don’t help.
It is, basically, a question of resource availability and political will. Actors who would have the political will in most cases lack resources, and those who have resources lack the political will to support the reconstruction under Assad’s uncompromising rule. Take, for example, the case of Russia and Iran, the two parties that until now have supported Assad’s military effort the most. For different reasons, both lack the economic resources to invest heavily in Syria’s post-conflict reconstruction. On the contrary, other actors such as the rich Gulf monarchies, who were among the biggest sponsors of the opposition, would hardly give significant amounts of money to the regime to reconstruct the country. The same can be said of the US, which is also reducing significantly its foreign aid programs. This leaves basically two actors endowed with significant resources and who may have the political will to invest heavily in Syria: The European Union (and its member states) and China. The EU needs stabilization in its Mediterranean neighborhood and needs the flow of refugees to stop and possibly to reverse. To achieve this, the right conditions in Syria must be created to allow refugees from the EU and Syria’s neighboring countries to come back. This may lead the EU to set some sort of conditionality on the provision of its aid in order to force the regime to create such conditions. However, I think there are many signs showing that this last outcome, the return of most of the refugees, is not welcome by the regime. Many of the refugees left especially because of Assad’s political and military actions, and the regime knows that, although a few were materially part of the armed uprising, many of them sympathize for the opposition. Several polls conducted among refugees in Lebanon or Germany (these are the ones I know of) demonstrate it. In sum, the regime needs funds to reconstruct, the EU may provide a good part of them, but at conditions that the regime may strongly dislike.
On the contrary, China may emerge as a provider of funds with no political constrains. China has been quietly on the side of the regime since the beginning. Although this news did not often reach the main outlets, China has sent military advisors to the Syrian army, nominated a special envoy for the Syrian crisis (the second in China’s history after the one for Sudan), and, more recently, participated in the first economic fair in Damascus after 2011 with a big delegation. This year Chinese representatives have discretely taken contacts with organizations and NGOs operating in Syria to establish partnerships and collaborations. Finally, the Chinese authorities publicly promised the first 2 billion dollars for the reconstruction, and many signs suggest that this may represent just the beginning. The rumor is that the Chinese leadership may decide to include Syria in its One Belt One Road plan to connect China to Europe and the Mediterranean through infrastructures and new maritime and land ways. Syria may become a hub for Chinese products and trades on the Mediterranean, and the Syrian government seems to be interested. The Syrian embassy in Beijing has been very active in the last months.
KA: In this article you also discuss a set of obstacles that could limit the Chinese role in Syria-related investments and reconstruction. What are these obstacles and to what degree they can affect Beijing’s plans in Syria?
ED: Sure, there are also several obstacles. First of all, it would not be the first time that China supports a bloody dictatorship. It has been the case, for example, in Sudan in 2007, when, to protect its investments in the local oil industry, China devoted a lot of political and diplomatic capital to protect internationally the Omar al-Bashir regime. However, this policy backfired, creating huge problems to China’s international image and not resulting in a stabilization of the country, which split a few years later.
China has perfected its “dictatorship policy” in the last years. Beijing won’t provide any significant investment without guarantees that can be summarized in one word: stability. The Chinese would be reluctant to put on the table significant financial and diplomatic assistance for a regime that cannot prove itself able to guarantee long-term stability. And, in my opinion, the Assad regime can hardly comply with this condition. Although it is retaking control of most of the country, its grip is loose and its military and political power still too weak in comparison with the number of enemies and complications on the ground and abroad it has still to face. Although the main military confrontations may come to an end relatively soon, Syria under Assad risks a few more years of instability, which may impair significant Chinese economic interventions.
Finally, it is also worth saying that a big Chinese presence in Syrian affairs may also be opposed by Russia and Iran. They know that once the main military operations are over money may become much more influential than guns, and this may jeopardize their control on the Syrian regime in favor of China.
KA: You co-authored a piece with Annalisa Perteghella titled “EU Should Play Major Role in Syria Reconstruction.” Here, you discuss how different scenarios for ending the Syrian war might result in different reconstruction plans with various influences of international donors. Why do you think the European Union is the major international donor that can contribute significantly to the reconstruction of Syria? More importantly, why you dismiss the role of international powers such as Russia and regional power such as Iran and the Gulf monarchies?
ED: As I said before, there are two main requirements for the participation in the Syrian reconstruction: resources and political will. Russia and Iran are both going through a difficult economic phase. Low oil prices damaged heavily both their economies. Russia is also facing the effects of the European sanctions and years of economic mismanagement, while Iran is trying slowly to reorganize its economy after the end of the heaviest sanctions. Not only do these two countries not show any willingness to invest significantly in the reconstruction, but they are also starting to collect repayment for their support from the regime. They both obtained big shares of the Syrian natural resources, de facto jeopardizing the future reconstruction efforts. In fact, such resources are key for financing future reconstruction projects and now big shares of the profits deriving from them will go in Moscow and Teheran’s coffers.
I don’t rule out that other regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf monarchies, would invest in the reconstruction. But, like the European Union, they would do that under certain conditions. They aim to obtain some settlement in favor of the opposition (or at least their protegees among the opposition), which is something that the regime and its allies (in particular Iran) would hardly concede. A role apart may be played by Qatar which, although having been a big sponsor of the opposition, is currently re-aligning its regional stance away from the other Gulf monarchies and closer to Iran.
The key in this matter can be also summarized in one world: decentralization. If some sort of real decentralization is realized, especially in the areas that have been governed by the opposition for years, and the external aid can flow directly to these local entities without passing through Damascus, then it is possible that other regional powers such as the Gulf monarchies or Turkey participate significantly in the reconstruction effort. The same can be said of the European Union. Decentralization is one of the few solutions that provide some guarantees to the returning refugees and may be one of the main conditions imposed by the EU for its aid.
KA: Can you share with us what are your future Syria-related projects?
ED: I think that it is important to keep in mind that everything that is discussed in these days regarding the Syrian reconstruction will matter only in its initial phase. The reconstruction of Syria will be a long endeavor, even bigger and more complicated than the Lebanese one, and will probably be measured in decades. Along this long period many things can change and the final outcome may be something completely different from anything we can imagine now. It is likely that in the end we will see some sort of involvement from all the actors, including the EU, the Gulf monarchies and Turkey, even without significant concessions from the regime. The reconstruction business is too huge and each country’s national industrial sector will push its government to get a share, although smaller than the one they would have got under the right conditions.
I think that what can be said right now with relative self-confidence is that the first phase of the reconstruction is going to be slow and, for this reason, unfortunately will not provide much relief for the Syrian population that has already endured the pain of six years of conflict. The problem is that the actors on the field, especially the Syrian regime, are once again paying much more attention to their political survival and short-term interests than to long-term plans for a homogeneous and sustainable reconstruction of the country. For example, one key element that may change forever the economic shape of the country is whether the materials for the reconstruction projects, such as cement and steel, will be produced in Syria or imported from elsewhere. Obviously, it would be much better for the Syrian economy in the long term if the regime would first channel resources to rebuilding at least part of the national industry to make it part of the reconstruction effort. The point is that we see now few signs of this kind of long-term thinking. Even the possible sources of funds are scrutinized primarily according to the danger they may represent for the power of the regime, and only secondarily according to the actual support they can provide. Much more attention is devoted to guarantee compensations for the loyal sectors of the society, for foreign allies, and to keep at bay possible future opponents and their potential supporters who are now refugees abroad.
Eugenio Dacrema is an Arabic-speaking PhD candidate at the University of Trento, Italy, and a research associate at the Italian Institute for International Studies (ISPI). He lived in Syria from 2009 to 2010 where he worked for the Italian embassy. In 2016 and 2017 he was visiting scholar at the American University of Beirut and at the George Washington University. Dacrema is a regular contributor to several Italian and international newspapers and writes advisory reports for the Italian Parliament.
بواسطة Ibrahim Hamidi | نوفمبر 20, 2017 | غير مصنف
كشفت وثيقة الاتفاق الأميركي – الروسي – الأردني، اطلعت على مضمونها، عن تعهد موسكو “بتنفيذ” فوري” لإبعاد “مقاتلين غير سوريين” في إشارة إلى “حزب الله” وفصائل تدعمها إيران من “المنطقة الآمنة” بعمق وسطي قدره 5 كيلومترات بين قوات النظام وفصائل المعارضة وسط نشر عشر نقاط روسية للرقابة و نقطتين للتفتيش، مقابل تعهد واشنطن وعمان بالعمل فوراً مع فصائل المعارضة لقتال “داعش” و”جبهة النصرة” وتنظيم “القاعدة” عن خط التماس في هدنة جنوب غربي سوريا. ويطرح ذلك موضوع التزامن بين الأمرين.
وبعد تبادل وزيري الخارجية الأميركي ريكس تيلرسون والروسي سيرغي لافروف الزيارات إلى موسكو وواشنطن، بدأ الطرفان في مايو (أيار) العمل في عمان على تنفيذ اتفاق “خفض التصعيد” في جنوب سوريا قرب الأردن، وخط فك الاشتباك في الجولان مع إسرائيل، باعتبار أن الأميركيين رفضوا المشاركة رسمياً في عملية آستانة التي انطلقت نهاية العام، وأنجزت مسودة الاتفاق في مايو الماضي. وجرت في العاصمة الأردنية محادثات مكثفة بين دبلوماسيين وعسكريين ورجال استخبارات من أميركا وروسيا والأردن، حيث اعتقد الوفد الأميركي أنه حقق إنجازاً لاختبار مدى قدرة روسيا على ممارسة النفوذ على إيران في سوريا بإدخال عبارة منع وجود “قوات غير سورية” في منطقة “خفض التصعيد” في إشارة إلى “حزب الله” وفصائل تدعمها إيران، خصوصاً “حركة النجباء.”
ولدى التوصل إلى المذكرة الثلاثية، أعلن الرئيسان دونالد ترمب وفلاديمير بوتين خلال لقائهما في هامبورغ في 7 يوليو (تموز) الاتفاق على إقامة منطقة “خفض التصعيد” جنوب غربي سوريا، لكن عمق انسحاب “القوات غير السورية” في إشارة إلى “حزب الله” وفصائل إيران بقي عقدة رئيسية في المحادثات التي استمرت خلال الفترة الماضية، إضافة إلى نقاط انتشار المراقبين الروس وشروط فتح المعبر الحدودي الأردني – السوري. وطرحت أرقام عدة لعمق الانسحاب. وتأرجحت الطروحات بين أن يكون 20 ميلاً و10 أميال وصولاً إلى خمسة أميال وسط محادثات مكثفة بين مسؤولين إسرائيليين وأمريكيين لإبعاد “حزب الله” والإيرانيين عن الجولان.
مبادئ الحل
وقبل لقاء سريع بين ترمب وبوتين، أنجزت المحادثات الثلاثية في عمان في 8 من الشهر الحالي الاتفاق على مذكرة تفاهم ثلاثية وخرائط أعدها خبراء عسكريون، إضافة إلى مبادئ للحل السياسي في سوريا. واستطاع تيلرسون ولافروف صوغ مسودة اتفاق ترمب – بوتين الذي أعلن خلال لقاء سريع بين الرئيسين في فيتنام في 11 الشهر الحالي، تضمن ثلاثة مبادئ: الأول، سياسي، دعم عملية جنيف لتنفيذ القرار 2254 وإجراء إصلاحات دستورية لإجراء انتخابات سوريا. الثاني، عسكري، تنسيق بين الجيشين الأميركي والروسي في محاربة الإرهاب وهزيمة “داعش»” شرق سوريا. الثالث، تنفيذ اتفاق “خفض التصعيد” جنوب غربي سوريا ومباركة مذكرة التفاهم في عمان.
وتضمن اتفاق ترمب – بوتين الترحيب بمذكرة تفاهم جديدة أميركية – روسية – أردنية وُقِّعت في عمان في 8 من الشهر الحالي لـ”الخفض والقضاء النهائي على وجود القوات الأجنبية والمقاتلين الأجانب من المنطقة لضمان سلام أكثر استدامة”، على أن يراقب ذلك، مركز الرصد في العاصمة الأردنية الذي يتناول الخروقات وكيفية التعاطي معه.
وبحسب نص المذكرة الثلاثية، التي اطلعت عليه “الشرق الأوسط”، فإنه يقع في سبعة مبادئ مشابهة لوثائق اتفاقيات “خفض التصعيد” في غوطة دمشق وريف حمص ومناطق أخرى، بحيث تؤكد الأطراف المعنية “احترام مبدأ سيادة الجمهورية العربية السورية وسلامتها الإقليمية وضرورة توقف سفك الدماء، ومرجعية الحل الشامل في سوريا المبني على القرارات الدولية، ولا سيما بيان جنيف 1 وقرار مجلس الأمن رقم 2118 والقرار رقم 2254 واتفاقية أنقرة لوقف إطلاق النار المؤرخة بتاريخ 30 ديسمبر (كانون الأول) 2016.”
وتناولت المذكرة تأكيد الأطراف الثلاثة “استمرار تجميد” وتنفيذ اتفاق وقف النار أو “خفض التصعيد” في أرياف درعا والقنيطرة والسويداء بين الحكومة السورية والقوات الموالية لها من جهة وفصائل المعارضة من جهة ثانية، إضافة إلى “التزام بقاء الترتيبات الإدارية والأمنية الخاصة بالمعارضة”؛ ما يعني بقاء المجالس المحلية ومؤسسات المعارضة “خلال فترة مؤقتة”، مع التأكيد على ضمانات بعدم حصول أي تغيير ديموغرافي والسماح بعودة اللاجئين والنازحين إلى بيوتهم.
وتناولت الفقرة الأهم، بحسب مسؤولين غربيين لديهم الوثيقة الثلاثية، أن يتم في المرحلة الأولى إقامة “منطقة عازلة” خالية من وجود المقاتلين الأجانب غير السوريين في إشارة إلى “حزب الله” وفصائل إيران، مع تأكيد على رفض أي وجود عسكري أو استخباراتي أجنبي في المنطقة المحددة والمعرفة باسم “منطقة عازلة” بموجب خرائط مرفقة بالمذكرة يُعتقد أنها بعمق وسطي قدره خمسة كيلومترات في محاذاة منطقة سيطرة المعارضة في أرياف درعا والسويداء والقنيطرة. ونصت المذكرة أيضاً على أنه “لن يكون هناك أي وجود بأي شكل من الأشكال، بما فيه الاستخباراتي في هذه المنطقة العازلة.”
ولا يشمل القوات غير السورية، الفصائل الموقعة على هذا الاتفاق، بحسب الوثيقة، التي نصت أيضاً على أن تلتزم روسيا بدء “التنفيذ الفوري” لهذا البند الخاص في المرحلة الأولى من المذكرة، المتعلقة بإبعاد “القوات غير السورية” من المنطقة “العازلة”؛ إذ إن الجيش الروسي سيقيم فيها عشر نقاط تفتيش ونقطتي رقابة لضمان الالتزام، على أن تقوم أميركا والأردن بتنفيذ فوري أيضاً لقتال “داعش” وإخراج “النصرة” وفصائل مرتبطة بتنظيم القاعدة من مناطق سيطرة فصائل “الجيش السوري الحر” أو يما يعرف بـ”الجبهة الجنوبية” بموجب خريطة حددها الجيش الروسي.
وإذ يذكر الاتفاق الثلاثي “النصرة” و”داعش”، لم يذكر بالاسم إيران أو “حزب الله”، لكن المفاوضات كانت تدور عنهما. وقال مسؤول أميركي رفيع المستوى: “مذكرة الأطراف تكرس التزام الولايات المتحدة وروسيا والأردن بالقضاء على وجود القوات الأجنبية غير السورية. ويشمل ذلك القوات الإيرانية والميليشيات التي تدعمها إيران، مثل (حزب الله) اللبناني والمتطرفين الأجانب الذين يعملون مع (جبهة النصرة) وغيرها من الجماعات المتطرفة من المنطقة الجنوبية الغربية… ما قوض وقف إطلاق النار وشكل تهديداً للأردن وإسرائيل.” ونفى مسؤولون روس أن يكون الاتفاق نص على سحب “حزب الله” وإيران، مشيرين إلى أن ذلك مرتبط باستقرار وقف النار وتحقيق السلام.
مجلس محلي معارض
يضاف إلى ذلك، تضمنت المذكرة السماح بإدخال المساعدات الإنسانية ومواد إعادة الإعمار وتعهد الأردن بفتح معبر الحدود مع سوريا لتسهيل الحركة التجارية بموجب ترتيبات متفق عليها مع الحكومة الأردنية وفصائل المعارضة جنوب سوريا ووجود رمزي ما للسلطات السورية. وأوضح المسؤول الأميركي: “المذكرة التي تم التوقيع عليها بالأحرف الأولى في عمان، وأقرها الرئيسان اليوم، تعكس الالتزام الثلاثي بأن الترتيبات الإدارية وترتيبات الحكم القائمة في المناطق التي تسيطر عليها المعارضة في الجنوب الغربي ستبقى خلال هذه المرحلة الانتقالية. وإن المعارضة بعبارة أخرى لا تسلم الأراضي إلى النظام؛ مما يؤجل المسائل المتعلقة بترتيبات سياسية طويلة الأجل للعملية السياسية بموجب قرار مجلس الأمن التابع للأمم المتحدة رقم 2254.”
عملياً، يعني تنفيذ المرحلة الأولى من المذكرة ابتعاد “حزب الله” وفصائل إيرانية بحدود 15 كيلومتراً عن خط فك الاشتباك، ومسافة أقل من حدود الأردن، باعتبار أن فصائل المعارضة تسيطر على منطقة بعمق يصل إلى عشرة كيلومترات بين الجولان ودمشق. وأفادت وسائل إعلام إسرائيلية أمس، بأن المرحلة الثانية من المذكرة بعد القضاء على “جبهة النصرة” و”داعش” تتضمن إبعاد “حزب الله” وإيران بعمق 40 كيلومتراً من الأردن. ولم يتم التأكد من ذلك من مصادر أخرى، علماً بأن مصادر تحدثت سابقاً عن 30 كيلومتراً كحد أقصى.
وطرح في هذا السياق موضوع إحياء اتفاق فك الاشتباك بين سوريا وإسرائيل للعام 1974، ونص على نشر “القوات الدولية لفك الاشتباك” (اندوف) لمراقبة التزام الطرفين بمناطق عازلة وأخرى محدودة السلاح. ونشرت وسائل إعلام غربية أن إسرائيل أصرت على إحياء منطقتين محدودتي وجود السلاح بعمق 20 كيلومتراً من خط فك الاشتباك في الجولان، بحيث يحظر وجود “حزب الله” وفصائل إيران. واقترحت موسكو حلاً وسطا تضمن بالسماح بانتشار قوات النظام خصوصاً في منطقة حضر الدرزية التي تعرضت لهجوم من “النصرة” الأسبوع الماضي.
وكانت موسكو تريثت بالطلب من طهران سحب “حزب الله” وميليشيات إيران من الجنوب. ونفى مسؤولون روس أن يكون الاتفاق الثلاثي نص حرفياً على ذلك، ما يفتح الطريق لـ”الغموض البناء” وسعي روسيا إلى عدم إحراج حلفائها خلال تنفيذ الاتفاق الثلاثي.
