بواسطة Ahmed Ramadan | ديسمبر 21, 2017 | News, Reports
الحسكة
ظهرت في الأيام الاخيرة بوادر مواجهة عسكرية بين دمشق والاكراد شرق سوريا. اذ سجل استنفار أمني في مناطق سيطرة «قوات سوريا الديمقراطية» الكردية – العربية، بعد اتهامها بـ«الخيانة» من قبل الرئيس بشار الأسد واعتبار نائب وزير الخارجية فيصل المقداد هذه القوات مشابهة لـ«داعش»، في وقت بدأ النظام السوري إعادة فتح قنوات مع قادة عشائر شرق سوريا لمواجهة محتملة مع الأكراد الذين سعوا لوساطة من موسكو.
وكثفت الشرطة الكردية (آسايش) و«وحدات حماية الشعب» الكردي دورياتها في مدن منبج وتل أبيض ورأس العين والدرباسية والقامشلي والقحطانية والحسكة دورياتها وعززت نقاطها بعناصر إضافية خوفاً من تحرك أبناء العشائر العربية الذين يرفضون هيمنة الأكراد على مناطقهم بإشارة من النظام.
وقال مصدر في محافظة الحسكة: «تصريح الأسد لم يصف الأكراد بالخيانة، بل وصف كل من يعمل تحت المظلة الأميركية بالخيانة وهذا الأمر ينطبق على الأكراد والعرب والمسيحيين والتركمان باعتبارهم مشاركين في قوات سوريا الديمقراطية التي تعمل تحت المظلمة الأميركية». وأضاف: «رد فعل الأكراد على تصريحات الأسد كان قاسيا ولا يقل عن تصريحه فقد وصفوه بالخيانة باعتباره فتح أبواب سوريا أمام كل الإرهابيين. وغياب أي رد فعل من جميع المكونات الأخرى، يشير إلى أن وحدات الحماية الكردية وباقي الفصائل الكردية المشاركة معها تعمل تحت المظلة الأميركية وهم من ينسقون ويتواصلون مع الأميركيين لأنهم بصراحة لا يثقون بالعرب وغيرهم من قوات سوريا الديمقراطية التنسيق فقط مع الوحدات الكردية، وهذا ما أكده الناطق الرسمي باسم قوات سوريا الديمقراطية طلال سلو بعد انشقاقه منتصف الشهر الجاري».
واتهمت «قوات سوريا الديمقراطية» في بيان الأسد بـ«الخيانة». وقالت: «الأسد وما تبقى من نظام حكمه، هم آخر من يحق لهم الحديث عن الخيانة وتجلياتها، بما أن هذا النظام هو المسؤول مباشرة عن فتح أبواب البلاد على مصراعيها أمام جحافل الإرهاب الأجنبي التي جاءت من كل أصقاع الأرض، كما أنه هو بالذات الذي أطلق كلَّ الإرهابيين من سجونه ليوغلوا في دماء السوريين بمختلف تشعباتهم». وأضافت: «النظام الذي ما زال يراهن على الفتنة الطائفية والعرقية ويتخندق وَفْق هذه المعطيات، هو ذاته أحد تعاريف الخيانة التي إن لم يتصدَّ لها السوريون ستؤدي بالبلاد إلى التقسيم، وهو ما لن تسمح به قواتنا بأي شكل من الأشكال». وكان وزير الخارجية السوري وليد المعلم قال إن «إقامة نظام إدارة ذاتية للأكراد في سوريا أمر قابل للتفاوض والحوار في حال إنشائها في إطار حدود الدولة».
ووصف المجلس التنفيذي لمقاطعة الجزيرة التابع للإدارة الذاتية في بيان تصريحات الأسد بأنها «كانت متوحشة بمثابة إعلان حرب جديدة على كل مناطقنا المحررة التي لم يميز بين مكوناتها، وكأنه بمعنى من المعاني يريد إعادة إنتاج الماضي الأسود القاتم لكل مكونات شعبنا العربية والكردية والسريانية والشيشانية والتركمانية وغيرها عبر اتهامها بالخيانة والتبعية. لا يحق لمن كان السبب في تدمير البلاد والعباد وملأ هذا الوطن بميليشيات الموت المرتزقة من كل أصقاع العالم أن يتهم القوى التي حاربت الإرهاب وحافظت على أمن واستقرار المنطقة بالخيانة».
ورد المقداد على موقف الأكراد ووصف «قوات سوريا الديمقراطية» بأنها «داعش» جديد في الشمال الشرقي من سوريا. وقال أمس: «هناك داعش آخر قد يسمى قسد، ويحاول الأميركيون دعمها ضد إرادة الشعب السوري». وأضاف: «هي في خدمة أميركا وخدمة المخططات الغربية ضد شعب سوريا وضد الدولة السورية»، معتبراً أنه «من يعمل على تفتيت الدولة السورية، ويضع شروط على إعادة دمج المناطق السورية ببعضها ليس بسوري ولا يمكن الوثوق به».
النظام السوري الذي ما زال يستند إلى قواعد له في شمال شرقي سوريا من عرب وأكراد وتركمان ومسيحيين وغيرهم، باشر ومنذ عدة أشهر إلى التواصل مع شيوخ عشائر العربية والتركمانية والكردية وغيرهم بعد اتخاذ الكثير منهم مواقف ضد النظام بسبب تصرفاته وخاصة في محافظات الحسكة ودير الزور والرقة والتي سيطر عليها تنظيم داعش. وكانت طائراته لا تفرق بين عناصر التنظيم والمدنيين، بل كانت تستهدف المدنيين أكثر وإشارات استفهام حول معارك وهمية بين عناصر التنظيم وقوات النظام التي سيطرة على مواقع عسكرية كان من الصعب السيطرة عليها لولا وجود تفاهمات وجر الثورة السورية إلى التطرف وخلق تنظيمات متطرفة شمال شرقي سوريا، بحسب نشطاء معارضين. وقال أحدهم: «شواهد كثيرة على تحالف النظام مع مسلحي داعش والذي سلم لهم محافظة الرقة وريف دير الزور الشرقي والغربي ونصف محافظة الحسكة».
وكان النظام وجد ضالته في ضغط «الوحدات» على العرب شمال وشرق سوريا ونظرة بعض عناصر إلى العرب للعودة إلى فتح قنوات التواصل مع شيوخ العشائر عبر أقاربهم ومعارفهم في دمشق وبعض المحافظات السورية الأخرى، ووجد الشيوخ عودة التواصل مع النظام فرصة لتخلصهم من «الوحدات» وقيادتها التي تتبع لجبل قنديل مقر حزب العمال الكردستاني وممارساتهم ضد العرب في تلك المناطق وصلت إلى حد المواجهات في مدينة منبج منتصف الشهر الماضي عندما فرضوا التجنيد الإجباري. وقال أحد الشيوخ: «إذا فرض على أبنائنا التجنيد سنرسلهم للخدمة في الجيش السوري الذي سيعود إلى المنطقة عاجلاً وليس آجلاً ولن نرسل أبناءنا للخدمة العسكرية وتقديم التحية لعبد الله أوجلان زعيم حزب العمال الكردستاني».
تواصل النظام مع شيوخ العشائر لم يقتصر على الداخل، فقد أعاد النظام الشيخ نواف راغب البشير شيخ قبيلة البكارة واحدة من أكبر العشائر العربية في شمال وشرق سوريا من صفوف المعارضة إلى دمشق، وأظهره بأنه داعم للنظام عبر مساندة فصيل لواء «محمد الباقر» المكون من أبناء البكارة ونشر صورا له مع قادة الفصيل في مدينة دير الزور إلى جانب العميد عصام زهر الدين الذي قتل منتصف شهر أكتوبر (تشرين الأول) الماضي. وقال أحد أبناء العشيرة: «إيران هي من أعادت الشيخ نواف البشير من تركيا وهو يقيم في حي كفر سوسة بدمشق تحت حراسة إيرانية. ولم يسمح له لقاء أي مسؤول سوري، بل هو شخص منبوذ بالنسبة لهم بل وقصة إعادته استغلت فقط إعلامياً فقط».
تحالف «الوحدات» الكردية مع النظام السوري بني في البداية على مواجهة كل حراك شعبي في مناطق شرق سوريا، واعتبر عدد من المسؤولين السوريين في تصريحات لهم أن «الوحدات الكردية هي جزء من القوى الوطنية». لكن هذا الوصف تلاشى بعد هجوم تنظيم داعش على مدينة الحسكة بتاريخ 25 يونيو (حزيران) 2015، حيث امتنعت «الوحدات» عن المشاركة لصد الهجوم على المدينة لأكثر من 20 يوماً من بدء الهجوم. ووعد قائد «الوحدات» الكردية الملقب بـ«لوند حسكة» بأن يشارك في صد هجوم «داعش» بعد مقابلة محافظة الحسكة السابق محمد زعال العلي، وقد وعد حسكة أن «تكون الوحدات الكردية إلى جانب الجيش والقوات الرديفة له في صد الهجوم»، بحسب مصدر. وأضاف: «قرار الوحدات الكردية ليس بيدهم هناك من يوجههم وهذه مشكلة بالنسبة لتعامل الحكومة السورية معهم، والتي ترفض لقاء أي مسؤول كردي ليس سوريا».
وتابع: «بعد هجوم داعش كانت قيادة الوحدات تنتظر سقوط مدينة الحسكة بيد تنظيم داعش وتقوم باستعادتها من تنظيم داعش وبذلك تفرض سيطرتها عليها بحكم الأمر الواقع، إلا أن صمود الجيش والقوات التي قاتلت معه أضاع الفرصة منهم، ودخلوا لتثبيت نقاط كان الجيش استعادها وبسطوا سيطرتهم عليها».
هذه السيطرة أوجدت حالة من الشك بين الحلفاء ضد تنظيم داعش، بل وصلت إلى حالة المواجهات عندما بدأت «الوحدات» تفرض سيطرتها على أغلب أحياء مدينة الحسكة والسيطرة على مقارها الحكومية وما كان من الصدام بد. وقال قائد إحدى المجموعات المسلحة التي تقاتل إلى جانب الجيش النظامي: «مع تمادي عناصر الوحدات الكردية في التعرض لنقاط الجيش والقوى الأمنية والرديفة لهم كان لا بد من المواجهة مع القوات الكردية، وهذا ما حصل وتدخل سلاح الجو في قصف مقرات الوحدات والآسايش في مدينة الحسكة بداية شهر أغسطس (آب) عام 2016، وعندها أدرك قادة الوحدات أن الحكومة السورية لن تسمح بسيطرتهم على محافظة الحسكة، وكل ما يقومون به هو تحت السيطرة بالنسبة للحكومة السورية».
وتعول الحكومة السورية في تواصلها مع شيوخ العشائر ووجهاء مناطق شمال وشرق سوريا على العنصر العربي، الذي يشكل نحو 70 في المائة من «الوحدات» الكردية، بحسب تصريحات قياداتها التي تنظر إلى هؤلاء كـ«مرتزقة»، كما يقول الشيخ محمد الفارس شيخ عشيرة طي في سوريا. وأضاف: «الوحدات تنظر إلى عناصرها العرب كمرتزقة وهم وقود أي معركة يدخلها الأكراد». وتابع: «عندما يكون الأمر يتعلق بالوطن سيكون العرب وكل شرفاء محافظة الحسكة وكل سوريا يدا واحدة ضد أي مشروع انفصالي أو غيره».
بواسطة Ibrahim Hamidi | ديسمبر 20, 2017 | غير مصنف
The intensity of fighting between the Syrian regime forces and both moderate and Islamic opposition factions has diminished thanks to the ceasefire agreements in several geographical areas. This has derived from the Astana peace process sponsored by Russia, Turkey, and Iran, as well as a ceasefire brokered by the US and Russia in southwest Syria.
The deals stemming from the Astana Agreement in May 2017 led to the ratcheting-up of the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) in eastern Syria, which led to the fall of Raqqa to the international coalition – led by the US and the Syrian Democratic Forces, and dominated by the Kurdish People’s Protection (YPG) Units. In the city of Dir Azzour, ISIS faced the same destiny at the hands of Russia, Syrian regime forces, and its allies from Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah. In light of these critical milestones, the justification Washington and Moscow have provided for continued participation in the Syrian war must end. Syria is now at a crossroads: either the country heads towards permanent and long-term peace, or it enjoys short-term peace that destabilizes the region in the long-run.
The First Scenario: “A Peace to End All Peace”
When the Ottoman Empire collapsed 100 years ago, Britain and France rushed to conclude the Sykes-Picot Agreement to split the Empire’s legacy in the Arab region, thus starting prolonged instability, which the region continues to suffer from. In his great book, A Peace to End All Peace, historian David Fromkin documented the period that coincided with World War I, the traces of which still exist 100 years later. The US and Russia seem to be rushing into a solution in Syria – an in Iraq as well for that matter. There is a worrying parallel between what the US and Russia are doing today, and the French and British models of the 20th century. This is especially the case in Syria if temporary solutions that do not address people’s substantive concerns are suggested. A short-sighted agreement would invariably cause new types of struggles and rebellion to emerge, thus leaving the Syrian crisis insoluble.
Southern Syria
Washington believes that it achieved a breakthrough when an agreement was concluded between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Hamburg in July 2017 to free the “truce areas” in the south of Syria – mainly Daraa, Kenitra, and As-Suwaida – from non-Syrian troops. This means that Iranian and Hezbollah-backed militias will have to retreat from that area, strengthening Moscow’s conviction that it pushed Washington into military cooperation between their two armies in spite of the great tension between them.
The deals stemming from the Astana Agreement in May 2017 led to the ratcheting-up of the fight against ISIS in eastern Syria.
The ceasefire deal covering southern Syria included provisions to establish a control center in Amman; enable the rebel forces to maintain their heavy and medium-range weapons; identify front lines; initiate trade exchange with the areas controlled by the regime; form an opposition local council; and be prepared for the refugees’ return from Jordan and for the existence of displaced persons near the borders. However, a few months into the deal, Russia failed to achieve the agreements’ provisions, due to the gap between US and Russian delegations over how far Hezbollah and Shiite militias should be from the Jordan and Israeli borders.
On the sidelines of the Asia Pacifica Economic Cooperation (APEC) meetings in Da Nang, Vietnam, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov, reached an agreement, which was signed by Trump and Putin on 11 November 2017. The agreement included elements highlighting the importance of de-escalation in southern Syria, near the Jordanian-Israeli border, as a temporary step to maintain the ceasefire and deliver humanitarian assistance. Having reviewed the progress from the agreement the two presidents singed in Hamburg on 8 July 2017, Tillerson and Lavrov welcomed a new memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed between the US, Russia, and Jordan in Amman on 8 November to put the July Astana agreement into action.
This MoU is expected to further strengthen the ceasefire agreement’s success in the “reduction of foreign forces and foreign combatants levels before ultimately freeing the area from them in order to ensure more sustainable peace in the region.” “Foreign forces” is a reference to the Iranian and Hezbollah militias which are deployment between Damascus and Jordan and occupied Golan. The US wants Hezbollah and Shiite militias to withdraw from Jordan and Israel. The control center in Amman, which was established under the Trump – Putin agreement will undertake the task of achieving these provisions and overseeing the implementation of the deal.
However, the likelihood of military escalation in the south of Syria stems from the fact that Israel is dissatisfied with the agreements’ results because it restricted its aircraft’s ability to shell targets of Hezbollah or of any Iranian organizations near Golan or southern Syria. This is separate from Israel’s conviction that Russia will not be able to push Iranian groups a “sufficient distance,” meaning that it would resume air-strikes near Damascus and other parts between the Syrian capital and occupied Jolan. This may foreshadow a confrontation with regional and international dimensions.
Recently, the Israeli army carried out large-scale military maneuvers near the Syrian border, which were intended to send a message to Moscow necessitating that Hezbollah and Iran must be kept away from the border. The media announced that Iran will establish a military base between Damascus and Golan. After the US-Russian agreement in November, the Israelis announced that they need to have a free hand in shelling any Iranian targets in Syria. The Israeli stance will be one of the factors of escalation in Syria amidst Iran’s strengthened presence. This coincided with the talks of building permanent Iranian military bases at a time when the US and Israel were hoping that Russia’s presence would weaken Iran’s role in Syria.
The Opposition Factions Fighting
The opposition factions fighting is one of several challenges in southern Syria. First, there is fighting between factions and warlords. Nearly 35,000 opposition combatants that used to be backed by the Military Operation Center (MOC) led by the CIA will be left unpaid at the end of 2017. At the same time, they are required to fight ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra loyalists in the south, thus starting a new chapter in which they combat extremist factions instead of the regime’s forces.
How long will the Russian veto be respected by Damascus and Tehran?
According to the de-escalation agreement, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions are required to fight ISIS and its ideology – politically and militarily – and expel the Tahrir al-Sham group (which includes Jabhat al-Nusra) after a grace period. This, however, means that a fratricidal struggle is likely to happen between factions that were once fighting together against the regime forces. Without a doubt, the factions’ dominations of the borders between Syria and Jordan and the dwindling external support may cause the warlords’ role to become more visible in view of the taxes they collect on services and trade.
In Ghouta, near Damascus, where a truce prevails under Russian-Egyptian auspices, a similar trend is developing as fighting is escalating between factions and warlords. Fighting had taken place in Damascus and eastern Ghouta before the Jaish al-Islam group joined the truce in Duma, afterwhich the Failaq al-Rahman group in Jobar and eastern Gouta acted similarly. Tahrir al-Sharm has not yet joined the agreement.
The August 2017 Russian-Egyptian agreement provided for the following: The First Party (the FSA) shall be committed to preventing the existence of Tahrir al-Sham group in the territories under its control in the de-escalation area; the FSA shall emphasize its stance against ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra and their hardline ideology in any area under its control; in the case of Jabhat al-Nusra Front affiliates being ready to leave for Idlib – either with or without their families – safe exit guarantees shall be offered by the Second Party. These provisions also apply to the truce in Homs countryside, which was also signed under the auspices of Russia and Egypt.
The Regime Forces Attack
The Syrian regime’s forces are determined to regain control of de-escalation areas when opportunities arise. Damascus’ military solution plan has not changed; it is looking for a suitable opportunity to pounce on opposition areas so as to “bring everyone back under the full authority of the government,” and consider “the truce as an opportunity for reconciliation with it,” as Syrian government officials said recently. Furthermore, Damascus refuses to have a local opposition council, contrary to Moscow’s stance and the truce agreement’s provisions.
The Russian Ministry of Defense deployed nearly 1,000 troops of its Russian (Chechen) military police to the de-escalation areas since May 2017 including the Quneitra, Deraa, Ghouta, and Homs countryside. The troops served as a barrier and frustrated the ambitions of Damascus, which lacks human resources. However, in view of its increased confidence in Damascus, over time these troops may challenge the cross-lines, and Russia may submit to Damascus with a view to “extending the government’s control over the country and maintaining Syria’s unity according to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254,” according to statements from Damascus.[1]
Idlib: Between War and Isolation
In Idlib, there are nearly two million civilians and over 50,000 combatants from hardline and moderate Islamic factions, including over 10,000 in the Tahrir al-Sham group. Washington believes there are nearly 10,000 combatants from Al Qaeda, considering that Jabhat al-Nusra is part of Al Qaeda.
The Russian-Turkish plan is aimed at deploying Turkish military observers in Idlib and around Efrin (north of Aleppo) to isolate al-Nusrah and allow local, civil councils, and moderate opposition factions to remain in Idlib
It is clear that relations between Damascus and the Kurds are heading towards either negotiations or war.
However, another battle in Syria could emerge in the future. Tensions have increased between Tahrir al-Sham and other Islamic factions to the extent that bloody clashes may break out in the coming months. Indications of such tensions were visible when a clash broke out between the Noureddin el-Zinki movement and the Tahrir al-Sham group in the Aleppo countryside. A third war is also possible, as Iran is pushing the regime’s forces and its supporting militias to fight in Idlib. During his visit to Idlib, Ali Akbar Velayati, the advisor of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, declared the need to attack Idlib and Raqqa. Tehran, Damascus, and Hezbollah all had planned to attack Idlib, but Russia managed to prevent it. An important question to consider is how long the Russian veto will be respected by Damascus and Tehran. Furthermore, Turkey announced that it would not allow passage between the areas controlled by the Kurdish YPG – which Ankara considers a terrorist organization – and the Mediterranean Sea, in order to prevent the establishment of a Kurdish province in northern Syria and southern Turkey. Hence, it is expected that some Syrian factions will fight the Kurdish forces in the near future.
Idlib is the second zone established by Turkey in cooperation with Russia. The first zone was in northern Aleppo when Turkey backed the Euphrates Shield campaign whereby the opposition factions dominated nearly 2,000 kilometers. In fact, Operation Euphrates Shield hindered the process of linking two territories established by the Kurdish Democratic Association, the political arm of the YPG. These two territories are Jazeera, near Kobani and east of the Euphrates River and Afrin, north of Aleppo and on the western side of the river.
Ankara and the Kurds
Ankara’s concern about the advancement of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), comprising mainly of the YPG, is heightened for three main reasons. First, the Kurds are advancing with American weapons and a cover from the international coalition led by the US. Second, the Syrian Kurds are considered an extension of the Turkish Kurds in southern Turkey. Third, Syrian Kurdish gains and achievements as well as the separatist aspirations of Iraqi Kurdistan that came under American-Russian pressure may shift the geopolitical aspiration to Turkey.
Ankara and Tehran joined forces to thwart President Masoud Barzani’s independence referendum, thus pushing the two countries to coordinate against western Kurdistan (northern Syria). In fact, such a measure is similar to an agreement in the late 1990s, which involved Ankara, Tehran, and Damascus imposing a no-fly zone in the face of the Kurds in northern Iraq. Furthermore, in spite of Washington’s reassurances that no political promises will be given to Syrian Kurds and that the American and European weapons will be withdrawn from the YPG once ISIS is defeated, the Turkish army may find itself in a position whereby it has to broaden its range of confrontation with the Kurds and cut deep into northern Syria just as happened a decade ago in Iraq.
Since 2012, Damascus has been turning a blind eye to the Kurds’gains on the gounds because they were not a priority. Yet, over time, and as confidence of the Syrian regime increased and the FSA retreated, a new fighting front between Damascus and the Kurds opened and Damascus began to turn a blind eye to the Turkish army’s bombing of the YPG.
This happened previously in Iraq years ago. Besides this, Damascus did almost nothing when the Turkish army backed Euphrates Shield factions to establish an enclave between Aleppo and the border.
In September 2017, 18 countries announced that they will not participate in Syria’s reconstruction efforts unless a political solution is reached as stated by Resolution 2254.”
Officials from Damascus had spoken of an upcoming war against the Kurds, a threat which was repeated by Iranian officials. It is clear that relations between Damascus and the Kurds are heading towards either negotiations or war, and an end to their “marriage of convenience” –which has been in place since 2011 – is looming. The regime forces did not fight the “Democratic Federation,” which is close to the Kurdistan Workers Party, chaired by Abdullah Öcalan. With the regime’s nearly 70,000 combatants and sophisticated weapons from the US and Europe, Damascus focused on fighting the FSA instead.
The US and Russia had agreed unofficially on spheres on influence, something that was confirmed by the agreement singed by Trump and Putin on 11 November 2017. The hotline between Moscow and Washington prevents the emergence of frictions in eastern Syria between the regime’s forces and Hezbollah (backed by the Russian army) on the one hand, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (backed by the international coalition), on the other.
The Democratic Union Party (PYD) – the political arm of the YPG – is aware that Washington betrayed the Iraqi Kurds in the 1970s and acted similarly with the Iraqi Shias in the 1990s – and with the Sunnis in recent years. Therefore, they are not excluding the possibility of the US betraying the Syrian Kurds further down the line after ISIS’ defeat. Some Kurdish officials believe it is in their community’s interest to slow down the fight against ISIS with a view to strengthenING their military presence on the ground under a federation to be established in northern Syria. However, other Kurdish officials are preparing for a “great battlefield” in the Euphrates Valley, considering that ISIS’ elements will gather again after they have escaped from Raqqa, Dir Ez Zour. Kurdish leaders want to keep US military presence in the east of Syria.
The confrontation is possible, especially given that Tehran seeks to test the Trump administration’s military determination to curb Iranian influence and block the way linking Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut. Iran was very keen to control Al Bukamal (north of the US al-Tanaf military base in eastern Syria) and encouraged factions within the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces to cut deep in southern Syria. Should this happen it may pave the way for a possible confrontation with between Damascus and the SDF, or Arab fighters will pull out from the SDF due potential tensions or struggles between Arab tribes and Kurds post-ISIS.
Militias and the Army
The regime-held areas are lacking natural resources. Considering that gas and oil in eastern Syria is under the control of the SDF and US allies, the reconstruction issue has become something akin to a battle. This is because Western countries declined to support such an endeavor without an acceptable political solution – let alone the fact that the regime’s allies in Russia and Iran lack the financial capacity to compensate the cost of destruction in Syria which has exceeded 220 billion dollars.
In a meeting held in New York in September 2017, 18 countries announced that they will not participate in Syria’s reconstruction efforts unless a political solution is reached as stated by Resolution 2254. This decision will cause major problems in regime-controlled areas.
It is interesting to note that when it comes to post-war reconstruction, there have been indications of other possible battles between war lords and new businessmen who emerged by taking advantage of the country’s war economy. Actors such as these are competing for a portion in the future of a country where corruption and crime rates soared dramatically and the administration efficiency declined.
It is also possible that there will be a war between Iranian backed militias and the regime forces. The former comprises both Syrian and foreign elements loyal to Tehran and whose total number exceeds 70,000. In an attempt to balance Iranian influence, the latter includes troops – known as the 5th Corpse – which Russia is trying to maintain by forming Russian-affiliated militias. Moscow decided to form the 5th Corpse particularly because of Putin’s decision not to send ground forces, retaining only the air force and observers from Chechnya. This decision meant that Moscow had to depend on the Tehran-backed militias, thus increasing the tension between the Shiite militias and the Sunni majority in Syria – unless Moscow establishes its own militias in Syria.
It is important not to forget existing sectarian tensions, particularly in Damascus and the areas located between the Syrian capital and the Lebanese border, as well as in the areas controlled by Hezbollah, Tehran’s ally in Lebanon. This is because of the increased presence of Iranian-backed militias that act in a sectarian manner amidst Iranian endeavors to carry out demographic changes unacceptable by a large portion of the Sunni population.
The Second Scenario: Top Down – Bottom up
There is a second complicated course that requires patience and persistence to reach a permanent solution in Syria. It entails a combination of meeting the Syrian people’s demands with major regional countries’ interests whereby Syria – which is at present being characterized by its geopolitical location among Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, and Israel and, on a broader scale, among the Gulf region, Europe, Egypt, and the US – can become a center point for the confluence of interests, rather than a flashpoint as it has been over the past years.
The political process must be led by Syrians, as envisaged by Resolution 2254.”
The deal signed on 11 November 2017 by Trump and Putin covered the cooperation between the two countries’ armies to fight terrorism, defeat ISIS, maintain the no-clash agreement between the two parties, and withdraw the Iranian militias from the South. However, this is not sufficient for Syria and the Syrian people. There is a real need to focus on Provision 3 of the US-Russian agreement concerning the implementation of Resolution 2254, which calls for a ceasefire and political settlement. The agreement included provisions stating that Trump and Putin “had been informed of President Bashar al-Assad’s commitment to the Geneva process, constitutional reform and the elections as required and according to Resolution 2254.” The statement added that the two presidents “believe that this step must include full implementation of Resolution 2254 including constitutional reform, and free and fair elections under the supervision of the UN and according to the highest transparency standards with the participation of all Syrians, including those in diaspora.”
Of course, this Trump-Putin agreement includes another regression in Washington’s position on the Syrian regime. The first regression came with the launch of the Vienna peace process and the establishment of the International Syria Support Group – consisting of over 20 regional and Western countries headed by the US and Russia – after weeks of direct Russian military intervention in late September 2015. At that time, interest in the Geneva Communiqué, issued in 2012, waned gradually, with the Communiqué calling for the formation of a “transitional governing body with full executive powers.” Instead, Resolution 2254 was adopted unanimously in December 2015 and included three provisions: forming a non-sectarian representative system of governance; adopting a new constitution; and holding elections.
The agreement touches upon constitutional reform, which means that the current constitution shall be kept in place – even though the 2012 constitutional referendum took place under the shadows of war and in the absence of nearly six million Syrian refugees and seven million internally displaced persons. The agreement did not indicate to holding presidential elections, rather, it included an approval of President Assad’s position; after meeting with Russian special presidential envoy for Syria Alexander Lavrentiev in October, Assad said that he approves “amending the constitution and holding parliamentary elections.”
Yet, the important part of the elections is that Washington agrees to support the Geneva process under the UN auspices. The Trump administration was not a part of Astana because it objected to Iran’s attendance as a guarantor. Although the Trump administration attended as an observer, it was clear that it became more interested in the launch of the Geneva peace process, especially after the defeat of ISIS in eastern Syria was looming.
This trajectory may lay the foundation for a political process that leads to long-term stability. However, it requires a series of steps: American-Russian sponsorship; political determination to push negotiations forward; participation of major regional countries like Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia with a view to pressuring the opposition to reach understandings and political agreements; and Syria’s unity.
The launch of a political process requires the combination of two approaches: both a bottom-up approach and top-to-bottom. This means that the local councils that were formed in the four de-escalation areas and in the areas liberated from ISIS must participate in the political process. In addition, opposition forces must participate in negotiations with the regime to search for a political and military solution in Damascus. Here, the decentralization model seems to be suitable for Syria in the future: maximum localization or decentralization without dividing the country. It is important that local councils are based on geography, not demographics. According to Resolution 2254, this would maximize Syria’s unity.
Considering the existence of tens of thousands of combatants in both the opposition and the regime forces, it is necessary that a joint military council is formed to gradually guide coordination between combatants, the reformation of security apparatuses and the army, and the establishment of a timetable for disarming militias and removing foreign combatants from Syria.
The launch of a disciplined and gradual process with political and military dimensions must lead to more control over the de-escalation areas in order not to shift into spheres of influence of other countries. Such a procedure must ensure that pre-requisites for political work and a neutral climate are met in order for the Syrian people to decide their own destiny. Additionally, the political process must be led by Syrians, as envisaged by Resolution 2254.
Without a doubt, a solution as such would encourage European countries, the US, the Gulf states, and the regime’s allies all to participate in the reconstruction of Syria and make available 220 billion dollars required to revive the country. In addition, such a process would lay the groundwork for accountability and responsibility for the war crimes committed by different parties, and for addressing the real grievances harbored by hundreds of thousands – even millions – who were victimized by the war. There must be a process for reconciliation as well as for healing the wounds in the social fabric based on tolerance and accountability. History has taught us that a delay in addressing problems causes them to escalate. In fact, Mosul fell into the hands of ISIS years ago because of the delay in addressing the major Sunni component’s problems in Iraq.
The Syria we know has gone, and a new state is being born. So, Syrians must decide which country they wish to live in. Similarly, the neighboring countries have to decide whether their neighbor will be a fragmented failed state that remains a source of threats, terrorism, refugees, chaos, or if Syria will emerge from a bitter war and head towards a better future.
In fact, the urgency to find superficial solutions that do not address crucial issues could lead to the emergence of a new type of insurgency, violence, and more profound rebellion in Syria. Hard-liners could then find supporters among the Syrian people.
There may be several scenarios, but there is one imperative: Syria must not turn into Iraq or Afghanistan.
[1] “Assad: liberation of Der Zour is the not the end of the war,” BBC Arabic, 7 November 2017, http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-41902909
[This article was originally by Turkish Policy Quarterly.]
بواسطة Sam Heller | ديسمبر 20, 2017 | غير مصنف
“The United Nations Security Council is expected to decide this week on whether to renew its legal mandate for Syria’s cross-border humanitarian response. The Security Council vote has the potential to remake the life-saving humanitarian architecture that has been built around the country’s years-long civil war.
The Security Council’s decision may also—despite efforts by backers of renewal to cast it as a purely humanitarian measure—have real political significance. Since 2014, the Security Council has sanctioned cross-border aid without the consent of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, a powerful symbol of Syria’s disintegration and broken sovereignty. The re-centering of the international humanitarian response in Damascus would be another step towards restoring the Assad regime’s international legitimacy and effective political control.
If the Security Council ends this humanitarian framework, it will be another symbolic victory for the Assad regime. But it will also complicate and endanger the humanitarian aid that millions of Syrians rely on—and with which the regime is likely to interfere if it can reassert its hold on aid delivery. It was the regime’s intransigence and abuse that originally prompted the United Nations to suspend the normal rules of state sovereignty. Now, with no real improvement in its conduct, the regime is poised to claw back control over aid to populations it considers hostiles and enemies of the state.
Humanitarians are just hoping to continue providing aid to millions inside Syria, and to keep their own principles mostly intact.
“We’re afraid of getting sucked into a political and diplomatic conversation we have very little control of, and being forced to pronounce ourselves in favor of non-humanitarian compromises,” one humanitarian source told me. Like more than a dozen other humanitarians and donor-country diplomats, he spoke to me on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the upcoming vote and so as not to threaten his organization’s continued work.
Since July 2014, United Nations Security Council resolution 2165 and its various successor resolutions have enabled the delivery of assistance to millions in areas unreachable from Damascus. UNSCR 2165’s mandate has allowed UN agencies to provide assistance themselves and to play a key coordinating role in the broader response, as well as lending international legitimacy to cross-border work by local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). But 2165 has only been renewed in year-long installments, and the current mandate expires on January 10. A Security Council vote to renew the resolution is, as of this writing, expected to be held on Tuesday, December 19.
Renewal essentially depends on the vote of permanent member of the Security Council and Assad-regime ally Russia, and no one has a really reliable sense of what Russia wants. In advance of the vote, Russia has taken a critical line on renewal, complaining about aid diversion and the measure’s violation of Syrian sovereignty. “This mechanism cannot be maintained in its current form,” Russia’s UN envoy said last month.
Most expect that 2165 will be renewed—this time. But even an extension is likely to be only a temporary reprieve, sources told me: a conditional renewal for six months or a year before the resolution is allowed to expire totally. And no one knows for sure. It remains possible that Russia will just veto a renewal outright, leaving humanitarians scrambling to reorganize the response before January 11.
The humanitarians and donors involved in the cross-border response are swimming against a current that runs, inexorably, towards Damascus.
Either way, the humanitarians and donors involved in the cross-border response are swimming against a current that runs, inexorably, towards Damascus. For millions of Syrians caught in that vortex, cross-border assistance provided under UNSCR 2165 has been, in the words of a top UN relief official, a “lifeline.”
“These [relief] organizations will be going, at some point, back to the origin,” a humanitarian told me. “Cross-border will die. What concerns me is the way it will die.”
The Genesis of the UN Cross-Border Response
The Security Council passed UNSCR 2165 in July 2014. The resolution was an expression of international frustration with the Assad regime’s obstruction of aid to besieged and other insurgent-held areas. It came after an earlier resolution aimed at opening up humanitarian access had been ignored.
The original Security Council resolution authorized UN agencies and their implementing partners to provide cross-border assistance “with notification to the Syrian authorities”—not advance permission from Damascus. It permitted the use of four official border crossings, “in addition to those already in use.” That latter clause arguably legitimated the use of unofficial border points such as Fish Khabour, the sole operational crossing to Syria’s northeast. The resolution also mandated the creation of a monitoring mechanism for cross-border UN assistance.
UNSCR 2165 also allowed notification-only cross-line assistance—that is, across conflict lines from regime-held areas to opposition-held areas—but no aid agencies ultimately acted on that permission.
UN agencies have used the 2165 mandate to deliver cross-border assistance from Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq to sections of Syria that have fallen out of central state control. Under the UN mechanism, UN-supported humanitarian cargoes are inspected and sealed before crossing into the country, and some NGOs also use the UN’s cross-border logistics capacity. UN agencies have also partnered with local Syrian and international NGOs to provide cross-border aid, funding them through sub-grants. And the UN has played a key leadership and coordination role in the broader cross-border response, establishing a “Whole of Syria” architecture and a set of “clusters” to coordinate relief actors.
UN-supplied aid is only a fraction of the cross-border aid response. Cross-border aid predated UNSCR 2165, and it also includes humanitarian assistance from NGOs, relief from Gulf charities, and Western-funded “stabilization” assistance for civil society, basic services, and governance. Much of this is sustained remotely through cash transfers, or enters Syria as commercial cargo and is not checked by the UN monitoring mechanism.
But UN assistance is nonetheless vital. According to the UN Secretary-General’s most recent reporting, in October the UN delivered food aid to more than 797,700 people via cross-border convoys. This is in addition to other UN assistance and the systemic impact of the UN’s coordination role on the broader cross-border relief effort, which supports millions. Cross-border beneficiaries were reached consistently—not intermittently, as with cross-line assistance from Damascus. According to the most recent Security Council briefing by UN humanitarian chief Mark Lowcock, on average, just over a quarter of beneficiaries included in bi-monthly access plans actually received cross-line aid, as the government declined to allow UN convoys to proceed. Lowcock said in an October briefing that, on average, only 10 percent of people in besieged opposition-held areas were reached with UN assistance each month this year. Key items, including medical supplies, are regularly removed from aid convoys.
“Our experience with cross-line operations from within Syria,” Lowcock said in October, “leads us to believe that it would be impossible to reach those people in a sustained manner from within Syria.”
“The renewal of the resolution is essential to save lives,” he reiterated last month.
The nonrenewal of UNSCR 2165 would put a halt to UN cross-border assistance and have a larger systemic impact on the cross-border response, including on the international legitimacy and acceptability of cross-border aid generally.
Security Council Maneuvering
Humanitarians told me that as late as this summer, no one was worried about the renewal of UNSCR 2165. By this fall, though, it had become a major concern and a preoccupation of humanitarians and donors—albeit a quiet one.
There has been a conscious collective effort to avoid bringing too much public attention to 2165, even as, privately, it has been the talk of the aid community.Backers of renewal have mostly avoided activist-y letters or public statements, and instead relied on closed-door meetings and advocacy in New York.
“We’re trying to keep a lid on this,” one humanitarian told me. “By upping the attention, we give Russia leverage we don’t want them to have.”
Humanitarians have even avoided creating formal contingency plans, the existence of which might signal their readiness to yield on “technical rollover”—un-amended, year-long renewal. “Plan A is a technical rollover,” said the same humanitarian, speaking last month. “Our line is that there is no Plan B.”
The Security Council’s three permanent Western members—the United States, Britain, and France, the “P3”—favor technical rollover, as do many non-permanent members. The Syrian government, unsurprisingly, is against it. The Syrians claimthat most cross-border assistance ends up in the hands of “terrorist groups” and that these crossings are used to arm militants.
But the swing vote, the only one that really matters, is Russia. Last December, Russia voted for the passage of UNSCR 2332, the latest renewal of 2165. But that vote came after a bruising fight in the Security Council over Aleppo, whose rebel-held eastern neighborhoods were collapsing, and Russia might have had its fill of international reprobation. In 2017, Russia just repeatedly vetoed attempts to renew the internationally sanctioned mechanism to investigate chemical weapons attacks in Syria—a sign that Moscow may be done caring about global outrage.
Russia has signaled, in public and private, that it wants to see the end of UNSCR, at least as it currently exists. In a statement at the Security Council last month, Russia’s UN envoy Vassily Nebenzia made public complaints that Russia had already made privately about aid diversion and insufficient monitoring of cross-border assistance. He said that, thanks to talks sponsored by Russia in Kazakhstan’s capital Astana, the volume of cross-line convoys has increased. In addition, he stressed, 2165 violates Syrian sovereignty. The resolution “is an unprecedented and extreme measure that must now be reassessed,” Nebenzia said.
Humanitarians are emphatic that “de-escalation” agreements, including those concluded in Astana, have not improved cross-line access. “The paradox is that cross-line access doesn’t really exist, and now we’re talking about stopping cross-border,” one told me. They also stress the robustness of the UN monitoring mechanism, on the border and at delivery points.
What exactly Russia wants in exchange for renewing 2165 is unclear. They have floated some amendments and trades in private, including discussion of a new monitoring mechanism. But if the mechanism concentrates on the border, it would seem set up to fail; it wouldn’t capture most non-UN NGO assistance, much of which is based on cash transfers into Syria and local procurement of goods.
Or Russia may just want to close out UNSCR 2165 and move forward. On December 11, Russian president Vladimir Putin visited Syria’s Hmeimim Airbase to declare victory in the fight over the Islamic State and order a partial withdrawal of Russian forces from Syria. Russia is trying to turn the international focus to Syria’s political process and post-war reconstruction. The expiration of 2165 would be a major symbolic step towards the international re-legitimization of the Assad regime and normalcy.
The Russian mission to the UN did not respond to a request for comment prior to publication.
Donor governments and humanitarians are working for UNSCR 2165’s renewal, but it’s not clear how they can affect Russia’s thinking. Even if Russia appears to negotiate, both sides may just be working towards a position Russia has already decided in advance.
As of this writing, the pro-renewal camp has deliberately avoided politicizing the debate over 2165. “We see this as a purely humanitarian mechanism that gets aid to the people who need it the quickest, and closest, and most effective way,” said one Western diplomat. “It’s not a political thing, from our perspective.”
“When the Council discusses this issue, it should be on the basis that it is a purely humanitarian tool,” he said.
The most likely scenario at the time of this writing seems to be renewal of six months to a year with what could be considered a “sunset clause”—for example, a requirement that the UN Secretary-General report on how to improve the assistance monitoring mechanism, which would lay the groundwork for either a substantial revision of 2165 or its end. After this abbreviated renewal period, Russia could decline to renew again.
“I don’t believe it’s not going to be renewed. It would be too much of a headache for everyone,” said one humanitarian. “I think Russia is quite aware right now that cross-border intervention is serving their interests, although it threatens the territorial integrity of the Syrian government.
“They can live with it for a couple months,” she said. “But I don’t think it will be renewed past the summer.”
Russia evidently wants UNSCR 2165 to conclude, but an alternative humanitarian mechanism doesn’t yet exist. The humanitarian community is unprepared for an abrupt end to 2165. Six or nine more months, though, might get them partway there.
“If 2165 is extended a couple months,” the same humanitarian told me, “that could give people a big kick in the ass to work out an alternative way to do operations.”
After UNSCR 2165
Still, there are limits to how much relief agencies can adapt to the end of internationally sanctioned cross-border access.
The worst scenario is that UNSCR 2165 is abruptly vetoed this week and aid organizations are caught flat-footed. In that case, a humanitarian told me, “Plan B is not a plan—just a Titanic moment, where we have to distribute life vests. And I guess the UN will be the orchestra. Just keep playing.”
But the termination of 2165 seems inevitable, either now or next year. Meanwhile, the reasons why the cross-border aid effort exists—and why a newly Damascus-centric response would be disastrous—will not change.
The Damascus relief hub does not have the capacity to compensate for the cross-border response, humanitarians told me. The main obstacle is access—specifically, the impenetrable Syrian government bureaucracy that humanitarians must navigate to secure permissions for cross-line aid convoys. This multi-layer authorization process has not been meaningfully reformed or relaxed, and no humanitarians I spoke to expected it to improve.
When the regime does okay cross-line convoys, it removes key items, caps relief quantities, and rounds down UN population estimates. Thus, even the limited numbers of successful relief convoys can be deceiving. “Access has become the metric of the success of the response,” said the same humanitarian, saying that just because convoy goes in doesn’t mean it’s delivered what’s most needed. “The convoy is counted as ‘reached.’ It’s a volumetric extrapolation.”
A secondary obstacle is that many rebel-held areas are resistant to receiving aid via Damascus, which they see as having political strings attached. They are unfriendly in particular to the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, which is regarded as a political actor.
The cross-border and the cross-line response are complementary. “We’re trying to push the message that both [cross-border and cross-line] should continue,” said another humanitarian. “The worst-case scenario is that the resolution is not renewed, but there also isn’t more access from Damascus. It would be a disaster for this population.”
“For us, cross-border is not preferred,” said another. “But we’re concerned about the lack of any other viable mechanism.”
While nonrenewal of UNSCR 2165 would not be good, its precise impact is unclear. The ramifications for the UN seem mostly known. UN agencies will likely be obliged to base out of Damascus and halt cross-border activities. But for the broader cross-border response, there are a number of variables at work, including the respective reactions of NGOs, donors, and neighboring countries. How much will each of these parties be willing to flout Syrian sovereignty and law, particularly when the Syrian regime-state is making a comeback?
For example, the unofficial Tal Shihab crossing on Syria’s southern border with Jordan “is being used by [international NGOs] thanks to, let’s say, a flexible approach by the Jordanians,” said one humanitarian. “That’s a liberty that’s been agreed to by the Jordanians. The question is how much the Jordanians would like to maintain that unofficial border crossing and put themselves in what would probably be a confrontational stance with the Syrians.
“We’re not in 2013, 2014 anymore, when everyone was betting on Bashar’s regime falling down.”
Many donor countries seem likely to continue their support for cross-border humanitarian assistance. And local and international NGOs could continue working, although they will likely be hit by the loss of UN funding for cross-border programming. Some organizations use the UN mechanisms at the official crossings and lack permissions to send relief through unofficial crossings, which will likely be strained by additional use. And without international legal legitimacy, these NGOs will be vulnerable. Their cross-border activities are illegal under Syrian law, so, for legal cover, they will depend on the goodwill of Syria’s neighbors and their appetite for violating Syrian sovereignty.
Both Turkey and Jordan seem to have recognized that the project of regime change in Syria, in which they participated, has failed. The two countries would both prefer cross-border aid to continue to avoid destabilizing these border areas and setting off new refugee flows, and Turkey has now occupied and taken more direct ownership of sections of Aleppo and Idlib. But Turkey, at least, has already cracked down on relief NGOs, and Jordan’s position on the Assad regime is ambiguous. If reduced cross-border access drove NGOs to, for example, rely more heavily on informal cash transfers to local partners and inside-Syria procurement of supplies, that might be enough to make either country nervous about money changing hands unaccountably and push them to run out more relief organizations. Their staff might be in danger of arrest or deportation.
The unofficial Fish Khabour crossing with Iraq poses its own challenges. It is the main artery of support for Syria’s northeast, which is now controlled by America’s local Kurdish partners in the military campaign against the Islamic State. Because Turkey has closed its border—it considers that Kurdish force a grave terrorist threat—relief and stabilization assistance runs through Fish Khabour. If the end of 2165 imperils NGOs’ ability to send in staff and supplies, that could in turn undermine U.S.-led post-Islamic State stabilization efforts.
The United States might have to make a special diplomatic effort to keep Fish Khabour open and to ensure that whatever Iraqi force is manning the crossing’s other side keeps traffic running. The Assad regime specifically objects to the use of Fish Khabour. In an October letter to the UN Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, Syrian UN envoy Bashar al-Jaafari claimed that Fish Khabour is not covered by UNSCR 2165 and said its use violates Syrian sovereignty. Yet his letter omitted the “in addition to those already in use” clause that has been used to justify aid through Fish Khabour. The crossing figures into Syrian objections both to foreign occupation of Syrian territory and international support for allegedly separatist, non-state governance structures.
But all these reverberations will seemingly shake the relief effort regardless of Tuesday’s vote. UNSCR 2165 cannot last forever. The normal international order does not accommodate this sort of exceptional humanitarian measure. Eventually, the millions of Syrians in areas outside regime control will suffer—although, with luck, not yet.
“If we thought this was something durable, we were wrong,” a humanitarian told me. “It was always temporary.”
Humanitarian Aid and Political Power
Relief organizations are already reorienting towards Damascus, humanitarians told me, and applying for registration to work under the Assad regime. They want to serve needy Syrians where they are; by now, most are living in areas of regime control.
But the regime has not somehow gotten more magnanimous or accommodating as its fortunes have improved. “The Syrian government has been getting more arrogant with NGOs,” said one humanitarian. “They say, if you want to operate from Damascus, you need to accept A, B, C, and D. Are we ready to accept?”
“I doubt they’ll forgive, and I doubt they’ll forget. You will be marked,” another told me, discussing NGOs that had operated cross-border from Syria’s neighbors and that actually manage to register in Damascus.
“So you’ll have a tier of NGOs who have been in Damascus, and will get preferential treatment for access, and a tier in Damascus who will basically be procurement agencies for [the Syrian Arab Red Crescent],” he said. “Life will be fucking miserable, they’ll make them pay.”
This return to Damascus will only further subvert humanitarians’ sacrosanct principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. For years, it has been debatable whether the Syrian aid response was “principled.” Some humanitarians maintain that when NGOs split between one cohort in Damascus and another operating cross-border from Syria’s neighbors and, arguably, chose sides in the country’s war, neutrality and impartiality were finished. But operating from Damascus under a revanchist Assad regime will mean a new level of compromise.
“Ultimately, what [Damascus wants] to achieve is total control of humanitarian action,” a humanitarian told me. “The principle of impartiality, they don’t know about that. They want to be sure assistance is delivered as a peace dividend, not based on needs.”
The shift of the international humanitarian effort to Damascus is a reflection of the regime’s mounting strength and centrality, but it is also, in real terms, an integral part of that power dynamic.
The shift of the international humanitarian effort to Damascus is a reflection of the regime’s mounting strength and centrality, but it is also, in real terms, an integral part of that power dynamic. Humanitarians are not observers to the Syrian war, they are participants.
“We should be careful considering the Syrian government the final winner,” said another humanitarian. “If we think this is the future, the final outcome, we’re probably empowering this government.
“There needs to be some reflection,” he continued. “Are we changing history with our actions? We’re probably not the biggest actor, but there are repercussions to what NGOs do.”
In a country in which assistance is now a major part of the economy, aid flows mean economic and political power. A post-2165 Syria with a single relief hub in Damascus—as opposed to several, including ones in Gaziantep, Amman, and Deirik—is a Syria with a single center of political gravity, towards which all the country’s restive peripheral regions will find themselves drawn. The end of UNSCR 2165 and the reordering of the humanitarian response is another step towards the return of Syria as a single, integral country ruled by the regime from Damascus.
UNSCR 2165 was a suspension of the normal rules of an international system premised on state sovereignty and legitimacy. It couldn’t last.
That system broke down in Syria as the state and country fell apart. Now the regime-led Syrian state is reconstituting itself, and the walls of that system are being rebuilt around it. Inside, Syrians will be trapped.
Sam Heller
[This article was originally published by The Century Foundation.]
بواسطة Motaz al-Hinawy and Basileus Zeno | ديسمبر 14, 2017 | غير مصنف
يُعدّ التعليم بكمّه ونوعه عموماً أداةً أساسيةً للدول لإنتاج هويةٍ وطنيةٍ ورفد الأجيال الناشئة بالإمكانات المعرفية والخبرات العملية الضرورية لبناء مستقبلها ومستقبل بلادها. من هنا فإنّ ما يواجهه النظام التعليمي والتربوي عموماً من تحدياتٍ لا يعد بالأمر السهل وخصوصاً في عصر انتشار المعرفة والتكنولوجيا وثورة الاتصالات والتواصل الاجتماعي المفتوح والتعدد في مصادر المعرفة وتنوعها، لذا كان لا بد من تطوير مناهج تعليمية متطورة تواكب هذه التغيّرات الجذرية المتسارعة. يُضاف إلى التحدّيات النظرية السابقة المهمة الأصعب التي تواجه أي لجنة تطوير للمناهج ألا وهي إعداد مناهج تعليمية في بلادٍ تعاني من تراجعٍ في معدلات التنمية وشرخ بين المعرفة والعمل.
أما في الحالة السورية، فإنّ تراجع النظم التعليمية وإهمال القطاع التعليمي وانعدام الاستثمار في ميادين المعرفة والبحث وهيمنة الأجهزة الأمنية والذي يعود إلى فترات ما قبل الحرب بوقتٍ طويل قد تلاه حرب أهلية مدمرّة وانقسامات حادة ضمن البيت الواحد، أمور جعلت صياغة مفاهيم متداولة كبديهيات كالوطن والهوية والجغرافية مسائل بالغة التعقيد والتشابك مع الظرف الراهن.
يُعتبر بناء المناهج وتطويرها مشروعاً تربوياً وسياسياً مقصوداً ومنظماً، ومعنى ذلك أنَ الأهداف المرجوة واضحة ومُحدّدة وكذلك الخطط والأنشطة والوسائل المناسبة لتحقيق تلك الغايات. إنّ وضع أي منهاج تعليمي يمر بمراحل متسلسلة، بحيث يبدأ من وضع الأهداف والغايات البعيدة والتي تحتاج لزمن طويل نسبياً لتحقيقها وهي مستمدة من السياسة العامة للدولة ومن فلسفة وقيم المجتمع إلى جانب القيم الأخلاقية والإنسانية العامة.
في ضوء ذلك يتم تحديد أهداف جزئية ومرحلية متفرعة عن الأهداف العامة حتى يصل الأمر إلى الهدف الذي يجب أن يتحقق من حصة دراسية واحدة. من هنا يتم بعدها اختيار محتوى المناهج والطرق والوسائل المناسبة، كما يتم وضع برنامج تقييمي ومراجعة دورية على مستوى المحلي (المنطقة، والمحافظة) والوطني (على مستوى البلد) لمعرفة مدى تحقق تلك الأهداف.
السؤال الإشكالي والمهم هنا: ما هي هذه الأهداف؟ وما هو المجتمع الذي تسعى المناهج التعليمية للوصول إليه؟ وفي سياقات طارئة، كالحرب مثلاً، هل يمكن فصل العملية التعليمية أو المناهج عن باقي مناحي الحياة أو عن مشاكل المجتمع وحاجاته؟ هل يمكن فصل العملية التعليمية عن الصدمات النفسية التي يعانيها الأطفال، أو عن الأرقام المقلقة حول نسبة الأطفال المتسربين من المدارس [1]، أو حتى مناهج تعليمية أخرى أو مُعدّلة [2] تمّ فرضها في مناطق خارج السيطرة الحكومية؟ هل يوجد إرادة حقيقية للتغيير؟ وكيف ستتم؟ وهل تعتبر المقارنات مع تجارب دول أخرى مشروعة وممكنة؟ ما جدوى الجدل القائم في سورية اليوم حول المناهج في ظل واقع سياسي واجتماعي واقتصادي منهار؟ ألا يقتصر تغيير المناهج على الشكليات فقط دون المساس بالجوهر والمضامين، لاسيما مع كثرة الخطوط الحمراء التي لا يمكن تجاوزها؟ وهل من الممكن إلغاء مادة التربية الدينية والوطنية من المناهج وخصوصاً في المراحل الأولى؟ أسئلة كثيرة يمكن طرحها هنا ولكن في ظل الواقع السوري الراهن ما هو المستحيل وما هو الممكن؟
هنا، نحاول رصد الجدل الذي دار حول المناهج الدراسية الجديدة وتداعياته وردود الأفعال في سورية والإعلام.
وسائل التواصل الاجتماعية والتخبطات الوزارية
الجدل الحاصل في سورية اليوم حول المناهج الجديدة والانتقادات التي وجهت إليها كانت بتأثير ما نشر عبر مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي من صورٍ لبعض الدروس والفقرات الإشكالية والتي اتضح أن الكثير منها كان مزوراً أو غير موجود في المناهج المفترضة. وبدلاً من قراءة المناهج الجديدة (52 كتاباً)، والتي لم تشمل جميع المناهج التعليمية، ونقدها على أساس علمي ومنهجي والتركيز على صحة المعلومات وقيمتها [3]، تحوّلت المنشورات على موقع “فايسبوك” إلى مقالاتٍ وأداةٍ صراعٍ جديدة حول جزئياتٍ عكست الاستقطابات الايديولوجية التي باتت متوقعة مسبقاً بين السوريين. فمثلاً اعترض مؤيدون للنظام للسوري على نشر قصيدة للشاعر ياسر الأطرش فتمّ إلغاء القصيدة واستبدالها بقصيدة أخرى بناءً على قرار وزاريٍ. يبدو الأمر للوهلة الأولى خبراً عادياً، لكن سبب الإلغاء يطرح علامات استفهام حول بديهيات كتعريف من هو السوري المنشود إعادة بنائه، فالقصيدة لم تُلغ بسبب عدم ملاءمتها لسنّ الأطفال أو نتيجةً لأخطاءٍ مطبعية بل بسبب ضغط شعبي من قبل مؤيدين للنظام السوري ممن رفضوا تدريس قصيدة لشاعر محسوب على المعارضة! الوزارة لم تبرّر سبب إلغاء القصيدة في القرار ولم تُشر حتى إلى اسم الشاعر أو إلى عنوان القصيدة وانما اكتفت بالإشارة إلى ورودها في الصفحة رقم (6) من كتاب التربية الموسيقية في الصف الأول، لكن القرار نفسه أورد القصيدة البديلة “وطني” بالكامل مع اسم الشاعر سائر علي إبراهيم. (الصورة رقم 1) [4].
الصورة رقم 1 : قرار وزاري ينص على إلغاء قصيدة لشاعر معارض
كما أصدرت الوزارة قراراً آخر قضى بإعادة لواء إسكندرون والجولان إلى خريطة سورية بعد اعتراضات على ورود خريطة في الصفحتين /169-204/ في كتاب مادة علم الأحياء والبيئة (كتاب الطالب والأنشطة والتدريبات) للصف الأول الثانوي لاتضمّ المنطقتين (الصورة رقم 2).
الصورة رقم 2 : قرار وزاري ينص على استبدال خريطة الجمهورية العربية السورية بالخارطة المرفقة بالقرار
في مقابلة مع التلفزيون الرسمي السوري أقرّ دارم طباع، مدير المركز الوطني لتطوير المناهج التربوية، بوجود أخطاء في بعض الكتب الجديدة ونوه بدور وسائل التواصل في تسليط الضوء عليها مبكراً، لكن أكدّ في الوقت نفسه أن الخرائط كلها صحيحة. وفي إجابةٍ غامضة، أوضح طباع أنّ الخريطة التي أثارت الرأي العام كانت “تمريناً للطلاب ]حيث[ وُضعت الحدود فقط بدون الجوانب الأخرى، فكانت هي مأخوذ منها جزء كأن لواء إسكندرون غير موجود فيها. أعيد ترتيبها، أي يعني عبارة عن خط، أما الخرائط الأخرى بنفس الكتاب فكلها كاملة وفيها لواء اسكندرون ولا يُمكن لأحد أن يُقيمها [المقصود أن يُلغيها].” [5] وفي لقاءٍ آخر مع البرنامج الأسبوعي “من الآخر” الذي يعدّه ويُقدّمه الإعلامي جعفر أحمد ويُبث على الفضائية الرسمية السورية و”سوريانا اف ام”، استهل مُقدّم البرنامج حلقته بقراءة عريضة من عشرة بنود باسم “الشعب السوري” وتُطالب، ضمن ما تطالب به، بمحاكمة مطوّري المناهج قبل أن يسأل، بنبرة أقرب لأسلوب المحقق، عن “الكوارث” التي حدثت. ومن جملة الأسئلة يتطرق أحمد مباشرة للشاعر المعارض مشككاً “هل وجود قصائد لياسر الأطرش تعزيز للانتماء الوطني؟” فيجيب طبّاع:
“هذه للأسف لم ينتبه إليها أحد، وكلهم ظنوه من أسرة الأطرش الكريمة [ملمحاً إلى عائلة سلطان باشا الاطرش قائد الثورة السورية ضد الانتداب الفرنسي، من محافظة السويداء في حين أنّ الشاعر ياسر الأطرش من محافظة إدلب].”[6]
وبين الاعتراضات التي أثيرت من مؤيدين ومعارضين على السواء بعض أغلفة الكتب المتداولة التي وُصفت بـ”المفزعة”[7]، فمثلاً كان هناك استهجان لوجود صورة على غلاف كتاب التاريخ لتمثال فسّره علمانيون بأنه مفزع وذو مضامين دينية واضحة من ذقنٍ طويلة وشاربين حليقين، في حين فسرّه إسلاميون متشددون بأنه “استعادة للوثنية” (صورة رقم 3)، وصورة لامرأة محجبة على غلاف كتاب اللغة العربية [8]، ليتضح الأمر بأنّ التمثال لحاكم مملكة ماري إيكو شاماغان (2453 قبل الميلاد)، وصورة المرأة هي لوحة للفنان السوري أدهم اسماعيل (صورة رقم 4 ).
[9] صورة رقم 3 : صورة أغلفة كتب التاريخ الجديدة، ويبدو الغلاف المثير للجدل في الوسط
ووصلت تأويلات بعض المعارضين إلى حدّ اعتبار المناهج الجديدة استهدافاً لـ “الهوية العربية والإسلامية”. ففي لقاءٍ مع برنامج “هنا سوريا” الذي تبثه قناة “أورينت” المعارضة، وصف ضيف الحلقة مازن رشيد وهو مدرس لغة عربية مقيم في إسطنبول صور أغلفة المناهج الجديدة بأنها: “مشينة، وإنما هي إخفاء للحضارة العربية الإسلامية. إنما هي تواصل أو بالأحرى اتصال بالوثنية…هي رسالة واضحة للتخلص من المظلة العربية، هي رسالة واضحة للتخلص من المظلة الإسلامية، هي رسالة واضحة أيضاً للعمل لصالح الأجندة الشيعية والاشتراكية.“[10]
لكن من غير الواضح ما الذي لفت انتباه رشيد في هذه الأغلفة على أنه دليل واضح على تنفيذ أجندة “شيعية واشتراكية” وما الذي يجمع “الشيعية بالاشتراكية؟”
[11] صورة رقم 4 : صورة أغلفة كتب اللغة العربية وآدابها
تفاقمت ردود الأفعال حول الموضوع الى حدّ عقد جلسة مُساءلة لوزير التربية أمام مجلس الشعب (البرلمان) [12]، كما عُقدت حواراتٌ وندواتٌ تلفزيونية وإذاعية حول الموضوع عدا عن كمّ التعليقات والمقالات والعرائض والانتقادات التي انتشرت كالنار في الهشيم على مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي.
إنّ اعتبار التصريحات الرسمية بأنّ ما يجري من نقاشاتٍ وحواراتٍ أمر جيد ويُعزّز لغة الحوار هو أمرٌ مُستغرب تماماً. إذ من ناحية بُنيت العديد من المشاحنات على أسس مغلوطة أساساً كمشاركة صور لآيات تكفيرية من مناهج “داعش” أو مناهج من دول أخرى على أساس أنها صور من المناهج الجديدة، ومن ناحية أخرى يُعتبر إعداد مناهج التعليم من تخصص مؤسسات ولجان أكاديمية ومهنية تحتكر كافة الصلاحيات دون تدخل من أي جهة وأقصى ما يمكن الأخذ به هو مجموعة المقترحات التي يمكن أن تقدم من المُدرسين والموجهين.
أمّا محتوى المناهج وما تقدمه حتى وإن كانت بالغة الأهمية لا يمكن تقييمه إلا في سياق النظام التعليمي ككل، فالمدارس التي تُشبه الثكنات العسكرية إلى حدّ كبير والغرف الصفية المزدحمة التي قد تصل الى 50 طالباً، وخاصة بعد تهدم معظم المدراس جرّاء القصف والاشتباكات وحركات النزوح الداخلية، وقلة الوسائل التعليمية واستخدام طرق وأساليب تدريس غير ملائمة وقديمة تعتمد على التلقين المباشر والتحفيظ الحرفي، عدا عن واقع الطلاب والمدرسين النفسي والاقتصادي والرواتب القليلة، كل ذلك له انعكاساته المباشرة على نتائج التعليم. وبالتالي فإنّ أي محاولة جدية للنهوض بالتعليم والتربية يجب أن تأخذ بعين الاعتبار كل تلك الأسباب والعوامل، بمعنى آخر يجب أن تطبق نظرية النُظم في التعليم باعتبار أنّ العملية التعليمية نظام متكامل له مُدخلات وعمليات ومخرجات وتقويم، وأنّ أي خلل في جزء من النظام سينعكس سلباً عليه ككل.
مناهج التعليم وصناعة الهوية
يُميز الفيلسوف الماركسي الفرنسي لوي ألتوسير (1918-1990) بين “جهاز الدولة القمعي” و”أجهزة الدولة الإيديولوجية،” التي تضم مجموعة من الأجهزة منها جهاز الدولة الإيديولوجي التعليمي الممثل بالمدارس [13]. لذا تحتكر الدول عملية إعداد المناهج الدراسية لتكوين هوية أفرادها القومية واتجاهاتهم السياسية، حيث يتم وضع المناهج بحيث تتوافق مع سياسة الدولة، أو بالأحرى النخب الحاكمة، حول القضايا الخارجية والداخلية وضمن رؤية تهدف إلى إعادة إنتاج علاقات الإنتاج.
من هنا تأتي إلزامية التعليم كجزءٍ من أدوات الدولة التي تُعلن سيطرتها على حدودها المُعلنة وتحتكر صياغتها لتحديد المسموح به من حيث اللغة الأم والتاريخ والجغرافية وهوية الدولة والمجتمع القوميتين (والدينية كما في معظم مناهج العالم العربي). كما تلعب التربية ومناهج التعليم دوراً كبيراً في إعادة إنتاج الأدوار الجندرية وتكريس الثقافة المهيمنة [14].
خلال فترة حكم الرئيس السوري (الراحل) حافظ الأسد (1970-2000)، كان يتم التركيز في مواد التاريخ والجغرافية واللغة العربية على المجتمع ككل ضمن إطار رؤية مُوحدة تعتبر المجتمع السوري مجتمعاً عربياً أولاً وجزءاً لا يتجزأ من وطنٍ عربي تعرّض لتجزئة استعمارية ومؤامراتٍ مستمرة أطاحت بمعظم المشاريع الوحدوية. كان على السوريين آنذاك مواجهة تناقضاتٍ وجودية، لكن بصمتٍ أو في سهرات البيوت الخاصة، جراء حفظ دروسٍ تتعلق بممارسة الديمقراطية الشعبية وحكم الشعب وحكم القانون وحياتهم الفعلية وسط ثقافة الخوف اليومية من سطوة الأمن والفساد وقصص المعتقلين والمختفين قسرياً. واختزلت مشاكل المجتمع على ضرورة مواجهة التحديات الخارجية “الراهنة” والظروف “الاستثنائية” التي تعيشها الأمة. كما مثّل فرض اللباس العسكري الموّحد والمنظمات المؤدلِجة كطلائع البعث واتحاد شبيبة الثورة كإطارٍ أوحد لتنظيم نشاطات الطلاب حتى على مستوى الفن والشعر والموسيقا، بالإضافة إلى معسكرات الصاعقة والمعسكرات الإنتاجية خلال المرحلة الثانوية وفرض معسكرات التدريب الجامعي على طلاب الجامعة (الذكور) جزءاً من عملية عسكرة المجتمع ككل وفرض هيمنة الدولة الشمولية على مستوى المؤسسات والأفراد على حساب تطور الطفل والمراهق نفسياً وفكرياُ، وقد شملت هذه السياسة “التربوية” أجيالاً بكاملها. كما مثّلت مادة التربية القومية الإشتراكية (الصورة رقم 5) الدليل الإيديولوجي المؤطّر لأي رؤية سياسية منشودة من قبل دولة الحزب الواحد، على الأقل على المستوى النظري والرسمي، أما على مستوى الممارسة الفعلية فلم تكن بالنسبة لمعظم الطلاب أكثر من مادة للنجاح أو مجرّد كتاب حزبي. ورغم التوجه العلماني الشكلي، بحكم سيطرة حزب البعث العربي الاشتراكي الحاكم المطلقة على كافة قطاعات ومؤسسات الدولة، بقي تدريس التربية الدينية الإسلامية والمسيحية جزءاً أساسياً مفروضاً، وليس اختيارياً، على الطلاب.
الصورة رقم 5 : صفحة من فهرس كتاب “التربية القومية الاشتراكية” للصف الثالث الثانوي العام والفني والمهني والشرعي. من إصدارات المؤسسة العامة للمطبوعات والكتب المدرسية للعام الدراسي 1996-1997 أرشيف خاص
كان الهدف من المناهج التي سادت خلال تلك المرحلة إعادة تشكيل مجتمعٍ من لونٍ واحد وتأطيره بمفاهيم موحدة تتماشى مع الإيديولوجيا السياسية المهيمنة وطبيعة نظام الحكم الموجود بغض النظر عن التعقيدات الطبقية والمجتمعية التي تتفاوت من محافظة إلى أخرى بما فيه التنوع الاثني والطائفي. وتعتبر القضية الكردية أحد أهم الأمثلة على ذلك. إذ رغم وجود إرثٍ ثقافي ولغوي مختلف فإن المناهج الموضوعة لم تراع ذلك فكانت اللغة العربية هي لغة التعليم ومُنعت اللغة الكردية من المدارس بشكل كامل مما عرّضهم لتهميشٍ وتغريبٍ مضاعف. فمن ناحية، كان العديد منهم أبناءً أو أقارب أو جيراناً للأكراد المجرّدين من جنسيتهم بسبب إحصاء عام 1962، الذي تمّ في عهد حكومة الانفصال، ومن ناحية ثانية، فُرض عليهم تبني هوية ولغة واحدة بدلاً من الاعتراف بهويتهم كجزءٍ أساسي من الهوية السورية. ولكن مع تبدّل الأوضاع السياسية اليوم نرى أن أول ما فعلته الإدارة الذاتية الكردية [15] هو فرض مناهج تعليم خاصة على الصفوف الثلاثة الأولى الابتدائية (خلال العام الدراسي 2015-2016) تعتمد اللغة الكردية لأول مرة في سورية، وتم تبرير هذه الخطوة بأنها ضرورية وأساسية لـ “استعادة الهوية الكردية.” [16] وقد شهدت هذه الخطوة اعتراضاتٍ ورفضاً من قبل بعض الأهالي مما أدى إلى إغلاق بعض المدارس كما في حي غويران في الحسكة [17]. كما أدت التجاذبات والخلافات المستمرة بين مديرية التربية، بوصفها مؤسسة حكومية رسمية، وهيئة التربية التابعة للإدارة الذاتية [18] إلى تأرجح مستقبل طلاب تلك المناطق بين كفة التوافق السياسية بين كافة الأطراف من ناحية، وبين خطر عدم الاعتراف بشهاداتهم في حال انهياره مما يُهدّد الآفاق المستقبلية للطلاب الراغبين باستكمال دراساتهم الجامعية على المدى البعيد. لذا مازالت مناهج التعليم التي تُقرّها وزارة التربية معتمدة إلى حدٍّ كبير، مع بعض التعديلات، حتى في المناطق خارج السيطرة الحكومية. فمثلاً قامت “هيئة الشام الإسلامية” التي تأسست في تشرين الأول (أكتوبر) 2011 باعتماد المنهاج السوري الرسمي وإعادة طباعته، بعد حذف مادة التربية القومية الاشتراكية، التي بات اسمها “التربية الوطنية،” وكل ما يتعلق بحزب البعث الحاكم في سورية وعائلة الأسد، وقامت بتوزيعه على بعض المخيمات في الداخل وحلب (قبل أن تفقد المعارضة سيطرتها على المدينة) وبعض المدارس في المدن التركية [19].
يُضاف إلى جميع التحديات السابقة هوية الأفراد، كسوريين، في فترة ما بعد الحرب حيث يعيشون ويعشن خضمّ مرحلةٍ من الهويات المتصارعة في مرحلة تعتبر أساسية لتكوين شخصيتهم/ن وتوجهاتهم/ن وأفكارهم/ ن.
المناهج الجديدة: صعوبات الحياة والبحث
في زيارة قمتُ [20] بها لإحدى المدارس في مدينة السويداء في 28 أيلول (سبتمبر) 2017، توجهتُ للإدارة لأسأل عن إمكانية اطلاعي على بعض المقررات القديمة في أرشيف المدرسة لتصويرها بغية إجراء مقارناتٍ مع زميلي في البحث، لكنّ المديرة أخبرتني بوجود تعليمات تقتضي بإتلاف الكتب كل خمس سنوات لكنها اقترحت عليّ بأن أسأل عامل النظافة في المدرسة لأنه يجمع الكتب المعدة للإتلاف ليستخدمها للتدفئة. وعندما سألت أقاربي وأصدقائي عن كتبهم المدرسية (قبل عام 2000) تراوحت إجاباتهم بين تصريف هذه الكتب قبل سنواتٍ طويلة، أو منحها لآخرين عندما كانت معتمدة من قبل الوزارة، أو أنهم استخدموها مع دفاترهم القديمة للتدفئة خلال الشتاء القاسي الذي شهدته المنطقة في السنوات الماضية [21]. وعندما سألتها عن رأيها في المناهج الجديدة أجابت:” بصراحة لم أجد اختلافاً كبيراً بين المناهج القديمة والجديدة باستثناء كتاب الموسيقا للصف الأول الذي كنا نحلم بوجوده في أيامنا وبعض الأساليب الجديدة في تدريس المواد.”
وقد طلبت مني المديرة أن أتوجه بسؤالي للمعلمات في المدرسة. ذهبت إلى غرفة الإدارة حيث وجدت معلمتين تتبادلان أحاديث جانبية، وبعد أن بادرتهنّ بالتحية توجهت بالسؤال لإحداهنّ فعدّلت من جلستها ومن نبرة صوتها وأجابت بعباراتٍ جاهزةٍ كما لو أنها كانت تخاطب موجهاً موفداً من التربية: “المناهج جيدة وغنية، وقد قمنا باتباع دورةٍ لاستخدام أساليب التدريس الجديدة كالتعلم باللعب والنشاط والتعلم الذاتي وإثراء ذكاء ومعارف الطفل ومهاراته.”
وعندما طلبت منها أن توضح لي الأمر بالأمثلة وحول الآلية التي سيتم أو تتم عبرها تطبيق هذه الأساليب في المدرسة، حاولت التهرّب من الإجابة عبر سرد مشاكل التدريس وضعف الإمكانيات المتاحة. حاولت استقصاء آراء مدرسين آخرين وكانت إجاباتهم/ن متفاوتة بين التعاطي الجدي والنقدي وبين الاكتراث وفقدان الأمل في أي مستقبل مع تردي الأوضاع الاقتصادية وحالة الحرب والتمزق الاجتماعي. فبحسب تامر (اسم مستعار، 34 عاماً، مدرس مادة التاريخ لمرحلة التعليم الأساسي) المشكلة ليست بالمناهج ولا بالمدرسين وإنما في “جيل الطلاب الذي لا يريد أن يتعلم ولا يعرف قيمة العلم” معقباً بنبرة متحسرة “في أيامنا كنا نحلم بربع المتوفر لدى هؤلاء الطلاب، ورغم ذلك كنا ندرس وننجح رغم كل الصعوبات. حالياً يوجد مشاكل كثيرة ضمن الأسرة وبين الأهالي مما ينعكس مباشرةً على المدرسة، ماذا بوسع المدرس أن يُصلح لُيصلح؟”
الأمر الذي أثار دهشتي هو عدم إشارة تامر الى ظروف الحرب، فرغم كل الصعوبات التي عايشناها لا يُمكن مقارنتها بالأوضاع الكارثية الحالية.
كما التقيت بربيع (اسم مستعار، 45 عاماً، موظف، سائق في مديرية الزراعة) وسألته عن المناهج الجديدة باعتبار أن أولاده مازالوا طلاباً في المدارس الحكومية، فأجابني بصراحة: “تباً لهذا البلد وللمدراس ولمن فيها، لولا إلزامية التعليم لكنت أخرجت أولادي منها وعلمتهم إتقان مصلحة حرفية يعيشون منها. يكفي أنهم يعرفون القراءة والكتابة، ما الذي سيجنونه من العِلم؟ في هذه البلاد العلم لايُطعم خبزاً، وحتى لو درسوا وتخرجوا من الجامعات ماهي فرص العمل المتوافرة؟ إما أنهم سيُعلّقون هذه الشهادات على الجدران ويجلسون دون عمل، أو سيعملون بأعمال البناء، وبأحسن الأحوال قد يعملون في وظيفة حكومية وبراتب شهري لايُعادل حالياً ما قد يجنيه أحدهم في يوم إذا أتقن مصلحة!”
في إجابة تتوافق مع هموم ربيع اليومية، استغرب حسن (اسم مستعار،31 عاماً، مدرس مادة اللغة عربية لمرحلة التعليم الأساسي) سؤالي قائلاً: “بصراحة لا يهمّني الموضوع، هل أنت جاد بسؤالك؟ سيبقى الوضع أعوجاً ولن يتصلّح مهما حاولنا. أنا أعطي الدروس المُكلّف بها وأعمل ما بوسعي، ولكن الأهم هو هذا الراتب في نهاية الشهر. وكما تعلم فأنا أعمل سائقاً لسيارة أجرة كل مساء لأؤمّن مصاريفي ورغم أنّ الراتب لايساوي هراءً إلا أنه يبقى مصدراً ثابتاً ومضموناً كل شهر.” أما منال (اسم مستعار، 31 عاماً، صحفية مستقلة) فقد استنكرت هدر الأموال العامة على تطوير المناهج على حساب الاستثمار فيما قد ينفع الناس الذين يرزحون تحت ضغوط اقتصادية بالغة الصعوبة.
الإشكاليات المثارة حول المناهج السورية القديمة منها والجديدة كثيرة، ولكن حسب رأي رامي (اسم مستعار، 36عاماً، معلم موسيقا لمرحلة التعليم الأساسي) هناك مفاصل حساسة ومهمة تتلخص بأمرين: الأول يتعلق بتعليم الدين في المدارس، والثاني يتعلق بتنمية القدرات الإبداعية والفنية والنقدية للطلاب. وشرح رامي ما يقصده بالتأكيد ضرورة الربط بين منطقية العملية التعليمية والمعلومات التي يكتسبها الطالب بما يحترم عقله وتفكيره بالدرجة الأولى “فكيف لطالب أن يخرج من درس العلوم مثلا وقد تعلم نظرية دارون عن أصل الأنواع والتطور وفي نفس الوقت تُعلمه دروس الدين نقيض ذلك وتقول له بأن آدم وحواء هم أصل البشرية. أو كيف له أن يدرس في الجغرافية والفيزياء حركة الكواكب وكروية الأرض ونشوء الكون وطبيعة المادة والعناصر، ليصطدم بمن ينفي كل ذلك. فالتناقضات العقلية والمعرفية وحتى النفسية عند الطفل ستكون كارثية.” ويضيف قائلاً: “لا يمكن أن نكون حالمين بإمكانية إلغاء الدين من المدارس أو علمنة المناهج ولكننا نستطيع أن نُعلّم قيماً أخلاقيةً تتضمنها الأديان بدلاً من التركيز على تعاليم الدين نفسه وبخاصة في المراحل الدراسية الأولى.”
ويذكر كاتبا هذه السطور خلال دراستهما الثانوية في السويداء، كيف أن أستاذ التربية الإسلامية كان يُدرّس مادة الرسم في الوقت نفسه ويمنع أي تصويراتٍ لكائناتٍ حية باعتبار أنها تضاهي ” خلق الله.” [22]
أما فيما يتعلق بتنمية الابداع والفن، استنكر رامي التقليل من أهمية دروس الرسم والموسيقا باعتبارها مواد ثانوية بالمقارنة مع المواد الأساسية وإهمال دورها الهام جداً في بناء وتوازن شخصية المُتعلّم وتشكيل وعيه. عدا عن ذلك “ماتزال الطرق المتبعة في التدريس بدائية لا تُنمّي مهارات التفكير الحر والحوار ولا تحفز على الإبداع.”
في المحصلة، يعكس الجدل الدائر حول المناهج التعليمية عدة نقاط لا يمكن عزلها عن سياق الصراع نفسه. أولاً، ينبغي في البداية الإقرار بأنّ أي تغيير طرأ أو يطرأ على مناهج التعليم يمسّ مباشرةً السوريين الذين مازالوا مقيمين في الداخل، سواء في مناطق السيطرة الحكومية أو في مناطق سيطرة المعارضة، وبدرجة أقل بكثير السوريين المقيمين في الخارج أو اللاجئين. لانقصد هنا إعادة إنتاج الفرز السائد، والإيديولوجي أساساً، بين “جماعة الداخل” و”جماعة الخارج”، وإنما الدفع نحو شيء من الانعكاسية في التقييم، فالملايين التي نزحت عن بلادها إما أنها قد سجلت أولادها في مدارس في مواطن اللجوء (خاصة في الدول الأوروبية وأمريكا) أو أنها تعاني انقطاعاً في سبل مواصلة التعليم (خاصة في المناطق العربية المجاورة). وبالتالي فإنّ تداعيات الجدل حول المناهج أكثر مصيرية على السوريين في الداخل، على الأقل على المدى القصير، وعلى الجميع على المدى المتوسط والبعيد.
ثانياً، مما لاشكّ فيه أنّ مناهج التعليم ليست فقط وسيلة تعليمية ولكنها أيضاً وسيلة سياسية وإيديولوجية بامتياز لذا تحتكرها الدول، أو تسعى لاحتكارها، وتفرض إلزاميتها لما لها من دورٍ جوهري في تكوين هويات متخيلة تنسجم مع رؤية وتطلعات النخب الحاكمة وتوجهات الدولة. [23] الأمر الذي يطرح تساؤلاً حول فعالية المناهج وأهدافها المنشودة على المدى البعيد في ضوء الحرب المستمرة ووسط نزوح وتشريد أكثر من نصف السكان. خلال الحرب الحالية ازدادت نسب التسرب المدرسي وخضع الأطفال في مناطق مختلفة، من ضمنها مخيمات اللجوء، إلى مناهج متعددة أو معدّلة أو مناقضة لما يحياه الطفل. فالتناقضات التي تزرعها هذه المناهج في أجيال الحرب تتفاقم مع التجربة الحياتية للأطفال أنفسهم، فلا يكاد يخلو بيت لم يفقد ضحية على يد أحد أطراف الحرب، ولا يقل الأثر النفسي لهذا الفقدان ولوم “الآخر” عن أثر العملية التعليمية نفسها. أخيراً، كما أشارت بعض آراء المدرّسين، لا يمكن اعتبار تطوير المناهج عملاً جذرياً مالم يتم توجيه النقد لجذور العملية التعليمية والتربوية، وإلا فإنه لن يقود إلا إلى حلقة مفرغة مفضياً إلى النتائج نفسها مهما كانت المناهج الجديدة غنيةٍ بالمعلومات والأساليب الجديدة.
هوامش:
1 من بين كل ثلاثة أطفال سوريين يوجد طفل غير ملتحق بالمدارس، وحوالي 1.4 مليون آخرين مهددين بالانقطاع عن الدراسة. يُضاف إلى ذلك تعرض مدرسة من بين كل أربع مدارس لأضرار، أو دمار، أو احتلال، أو إغلاق، أو إعادة الاستخدام كمأوى، أنظر:
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 2017 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic. December. 2016. p.11.
2 مازال المنهاج السوري الرسمي معتمداً في معظم المناطق التي تسيطر عليها المعارضة مع بعض التعديلات في بعض المناطق تناولت حذف الإشارات لإنجازات حزب البعث ومنجزات الأسدين. للمزيد يمكن الاطلاع على: درويش، صبر: العملية التعليمية في مناطق سيطرة المعارضة المعتدلة. سوريا حكاية ما انحكت. 21 حزيران، 2015.
3 كان المؤرخ السوري سامي مبيض قد انتقد سابقاً كتاب “تاريخ الوطن العربي الحديث والمعاصر” المقرر في منهاج البكالوريا الأدبي والصادر خلال العام الدراسي 2014-2015 لما احتواه الكتاب من أخطاء تاريخية فادحة عدّد منها اثنتين وعشرين نقطة. انظر مبيض، سامي: تزوير كتب التاريخ المدرسية نتيجة خطأ أم جهل؟! … المؤرخون والمفكرون والسياسيون السوريون يغيبون عن المشهد التعليمي! صحيفة الوطن. 2 شباط، 2017.
كما حلّل الصحفي السوري سابقاً كتب مرحلة التعليم الأساسي (الصف الأول وحتى الصف التاسع) للعام الدراسي 2014-2015، انظر: درويش، صبر: العملية التعليمية في سوريا بين الحاضر وبين المستقبل المأمول. سوريا حكاية ما انحكت. 19 أيار، 2015.
4 وزارة التربية، الجمهورية العربية السورية: تشكيل لجنة خاصة لدراسة الملاحظات والمقترحات الواردة إلى الوزارة حول المناهج المطورة، 16 أيلول، 2017.
5 برنامج صباحنا غير: د. دارم طباع مدير المركز الوطني لتطوير المناهج التربوية. قناة Saba7na Gheer على اليوتيوب .18 أيلول، 2017. الدقيقة 2:10-2:30.
6برنامج من الآخر: آزمة المناهج هل خطأ في الاختيار أم خلل في التفكير. الهيئة العامة للإذاعة والتلفزيون- سورية. 18 أيلول، 2017. 1:06:50-1:07:25
7 فاضل، عهد: ليس فيلم رعب.. بل أغلفة كتب تلاميذ سوريا!. العربية. 9 أيلول، 2017.
8 عنجريني، صهيب: «داعش» والمناهج الجديدة: السوريون «يقصفون» عشوائيّاً. الأخبار. العدد 3274 الخميس 14 أيلول، 2017.
9 المصدر: الموقع الرسمي للمركز الوطني لتطوير المناهج التربوية.
10 برنامج هنا سوريا: “تثير الرعب” الصور الكاملة لمنهاج النظام الجديد!. أورينت نت. 11 أيلول، 2017. الدقيقة 3:42-4:17.
11 المصدر السابق: الموقع الرسمي للمركز الوطني لتطوير المناهج التربوية
12 ديب، يسرى: «ضجّة» المناهج بين أسئلة مجلس الشعب وأجوبة وزير التربية. جريدة تشرين. 21 أيلول، 2017.
13 Althusser, Louis. On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, trans. and ed. G.M. Goshgarian (Verso, 2014).
14الجباعي، جاد الكريم: نحو مدخل اجتماعي للتربية والتعليم. جيرون. 12 آب، 2012.
15 خليل، إبراهيم: مناهج التعليم الكردية في الإدارة الذاتية. مدارات كُرد. 8 كانون الأول، 2015.
16 عثمان، أحمد: افتتاح المدارس في مدينة قامشلو مع المنهاج الكردي الجديد. نبض الشمال. 28 أيلول، 2015.
17 الأحمد، سامر: الحسكة: مناهج تربوية مسيسة تهدد مستقبل جيل بأكمله. المدن. 23 نيسان، 2017.
18 ملا رشيد، بدر: الواقع التعليمي في مناطق “الإدارة الذاتية”. مركز عمران للدراسات الاستراتيجية. 15 تشرين الثاني، 2016.
19توزيع عشرة ملايين كتاب مدرسي في المناطق المحررة. عنب بلدي. العدد 217. 17 نيسان، 2017.
20 المقصود هنا الكاتب معتز الحناوي المقيم في السويداء (سوريا)، في حين يقيم الكاتب باسيليوس زينو في الولايات المتحدة.
21 الحناوي، معتز: سنديان السويداء ولعنة الحرب السورية. جدلية. 23 حزيران، 2017.
22 خلال أحد الدروس طلب الأستاذ نفسه أن نرسم رسماً حُراً أو أن ندرس لصفٍ آخر، فقمت برسم شخوصٍ كاريكاتورية بشرية على دفتر الرسم وعندما شاهدها خلال جولته بين الصفوف قام بتشطيب رسمي مما أثار دهشتي وغضبي. وعندما سألته عن السبب قال إنّ رسم الكائنات الحية حرام وأنّ المُصوّر يرتكب إثماً بمحاكاة الخالق في خلقه. كان تفسيره غريباً عليً ولم أستطع كبت ضحكةٍ لا إرادية مما استدعى طردي من الحصة (باسيليوس زينو، جرت الحادثة سنة 1998)
23 لانقصد القول هنا أن ميدان التعليم يقتصر على ما تفرضه الدولة ضمن مدراسها. ففي العديد من دول أمريكا اللاتينية، كالبرازيل، تمكن العديد من مجتمعات السكان الأصليين والمحرومين من الأراضي (التي سيطرت عليها الدولة بالقوة) من فرض نظام تعليمي تحرري يؤكد هويتها الثقافية في مواجهة فرض القيم النيوليبرالية على مجتمعاتهم، مؤكدين على أهمية التعليم “في الحراك” كجزءٍ أساسي من حركات اجتماعية مستمرة. للمزيد انظر:
Zibechi, Raúl. 2012. Territories of Resistance: A Cartography of Latin American Social Movements. Oakland, CA: AK Press. pp. 21-33.
معتز الحناوي وباسيليوس زينو
بواسطة Nour Samaha | ديسمبر 12, 2017 | Cost of War, غير مصنف
“TWELVE-YEAR-OLD MUSTAFA GRINNED as he bit into an apple, munching away excitedly. Only a month ago, he sunk his teeth into a piece of fresh fruit for the first time in three years. Mustafa, along with his family, survived a siege.
Mustafa’s mother, Sara, her face gaunt like that of her teenage daughter, described how they made it. “We would have to buy tomato paste by the gram,” said Sara, whose family name The Intercept is withholding for security reasons. “Our daily food consisted of rice or lentils. Get meat, fruit, or vegetables out of your head, they didn’t exist. Forget the fridge, there was never any power to keep it running. Forget everything.” Pointing to Mustafa, she asked, “Look at him. Does he look like a normal 12-year-old? Look at the girls. Do they look healthy?”All the children in Deir al-Zour appear small for their ages.
Mustafa looked like a child of eight or nine years old. All the children in Deir al-Zour appear small for their ages. Sara’s daughters had dark circles under their eyes, their skin tinged yellow, and their cheeks ever so slightly sunken in.
Since the end of 2014, the residents of the city of Deir al-Zour in Syria had been all but cut off from the outside, besieged by the Islamic State as it attempted to consolidate its power base across northern Syria and Iraq. Water, fuel, electricity, and channels for communication slowly disappeared. Basic food products like tea, sugar, meat, and fresh produce became unaffordable luxuries, held hostage by a handful looking to profit off the siege.
After months of intense battles, the Syrian army and its allies broke the Islamic State siege on Deir al-Zour in early September. It took another three days for Syrian forces to reach the main entrance of the city; the Islamic State had surrounded the nearby military post with thousands of landmines.
The city is the capital of a region of the same name. Deir al-Zour Governorate, too, was mostly freed from the Islamic State’s grip following months of heavy fighting by both the Syrian government and its allies on one side of the region and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces on the other. Today, control of the province is split along the Euphrates River: The government and its allies control the territory south of the river, while the Syrian Democratic Forces and its allies control the territory north of the river.
Sections of the road to reach the city of Deir al-Zour still remained under Islamic State control for a few weeks after the siege ended. Traveling by air remained the only way to access the city. By mid-October, however, according to Syrian military officials, the road leading directly to Deir al-Zour was cleared of standing threats. Aid trucks, civilians, and, finally, journalists were finally able to travel by land to the city.
Deir al-Zour is a shell of what it used to be. Once a bustling city home to around 700,000 people, now the city’s roads are pockmarked by years of shelling; its buildings lie crumbling, caught between destruction and abandonment; and the city still wants for basic services, such as electricity and communication lines. Mobile phone reception is sporadic at best, and most houses are running full-time on generators or large battery packs. A World Bank report released in July 2017 estimated that Deir al-Zour province suffered the highest housing destruction as a result of the war.
Residents who stayed behind, approximately 100,000 by January 2017, as the blockade drew on endured a double siege: One siege by the Islamic State, which prevented people or supplies from entering or exiting; and the other inside city limits, perpetrated by those who saw in the misery an opportunity to turn a profit.
Today, they are war-weary, undernourished, and frustrated. While some neighborhoods are pushing to return to normal, there is an underlying concern that, just as the city had been overlooked during the siege, its residents will quickly be forgotten about as the cries of liberation and victory fade away.
SITUATED BETWEEN THE two former Islamic State capitals, Raqqa and Mosul, the city of Deir al-Zour, on the banks of the Euphrates River, was a flashpoint in the conflict, yet its residents were overlooked by all the warring parties. As a result, residents suffered at the hands of local war profiteers inside the city while also fending off attacks, infiltrations, and onslaughts from the Islamic State, which sought Deir al-Zour to consolidate its control over the surrounding area.
At the outset of the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad in 2011, Deir al-Zour was a hotbed of opposition activity, and was attacked by the Syrian army. By 2013, rebels from the Nusra Front and other groups held the city, jostling for control with other rebel factions and fighting off government offensives. By 2014, the Islamic State took over much of the surrounding area and laid siege to the city — until its defeat this fall.
The road to Deir al-Zour, a nine-hour drive from Damascus through a vast expanse of unfriendly desert, reveals how much still needs to be done before civilians can return to any sort of normalcy following the Syrian government’s recapturing of territory from both the Islamic State and the Syrian opposition. Palmyra, the last major town before Deir al-Zour that was recaptured from the Islamic State — for the second time — in March 2017, is still in ruins. Only a handful of civilians remain. Instead, pro-government militiamen — from the Lebanese group Hezbollah, to the Afghan Fatemiyoun group, to local Syrian forces — dot the streets, with each faction commandeering its own residence from what buildings still stand, while Russian troops guard the ancient ruins.
Most of the vehicles traveling beyond Palmyra have a military purpose. The Russians are here, along with Syrian regular forces and pro-government paramilitary groups. Pickup trucks with Syrian, Afghan, and Lebanese fighters pass by, their flags flapping in the wind. One particular checkpoint on the main thoroughfare connecting the province of Homs to northeastern Syria — the cities of Deir al-Zour, Al Mayadeen, and Abu Kamal — is manned by a Syrian soldier, a Russian soldier, and an Afghan fighter. At the entrance of the recently recaptured town of Sukhnah stands a massive billboard with the words “Death to America and Israel” plastered across it, with Fatemiyoun flags at its edges.
As the road approaches Deir al-Zour, the landscape is scattered with small clusters of flat, one-story houses, now abandoned and derelict. Just beyond the main Syrian army checkpoint, an arch with large pieces of its mosaic tile design missing welcomes visitors to Deir al-Zour. According to local residents and Syrian military, landmines still dot the vast expanse of desert stretching out around the city entrance, making it unsafe to travel by foot. After another Syrian army checkpoint, a large statue of a jug welcomes visitors, but no one stops here — Islamic State snipers still lurk in the distance.
As the city turns to residential blocks, Syrian army checkpoints dot the streets. Jeeps with young men in military fatigues — a mix of Syrian army and local pro-government forces — can be seen driving through the connecting neighborhoods. They are keeping close watch over what is left of Deir al-Zour; in the western outskirts of the city, entire neighborhoods are completely destroyed, the enormous scars of the Islamic State’s presence and the subsequent battles that forced them out.
ON A RECENT night, the market on Wadi Street inside Deir al-Zour was full. The city was pitch-black, except for the flicker of battery-powered bulbs. Explosions could still be heard in the near distance above the din of generators but were not threatening enough to stop people from socializing. Before they were routed, shelling from the Islamic State drove people to take cover, for fear of becoming one of the thousands of civilians killed in 2017 during the battle for the city. Now, smoke-filled coffee shops bustle with young men puffing hookah, gathered around the few TV sets currently operational in the city. Others pause by the market stalls, inspecting the fresh produce, now more readily available.
Loud whispers of the “tujjar” — the Arabic word for traders or anyone who demands money in exchange for something, including services — float between shoppers in the souk, as residents, vegetable sellers, and even children talk of how they were, as one shopkeeper described it, “under siege on the outside and the inside.”
The tujjar tended to be locals, either from the city or the countryside, who capitalized on the Islamic State siege. They sold everything from bread, wheat, rice, bulgur, and canned food, to aid, diesel, wheat, oil, government passes, and spaces on planes or helicopters to be airlifted out. The tujjar hailed from many different backgrounds. Some were from local gangs who had been absorbed into the different branches of the National Defense Forces, a pro-government militia; others, like Hossam Qaterji, were high-powered businessmen who organized aid drops and allegedly negotiated trade deals over wheat with the Islamic State.
Sara described how the tujjar lined their pockets. “The aid drops we got were collected by the tujjar, divided into two, of which half was put into warehouses to expire” — in order to inflate prices — “and the other half would be sold at exorbitant prices to the residents in the souks,” she explained. They “are also responsible for our suffering.”
Once the sun set, gangs would often loot the neighborhoods and houses of those who had fled. According to one resident, his neighbor found his entire kitchen, including the fridge, for sale off the back of a pickup in a nearby city.
“Just watch now, the pickup trucks coming back from Al Mayadeen, full of goods looted from the homes there,” said Abu Mohammad, who asked his proper name not be used because of security risks. “These gangs did the same here, inside our city.”
“Everything was for sale in Deir al-Zour,” explained Mohammed Saleh Alftayeh, an expert on the Syrian military and politics, who is from Deir al-Zour. “Everyone had something that others needed.”
In order for a government employee to be able to leave the city, for instance, he would have to get official permission, which came at a price. Once the government employee left, he would have to pay his way through checkpoints on the outskirts of the city to allow him to travel by land or pay even more to be allowed to use helicopters or a cargo plane. And the fees increased as the siege went on.
In February 2015, the fee to get airlifted out was around 25,000 SYP (around $100 at the time) per person, according to a number of residents both inside and outside the city, including those who left via airlift. In the fall of 2015, when Islamic State forces crept too close to the airport, airlifts by cargo plane stopped entirely. With only smaller planes — and therefore fewer seats — making the flight out, prices skyrocketed. By October 2015, the fee had increased tenfold: A family of three would have to pay 700,000 SYP — and, even then, a waitlist remained, full of people waiting to escape.
Those who could not afford to be airlifted risked their lives by attempting to cross by land through Islamic State territory.
WITH MOST OF Deir al-Zour liberated from the Islamic State siege, attention has now turned to reconstruction and returning civilians. But based on how little attention was paid to Deir al-Zour during the siege, some residents feel the city’s reconstruction needs will again be overlooked.
“I doubt it will be a focus for the government in terms of reconstruction,” said Alftayeh, the military and political analyst. He pointed to the government’s retaking of the war-torn city of Aleppo in December 2016. “It has been almost a year now for Aleppo, and there is no organized, government-led reconstruction,” Alftayeh said. “As long as there is no international funding, I doubt there will be serious reconstruction in Deir al-Zour, where the scale of destruction is huge.”
Residents are expected to come back to the city, yet two months after the siege was broken, only a slow trickle have returned. “There will be a flow back, partly because the section that was under the control of the government during the past years is in better condition that other parts, and it can accommodate significant numbers,” said Alftayeh, “and partly because the government wants internally displaced people to return to their original cities, Deir al-Zour included.”
In late September, the government issued a decree stating all public sector employees must return to their original workplaces within a month; in the case of Deir al-Zour, the deadline was extended to the end of the year.
Some humanitarian organizations are eager to see public sector workers return home, including to Deir al-Zour. “Public sector workers tend to fall into the poorest class bracket, and they are the ones who provide the basic services to any community for it to work properly again,” said one official working with an international organization across Syria, who asked for anonymity because he was not permitted to speak to the media, “so we are keen to see them return.”
Those who stayed behind and weathered the siege in Deir al-Zour, however, are less optimistic about the future. Haifaa, another resident in Qusour who was forced to stay behind while her husband left to seek medical treatment for their child in Damascus, said, “It will be another 10 years before anything can get back to normal here.””
[This article was originally published by The Intercept.]
بواسطة Haid Haid | ديسمبر 10, 2017 | غير مصنف
“More than 35 members of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – a coalition of rebel groups led by the rebranded al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, Jabhat Fateh al-Sham – have been assassinated in Idlib since September. While assassinations in Syria are common, the unprecedented rate and scale of these targeted attacks and their impact on the group’s capacity indicates a significant shift in the way its opponents are dealing with it.
It is extremely difficult to get a clear picture of the exact number of assassination attempts targeting HTS, due to the lack of systematic data collection and the secretive circumstances in which some of these attempts took place. However, a quick scan of public local media reports from the past three months shows that most of the attacks targeted high profile members. Eliminating HTS’s foreign Sharia scholars and leaders – mostly Saudis, Jordanians and Tunisians – comes at the top of the priority list, indicating that the assassinations are meant to weaken its leadership. Among the most prominent targets are Abu Talha al-Ordini, Abu Abdulrahman al-Mohajer, Abu Sulaiman al-Maghribi, Abu Yahya al-Tunisi, Suraqa al-Maki and Abu Mohammad al-Sharii. Local military leaders come as a second priority, namely Abu Elias al-Baniasi, Mustafa al-Zahri, Saied Nasrallah and Hassan Bakour.
Despite HTS’s efforts to become a rooted movement, it is still largely a network built around individuals with charisma and expertise. Therefore, the assumption is that eliminating those targets will destroy the network around them. As such, targeting HTS’s foreign scholars, who are mostly veteran fighters with long experience as jihadists, will weaken the group’s credibility and limit its ability to recruit. Likewise, the military leaders who are targeted are generally known to be effective and experienced and thus difficult to replace.
The assassination operations against HTS have significantly increased since last September, which coincided with preparations for the Turkish-led intervention in Idlib. Much of the speculation about a potential Turkish intervention in Idlib had portrayed it as an anti-HTS operation, leading to the assumption that Turkey is behind the attacks. The advocates of this theory argue that Turkey’s plan is to slowly weaken HTS rather than out-fight it in a military confrontation that would be costly and may even harden its base.
Central to this plan is exacerbating HTS’s internal divisions between the pragmatists and the hardliners. The latter, who are considered the main threat, can then be eliminated through a Turkish-led covert assassination campaign. But this theory assumes that Turkey, which entered Syria in coordination with HTS, would jeopardize its main objective in Syria – keeping the Syrian Kurds in check – in order to do this.
Alternatively, the pragmatic model adopted by HTS’s leader Abu Mohammed al-Julani – which led to divisions within the group – is used as evidence that the attacks are an inside job. The rift was widened by Jolani’s decision to sever the group’s external ties to al-Qaeda in order to establish Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS) in July 2016. The tension reached another level when its leader dissolved JFS a few months later to create HTS, despite internal objection from hardliners.
Likewise, Johani’s decision to negotiate with Turkey and allow it to launch its Idlib operation resulted in an internal crisis of confidence with his leadership. Accepting cooperation with the (secular) Turkish government is seen by the Salafist-jihadist community to which HTS belongs as a clear violation of that ideological school’s teachings.
Many HTS members expressed, in several conversations with me, their dissatisfaction with the group’s new line of thinking. In a recent interview, Hasan al-Daghim, a well-informed Syrian researcher and religious scholar focusing on Islamist movements, argued that HTS’s pragmatic wing will try to get rid of the hardliners to allow the new model to function. This statement is echoed by other observers, who believe that the assassinations started after the defection of two prominent HTS figures, Abdullah al-Muhaysini and Muslah al-Alyani, as a preemptive move to prevent further divisions and defections. But how can this sophisticated operation stay secret when many of the group’s sensitive private conversations were leaked?
There are unconfirmed reports about the involvement of foreign actors and governments in the assassinations through local proxies. With ISIS rapidly declining, international attention has turned more heavily toward the threat posed by HTS in Idlib. But instead of conventional military operations similar to the anti-ISIS campaign, a different approach is perhaps being used to eliminate HTS’s persons of interest without disturbing the conflict’s delicate dynamics.
The types of assassination attacks indicate that a small number of people are involved in executing them. The majority of assassinations are either done through planting explosive devices under the cars of the targets or by ambushing and shooting them. As such it is easy for certain governments to hire local mercenaries to kill high-value targets such their fellow citizens who joined HTS or other individuals who are perceived as a threat. Local sources have confirmed that many locals, whether proxies or bounty hunters, are already involved in such activities. But they also highlighted that the regime and ISIS may also be behind some of the assassinations.
The vast number of people with both an interest in assassinating HTS leaders and the means to do so adds to the difficulty of verifying who is responsible for what. But it is safe to say that such targeted attacks will continue as long as the group is perceived internationally as one of the biggest threats in Syria.
Haid Haid, November 2017″
[This article was originally published by Chatham House.]
