With Russia acting as the key broker in Syria’s reconstruction, it will inevitably position the Syrian government as the main distributor of reconstruction funds
There is a growing debate about reconstruction in Syria in Western and regional policy circles. The European Union has been closely studyingoptions for reconstruction, while some Western (and non-Western) governments are positioning themselves so that they can play a role in the reconstruction process.
Regional states are also stepping up their activities in this regard, since no one wants to be left behind when the time comes for Syria to take a step beyond the current conflict.
But this debate on reconstruction appears to be based on the assumption that the whole of Syria would be equally targeted by post-war reconstruction plans, and that all Syrians would be equitably treated in this process. The reality contradicts this assumption.
Post-war reconstruction debate
Debating reconstruction today is happening at a time when, according to a recent report by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Syria is witnessing its highest wave of violence since the fall of Eastern Aleppo. It is also happening at a time when plans for de-escalation zones have been announced while Russia continues to bombard the same areas it is supposed to be safeguarding. Meanwhile, civilians continue to be collateral damage in the international anti-Islamic State (IS) coalition’s air campaign on Raqqa.
The campaign’s military strategy is similar to that used to liberate Iraqi cities from IS control, which has led to wide-scale destruction of those cities’ infrastructures. The continuation of violence on this scale will inevitably raise the cost of post-war reconstruction even beyond the currently estimated figure of $200-$350bn.
There is a degree of consensus in international policy circles that Russia and Iran cannot bear this financial burden alone, and that international donors will have to be involved to cover the costs.
However donors’ motivations for participating in the reconstruction efforts are not just about humanitarian aid but also about politics. Funding is one way in which to retain a degree of influence in Syria.
With Russia positioning itself to play the role of key broker in Syria’s reconstruction, some regional states have taken steps to keep lines of communication with Moscow open despite political disagreements over Syria.
Individuals with vested interests from across the political spectrum in countries neighbouring Syria are also jumping on the Russian bandwagon. Recent visits to Moscow by Lebanese politicians have included rivals from both the March 8 and March 14 Lebanese political camps.
This political manoeuvring will have a direct impact on how reconstruction plans will be implemented inside Syria. Russia will inevitably seek to have the Syrian government be the key distributor of reconstruction funds.
Although regime-controlled areas have been less affected than opposition-controlled areas in terms of material destruction, it is likely that the Syrian government will funnel most funding to areas considered to be loyalist.
Rewarding loyalists
Foreign individuals with vested interests are likely to turn a blind eye to inequalities of reconstruction fund distribution in order to protect their business interests. Regional actors will follow a similar path in order to remain political stakeholders in the process.
Syrian businessmen who are already part of the political elite have started forming new companies so that they can position themselves favourably in procurement processes for reconstruction projects.
All the above means that implementation of reconstruction plans will not be equitable.
The Syrian regime wants to reward its loyalists through using reconstruction funds to improve their areas, but it also wants to punish those areas whose residents rose against the regime. Continuing to bombard these areas is likely to be followed by denying them access to reconstruction funds.
Neglected areas
With foreign donors and actors having to adjust their political positions in a bid to remain relevant, it is likely that these neglected areas will be left with no one advocating on their behalf.
This is likely to keep thousands of refugees, who had fled these areas to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey, abroad as they will have no homes to return to and no realistic prospects of restoring their livelihoods inside Syria. Fewer residents in these areas make them easier for the Syrian government to control, offering another incentive for the government not to make the areas desirable for living.
The debate on reconstruction in Syria has been dominated by the issue of whether or not the West will be able to use reconstruction as leverage over the Syrian regime. But the key underlying issue is that with or without the West, the Syrian regime – and its Russian and Iranian patrons – will be concentrating on reviving loyalist areas and not areas that the regime currently has no control over.
Syria’s demographic composition will be affected by this process, as will the situation of refugees in neighbouring countries.
European countries are considering offering Turkey incentives to keep Syrian refugees on its soil to deter them from crossing into Europe. Meanwhile Lebanese stakeholders are trying to present Lebanon as a platform for Syrian reconstruction, while continuing to benefit from foreign aid sent to Lebanon to alleviate its Syrian refugee situation.
These factors mean that both Syrian loyalist elites and non-Syrian actors are set to gain from the iniquities of implementation of reconstruction plans.
– Lina Khatib is the head of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. You can follow her on Twitter @LinaKhatibUK.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.”
Two days later the situation took dramatic turns. First, news emerged on Monday that Hayat Tahrir Al Sham escorted Turkish forces inside the rebel-held north west, as part of an effort by Turkey to establish monitoring sites for a ceasefire between the rebels and the regime. Then, a day later, an Islamist group ceded administrative control of a Syria-Turkey border crossing to the Syrian opposition’s interim government, in the zone that Turkey established last summer in northern Syria, further east.
The Turkish entry is supposed to be part of the Astana process’s de-escalation plan, agreed with Russia and Iran. De-escalation zones are designed to exclude Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, and only apply to non-jihadi rebel groups. Also, the Russian-sponsored process is envisioned as a way to temporarily de-escalate the conflict, rather than a way for the opposition to build political and governance structures.
But events since the weekend speak of different dynamics at play. In the space of two days, Hayat Tahrir Al Sham turned from being the subject of an imminent military campaign to practically being a partner, in a zone that Russia and Iran want to be free of the former Al Qaeda franchise. The breakthrough for the opposition’s interim government, even though not directly related to the de-escalation zone in Idlib, is relevant to the Turkish campaign in the north west.
The offer was declined, but the opposition continued to push for a way to spare Idlib possible destruction if the regime and its allies turned to it next. Especially since the regime’s recapture of eastern Aleppo, the possible fate of Idlib came to be the centre of speculation. Jabhat Al Nusra increasingly tightened its control over the rebel stronghold, using a combination of clashes and coercion to weaken and subdue its rivals. By July, the group emerged as the unrivalled dominant force in Idlib and surrounding areas.
The Idlib conundrum became even more complex. On the one hand, any offensive against the rebels in Idlib would cause a humanitarian disaster for the two million civilians living there. It would increase pressure on Turkey as a new wave of refugees would head to its borders. On the other hand, the growing presence of what many view as an Al Qaeda organisation troubled Syrians as well as outsiders.
Something had to happen to reverse the influence of Hayat Tahrir Al Sham. Increasingly, it became clear that only Turkey had the leverage to oversee such a process. A Turkish-backed offensive, though, seemed far-fetched: the rebels were too weak to dislodge the group, Turkey was too distracted by the expansion of Kurdish interests inside Syria, and the United States had no partners to carry out such a task. Meantime, Hayat Tahrir Al Sham counted on the brotherly jihadi sentiments within groups like Ahrar Al Sham to prevent a rebel alliance backed by a foreign country.
Against this backdrop, Turkey’s establishment of a protected zone in that region in coordination with Hayat Tahrir Al Sham seemed inescapable. Despite reports of a Turkish intervention, it was clear from the outset that neither Turkey nor Hayat Tahrir Al Sham was interested in a fight. The group quickly established contacts with Turkey and appointed a new coordinator with Turkish officials to ensure continued lines of communication.
In theory, the Turkish presence provides an opportunity to work closely with the group’s rivals to slowly create an alternative, something that never materialised with remote support. Multiple well-placed sources assert that Hayat Tahrir Al Sham is keen to persuade foreign countries that it has indeed abandoned Al Qaeda. One of the its top officials recently revealed that the group dispatched representatives to regional countries in a bid to build friendly ties with them, naming Turkey as one of those countries. This means that Turkey might be in a position to change the group’s behaviour with time.
But the Turkish model in the other zone to the east provides little room for optimism. Warlordism and thuggery continue unabated there. Turkey failed to centralise the operation to prevent the emergence of ragtag militias that extremists could exploit. Talk of armed groups releasing ISIL members for money is all too common in that area. Additionally, that the interim government was willing to leave Jabhat Al Nusra in control of the police and courts does not bode well for the effectiveness of such an effort.
In this context, the Turkish intervention is an opportunity since it promises to ensure the safety of two million people. But it does not solve the issue of Hayat Tahrir Al Sham’s dominance. It only kicked the can further down the road, if not worse.
Hassan Hassan is a senior fellow at the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy”
[This article was originally published by The National.]
“Like the country itself, feelings about Syria’s national football team, who play Australia tonight, are complex.
When the Syrian national football team walks onto the pitch in Sydney tonight , Obay Al-Akul won’t be inside the stadium cheering but outside protesting.
For many, the national side’s unlikely progression to the playoffs for 2018 World Cup qualification is less a fairytale and more a continuation of the nightmare that has seen more than 400,000 people killed since the Syrian uprising began in 2011.
“How can I support this team when so many civilians have been killed in Syria,” Al-Akul said on Tuesday. “How can I when too many athletes have been arrested and some of them killed by the regime because they supported the Syrian revolution.”
The result seemed so unlikely for a team ranked 75th in the world from a country ravaged by civil war, that many, like George Salloum from Granville in Sydney’s west, saw it as a rare reprieve from all the “bad news” the country his family migrated from faces.
Salloum was born in Australia, but many of his family still live in Zweitina, a Greek Orthodox Christian village near Homs in the country’s west.
“It’s good for Syria – with what’s happening there you’d think there would be no soccer team,” he said.
“People think the whole country is in ruins, but it’s showing the world we’re still up there and thriving. The country is still up and running, and people are so proud of Syria.”
But is Syria an example of triumph over adversity, or a cynical propaganda display from a despot?
After the Iran match, in an eerie demonstration of the cult of personality that surrounds the Assad regime, the players assembled on Syrian television to praise the dictator.
Among them were Firas al-Khatib and Omar al Somah, two players who before the Iran match had not played for Syria since 2012 in a boycott of the regime.
“First, we thank president Bashar al-Assad for honouring all the players,” al-Khatib said in a broadcast translated to English on Youtube. Al Somah mimicked him: “I thank president Bashar al-Assad for his support of sports and athletes,” he said.
Anas Ammo, a Syrian sports writer who has lived in Turkey for the past five years after fleeing the civil war, said the staged press conference was a display of how the national side has been co-opted by Assad.
“All the people in Syria love football, and six years ago we would be celebrating,” he said. “But this team – this is not a football team – this is a political team. This is a dictator’s team.”
Ammos, who says he’ll be supporting Australia, said the reasons for the player’s support for the national team were also varied and complex.
Some genuinely support Assad, while he believed others, such as al-Khatib, faced political pressure.
“Whatever happens, 12 million Syrians will love me,” he told Fainaru. “Another 12 million will want to kill me.”
Like many, al-Akul, who now lives in western Sydney, believes Assad is using the national team to project an image of normality to the international community.
“He didn’t care about football or sport before this – in Syria we had bad teams, bad funding, now all of a sudden he supports all of that?” he said.
“He wants the propaganda to show the world ‘look, after seven years of war we don’t care, we go to the World Cup qualifier’.”
It’s certainly true that the regime’s support for its athletes is newly found. Ammos believes at least 13 league football players are missing or in government detention. Almost 50 have been killed by government forces. And many have come up against the regime since the 2011 uprisings.
This week the website of the Asian Football Confederation published an interview with Syria’s most capped player, goalkeeper Mosab Balhous, on the country’s unexpected success.
Balhous, 34 and now based in Omar as a coach for Dhofar, predicted the team would beat Australia on the back of the “spirit, desire and determination of the players”.
Jihad Qassab, a former Syria captain who led his club al-Karama to the 2006 Asian Champions League final, died inside Saidnaya military prison in Damascus in late 2016 after being accused by authorities of making car bombs, an allegation he denied.
A second person named George Salloum, this one from Avondale Heights in Melbourne’s north-west, has been watching Syria’s matches on television.
Salloum moved to Australia from Syria 45 years ago as a 19-year-old. Usually he’d be supporting Australia, but he says the sentimental pull of Syria is too great.
“I should be supporting Australia because I have been here all my life [but] it’s human nature, you always have a soft place in your heart for the place that you’re from,” he said. “Plus, Syria are the underdogs.”
But, Salloum said, he understood why many didn’t feel able to support Syria.
“What has happened is a catastrophe in any way you want to measure it, cities and villages have been destroyed and people have been killed on both sides,” he said.
“The hatred and division is so profound it will take generations and generations to heal it.
“I don’t have any grudge against anybody.””
[This article was originally published by The Guardian.]
“Turkey’s discussions with al-Qaida-linked militants ahead of its deployment in Syria’s Idlib province indicate that a wide-scale offensive against the militant group may not be Ankara’s primary objective, according to Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute.
BEIRUT– Turkey on Saturday announced the start of its second major cross-border military operation in Syria, and Turkish troops are now preparing to deploy alongside Syrian opposition groups in a province controlled largely by al-Qaida-linked militants.
The campaign aims to enforce the so-called de-escalation zone agreement in territory currently held by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) alliance in Idlib province, but phase one of the Turkish-led operation may not involve an all-out confrontation with the militant group, according to Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute. While later phases may see more concerted action against the extremists, for now, a negotiated settlement seems to have taken shape, he told Syria Deeply.
“I am told that HTS and Turkey reached a final agreement to establish a Turkish protected buffer zone from the Idlib border village of Atme through Darat Izza to Anadan into western Aleppo,” Lister said. “From what I’m told, HTS agreed at most to leave these areas and agreed at minimum not to interfere with Turkey’s operations in that zone.”
Syria Deeply spoke with Lister, who has spent the past week meeting with Syrian opposition groups in southern Turkey, about Ankara’s strategy in Idlib, the sentiment among participating rebel groups and what this upcoming operation could mean for the Syrian war.
Syria Deeply: Do we know which opposition groups are part of the Turkish-led alliance?
Charles Lister: So far, it seems to be largely a combination of Euphrates Shield forces and a collection of FSA [Free Syrian Army] groups from Idlib, who were previously victims of HTS aggression. Groups like the Free Idlib Army, the remnants of the 13th Division brigade, and potentially some former members of the Hazzm Movement. But my impression is that this is really a Turkish-led campaign and that opposition group involvement will only be secondary. They will primarily be there for support.
Syria Deeply: What is the scope and aim of the Turkish-led operation?
Lister: So far, I don’t think there is any intention to go as far south as Idlib city. I think this would require a much more significant military operation than what Turkey is able and willing to do. At the moment, I think we are looking at phase one, which is for Turkey to pursue its own interests: to protect its borders, deter Kurdish threats, minimize further refugee flows and eventually […] establish some territory in Syria that refugees in Turkey could move back into. In a sense, what we are looking at is Turkey trying to secure its own internal national security interests and to potentially contribute toward further stabilizing at least some parts of Idlib.
Turkey and some of the opposition’s secondary intention in this first phase is to establish a Turkish protected area in northern Idlib, which can be used to start a slow and gradual campaign to undermine HTS. Some of Turkey’s long-term partners in Syria, groups like Failaq al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham, are on board with this strategy. They don’t want to enter a full-scale confrontation with HTS. Instead, they want to more methodically undermine the extremist wings of HTS, particularly to try to encourage defections and divisions within HTS to make it a more manageable competitor rather than an adversary.
From what I’m told, Turkish intelligence has been working on this for some time already, in cooperation with opposition groups previously close to HTS. A spate of recent assassinations are apparently linked to this subversion campaign and, perhaps more importantly, so are a number of recent audio leaks of HTSinternal communications.
Syria Deeply: What is the sentiment among rebel groups in Idlib?
Lister: Every single group that I have met with [in Turkey] over the past week, which spans all the Euphrates Shield groups, all the main FSA groups across Syria, Failaq al-Sham, Nour al-Din al-Zinki brigades and Ahrar al-Sham, have expressed support for Turkey’s intentions in Idlib. The one key area of difference is that groups within the Euphrates Shield and within the FSA seemed more determined to initiate a conflict with HTS, whereas groups like Failaq al-Sham, Zinki and Ahrar al-Sham strongly opposed the idea of a full-scale confrontation because they thought it might potentially strengthen HTS. They advocated instead for a slow and methodical campaign of undermining HTS from the inside.
But, these groups unanimously agreed on [their] suspicion, opposition and hostility toward HTS and particularly toward [HTShead Abu Mohammad] al-Julani. Over the three or four years that I’ve met with all of Syria’s opposition, this was the first time not a single group expressed some element of defense or support of HTS.This definitely struck me over the past few days. Al-Julani appears to have burned a lot of the bridges he built earlier in the conflict but he does still hold several advantageous cards.
Syria Deeply: HTS militants allegedly escorted a Turkish reconnaissance unit into Idlib on Sunday, implying that there have been talks between Turkey and HTS. Have there been any negotiations and do we know what their focus was?
Lister: As far as I am aware, there have been around three or four meetings, including one that took place yesterday (Sunday). In yesterday’s meeting, HTS and Turkey reached a final agreement to establish a Turkish protected buffer zone from Atme through Darat Izza to Anadan into western Aleppo. From what I’m told, HTSagreed at most to leave these areas and agreed at minimum to not interfere with Turkey’s operations in that zone.The idea here would be to replicate what Euphrates Shield looked like at the beginning of the Euphrates Shield operation, which was also preceded by a full Nusra Front withdrawal from areas of Turkish operations.
Syria Deeply: Why would HTS agree to a deal with Turkey considering that it has been a vocal critic of the de-escalation zone agreement?
Lister: I think we need to draw a distinction between what HTS says for its public audience, and what is being done behind the scenes, which is much more murky and political. Al-Julani is not only fearful of an all-out confrontation with Turkey and the opposition, his biggest fear is something catalyzing internal defections from the original Nusra core of Syrian fighters now within the larger HTS alliance.
This core is almost entirely composed of local Syrians who have been recruited into the Nusra Front, which later rebranded into Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and later formed the HTS alliance. Throughout this process, the Nusra core has become even more heavily Syrian, which for al-Julani is an invaluable source of local credibility that protects his forces from attack by most rival opposition groups – as we have seen in 2017. If Turkey or any other opposition faction – working by themselves or together – managed to create an alternative reality somewhere in Idlib, I’m told al-Julani’s biggest fear is that some of those Syrians will jump ship and join them, thereby weakening al-Julani’s credibility on the ground and creating opportunities to isolate him from the revolutionary street. So his greatest fear is internal defections and I think this is why he has channeled so much energy into negotiating with Turkey to prevent a full-blown confrontation.
Syria Deeply: Reports circulated of a series of defections from HTS in the weeks leading up to the campaign, as part of a larger Turkish effort to isolate HTS in Idlib. Which groups have defected and what is the scale of defection?
Lister: The major big loss was the al-Zinki movement. I was told Turkey had some kind of role, potentially with some opposition support, in making this happen. But there have been some other smaller defections from within the HTS core – small HTS sub-factions and local units. The latter are more concerning to al-Julani than anything else, as they represent the partial or possible disintegration of Nusra’s core Syrian structure.
Syria Deeply: There has been a lot of focus on HTS being the primary target of this campaign. What about the Kurds?
Lister: For Turkey, the [Syrian Kurdish] YPG is just as much of a concern and perhaps an even more critical concern than HTS. The fact that Turkey is looking to establish a lookout post or a launching-pad base on Mount Barakat, which overlooks Kurdish-held Afrin, speaks to that.
At the moment, however, I don’t think there is a prospect for a military operation in Afrin. But there is a Turkish effort to exert some kind of influence and a potential deterrent threat on the area to discourage the YPG from moving further into opposition territories. Russia seems to have lent its support to this, which is intriguing.
Syria Deeply: Turkish officials, including the president and prime minister, said that Turkey will cooperate with Russia on the Idlib campaign. What does this mean for the FSA?
Lister: I was actually sitting with all the Euphrates Shield leadership when Erdogan gave this statement. None of them expected this apparent comment of Russian air support and they were all opposed to it. They were genuinely incensed by the idea that Russia could be providing them with support from the air. Let’s see how that plays out. If Russia does provide air support, I think that may cause some problems.
Syria Deeply: Could it be a deal breaker?
Lister: It could potentially be a deal breaker. All the armed groups, who don’t already have a presence in Idlib, would lose credibility there if they entered into an alliance with Russia. It’s pretty well known that the Russians have been bombing Idlib on and off for a long time. So I think active Russian military involvement could be a deal breaker. But I’m not sure if that is going to end up being the case.
The answers have been edited for length and clarity.”
[This article was originally published by Syria Deeply.]
“Syria’s conflict landscape has changed dramatically since the Russian military intervened in 2015, with most major territory controlled by armed groups falling under the control of regime-aligned forces. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as ISIS) has been severely depleted, while the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have assumed control of more territory, increasing the possibility of Kurdish autonomy.
Meanwhile, the Astana process has imposed new realities on Syria’s armed opposition, as the tripartite talks between Russia, Turkey and Iran produced an agreement on de-escalation zones.
Below is a brief profile of the three main conglomerations of armed groups in Syriatoday and how they fit into the ongoing conflict.
Hay’et Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)
HTS is Jabhat al-Nusra’s successor and comprises some of the more powerful armed groups operating in Idlib province.
After 2015, agreements between regime and opposition forces led to the forced displacement of fighters and many civilians from conflict zones, pushing them into Idlib. The situation has created intense competition and infighting, along with a dizzying number of alliances and counter-alliances among the various armed groups.
HTS emerged out of this competition as one of the stronger groups in Idlib. In early October, a Turkish-led military campaign began against HTS in Idlib in order to establish a de-escalation zone. The campaign involved Turkish aerial bombardment to support Free Syrian Army (FSA) advances against HTS.
This has been a common pattern in recent years in Syria: A ground force relies on external intervention to support its territorial advances. American support allowed the SDF to advance on ISIL; Russian support was provided to regime-aligned forces in recapturing Homs, Hama, Aleppo and other areas; and now Turkish support is being provided to the FSA.
It is unlikely that HTS will survive in its current form in the aftermath of the campaign, but as in previous years, it will likely splinter and reappear in various forms.
The Free Syrian Army (FSA)
The Free Syrian Army is the army that never was one.
Since the outset of the conflict, the FSA has been a conglomeration of armed brigades fighting under a loose umbrella in which central coordination and military planning never existed. FSA brigades have shifted alliances to other armed opposition groups, as well as re-defecting to the Syrian army.
There is thus virtually no ideological, political or military coherence, but the FSA persists as a loose organisational mechanism for armed groups.
In 2016, the FSA was mobilised against SDF forces to prevent the contiguity of Kurdish territory along Turkey’s southern border in Operation Euphrates Shield. Then, as now, the FSA was supported by the Turkish military through logistics, aerial support and intelligence.
Without this military support, the FSA is simply incapable of overtaking groups such as HTS or the SDF.
The Unified National Army (UNA)
The Unified National Army was created in mid-2017 with the aim of bringing together armed groups of various ideological and political backgrounds. Many of these groups are dispersed throughout Syrian territory in areas where there is still active fighting, such as the south, Ghouta and northern areas around Aleppo and Idlib.
The UNA is the latest in a long line of attempts to unify the Syrian armed opposition and it is unlikely that its fate will be any different from the others.
The main group within the UNA is Ahrar al-Sham, one of the few Islamist brigades to have persisted under this banner throughout the long course of the conflict. Brigades associated with the UNA have clashed regularly with the SDF, ISIL and HTS over territory, and have mostly been in military retreat since the Russian intervention.
While some of the southern factions retain control over some territory, their increasing abandonment by Jordanian authorities has limited their capacity and access to resources. Thus, despite having the appearance of a national character with brigades from all over the country pledging support for the project, the UNA has not solved the problems of coordination and material resources that have plagued previous attempts at unifying Syria’s armed groups.
Looking ahead
The Russian-led designs for Syria imagined through the Astana process are slowly being realised, and these new realities are imposing restraints and possibilities on the armed groups that will determine their futures.
As long as de-escalation zones are the military goals of the tripartite powers, there will be a need and a relevance for armed groups. These groups will morph accordingly, but they will remain weak and incapable of autonomous action outside of the designs and umbrella created by the Astana process.”
[This article was originally published by Al Jazeera.]
“Transitional justice is the only way forward for a lasting peace after the inevitable outcome, activists and lawyers say.
It is a narrative that regional and world powers have begun to accept: the Syrian war is over, and Bashar al-Assad has won. After six years of conflict, and half a million dead, what little military will remains – on either side – is focused on defeating the remnants of Islamic State.
But a counter-narrative is being pushed by those opposition members in far flung capitals: regardless of the military outcome, transitional justice must be served, and democracy will eventually prevail.
“It’s not about who wins. It’s about how we release the detainees, and ending torture, and finding out where the missing people are,” said Mazen Darwish, a Syrian civil rights activist who himself was released from prison in 2015.
“I’m not happy, whoever wins militarily,” he said, speaking to MEE from Brussels.
But, he added: “The most important thing is about the ordinary individual civilians who have suffered. As civil society, we need to guarantee that sustainable peace is achieved.”
The need for peace
The lawyer and president of the Syrian Centre for Media and Freedom of Expression was in Belgium to stress the urgent need for accountability in the conflict, but before that would be possible, he said, the violence needed to end.
“Firstly, the most important thing is the need for peace,” he said.
“I don’t believe any transitional justice could take place during the conflict, and nor can any political transition take place” while the violence is ongoing.
While a de-escalation deal, brokered by Russia and Turkey in Kazakhstan in July, had seen a reduction in overall violence, September became the deadliest month in the conflict this year, with at least 3,000 dead, including more than 900 civilians.
“The victims have to be given a chance to get accountability and see a process of justice,” Darwish said.
A scattering of convictions across Europe have already seen rebel fighters and IS members sentenced for their part in the conflict.
High-ranking officials in hiding?
Nerma Jelacic, a deputy director at Commission for International Justice and Accountability, welcomed the Stockholm development, but said European intelligence agencies should be looking for higher-ranking officials.
“It was quite welcome as it was the first time that someone from the regime has been tried for his crimes,” she told MEE.
“But our hope is that not only the low-level or direct perpetrators be brought to justice, but those who have command responsibility – those of the higher rank, that’s what we need to see.
“We might not see the president standing trial,” she said, “but it might be possible to find some high-ranking officials residing in Europe,” and currently living under the radar.
Darwish said the time is ripe for a renewed focus on the crimes of the war, from every side.
“This is a chance to keep the focus and keep these kinds of crimes under the spotlight… the international community and even Staffan de Mistura want to hide and forget everything that happened. It is not realistic.”
“Will the opposition be able to be unified and realistic enough to realise they did not win the war?” he asked, adding that “For the opposition, the message is very clear: if they were planning to win the war, facts are proving that is not the case. So now it’s time to win the peace.”
Darwish gave a damning indictment of the various peace talks on Syria over the years – parallel but often conflicting tracks, each sponsored by different parties, have run in Geneva, Cairo and Astana.
“Everything that has happened in Geneva and elsewhere up until now has just given the killers time to kill civilians,” he said, adding that UN resolutions condemning the violence also achieved nothing.
“If the international sides are serious in finding a solution to the conflict in Syria, they would start with criminal cases,” Darwish said.
As Syria does not recognise the International Criminal Court, war crimes can only be investigated if Damascus decides voluntarily to accept the court’s jurisdiction, or if the UN Security Council asks the ICC’s prosecutor to open an investigation – a move blocked by Russia and China in 2014.
But such cases in Europe fall under the definition of “universal jurisdiction”, whereby grave international crimes can be prosecuted by any country, even if the crimes were committed elsewhere.
These cases, are, according to HRW, “an increasingly important part of international efforts to hold perpetrators of atrocities accountable, provide justice to victims who have nowhere else to turn, deter future crimes, and help ensure that countries do not become safe havens for human rights abusers.”
Obstacles remain, though, and a case pursued in Spain earlier this year investigating members of the Syrian security services for murder collapsed after a panel within the High Court ruled that it did not have jurisdictionover the case, and that a Spanish connection was necessary. The legal team pursuing the case say they are appealing the decision.
Collecting the evidence
Husam Alkatlaby, in Brussels with Darwish, has spent years preparing for just this moment, and as director of the Violations Documentations Centre (VDC), has been overseeing the collation of such evidence.
And what the evidence shows, he said, must have a direct bearing on what any future government in Syria looks like.
“The government is responsible for the majority of the crimes, so from our point of view, there should be no place for them in the future,” Alkatlaby said, adding that this should also rule out “any other parties who committed crimes.”
Last December, the UN General Assembly established an International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) on international crimes committed in the Syrian Arab Republic, tasked with collecting the necessary evidence for any future trials.
And while this might not take the form of an ICC investigation, Jelacic, from the Commission for International Justice and Accountability, said that alternative courts could receive UN Security Council approval to try cases, such as an international court, in the Rwandan example, or a hybrid court comprising Syrian and international experts – the Cambodian example.
“A lot of IIIM’s work is based on data we have collected from 2012 until now,” Alkatlaby said, alongside evidence gathered from other civil society organisations. “And they are the most important partner here.”
It was time for the EU, and the global community, to stop seeing Syrian civil society groups as merely aid recipients, but as genuine partners, both Darwish and Alkatlaby said.
“We have asked the EU to put pressure on de Mistura to take civil society groups into consideration,” the VDC director said.
Currently, he added, “We think that de Mistura is far away from recognising the need for accountability and justice and looking at the families of those harmed in his policies.”
Despite the current prevailing narrative on Syria, and his own years in government detention, Darwish said he remained positive about what lies ahead for his country, and that there was good news to come soon.
“I’m still optimistic about the future, and moving towards democracy in the Middle East.”
“Even with all this suffering and crisis, in the end we will establish a new democratic country built on principles of dignity and human rights and freedom.”
