بواسطة Aron Lund | أكتوبر 25, 2018 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Looking back at seven years of Syrian civil war, it is striking how many pivotal moments have been the result of foreign intervention and external meddling.
That is not to say events since 2011 have played out according to a foreign script. Portraying Syria’s civil war as a process masterminded by foreigners would be unfair to Syrians – and, given the state of Syria, probably also to the foreigners. In reality, although many outside powers have tried to rearrange the Syrian battlefield, most of their grand ambitions have sunk without rescue into Syria’s swamp of competing factions.
But although local realities have fixed the conflict’s terms and frustrated many meddling outsiders, Syrians have had little power over their fate. Once it was clear that President Bashar al-Assad would not bend to the demands of his opponents and that those opponents had waded so far into the struggle that they could no longer see a way back, events began to unfold according to their own infernal logic.
In that spiral of state breakdown and social polarization, what one side felt to be a desperate act of survival would be perceived by the other as unconscionable escalation and met in kind. The structural makeup of the warring sides largely determined their behavior from 2011 onward, with many little situational upsets and gambles but few big-picture surprises – except for those that came from outside Syria’s borders.
In retrospect, some such interventions stand out as especially important. Most have of course been thoroughly dissected.
For example, the 2013 chemical weapons crisis has gained near-mythical significance in both Syrian and US politics, becoming a strange sort of shibboleth. But though the events of that summer and autumn were undeniably important, it is hard to shake the impression that President Barack Obama’s decision to settle for a Russian-inspired deal instead of firing missiles into Syria did more to disperse the fog of politics from existing circumstances than to break new ground.
Had Obama opted to pull the trigger anyway, for a one-off display of overwhelming dominance, Assad’s regime would likely have received one more disfiguring scar, the conflict would have taken a few extra spins, and the question of Syria’s chemical weapons program would have lingered as an equal or greater problem than it is today.
But there is little reason to assume that the conflict’s fundamentals would have evolved along radically different paths. Given the way the regime worked and the opposition did not, Obama had no credible path to victory on terms compatible with US politics – he knew it, and was trapped by that understanding.
In some sense, the 2013 crisis was like Assad’s December 2016 retaking of eastern Aleppo: a devastating turning point for the opposition and its backers, but also, ultimately, an unsurprising outcome of the war’s configuration at that moment.
Less obvious, but no less important, were the roads not taken.
In June 2012, the late Kofi Annan, who at the time served as a joint envoy of the UN secretary-general and the Arab League, summoned a group of major international players to sign off on basic principles for a peaceful solution in Syria. What came out of the Geneva I meeting could not have ended the war – the actual plan was idealistic claptrap. But if a UN-guided framework for international talks had been brought forward with appropriate caution and a stringent focus on more achievable goals – like trying to limit civilian suffering, preventing regional spillover, and hashing out mutually acceptable red lines – Annan’s gambit might have succeeded in routinizing conflict management habits more effective than the angry shouting matches that were to follow.
A display of early diplomatic pragmatism and collaboration on second-order issues might have spared Syrians some of the heartbreak that followed. Or maybe the opportunity would have been squandered by clashing agendas and over-ambitious diplomats.
We will never know, because Russian-US collaboration instantly broke down in a clutter of irreconcilable statements, partly, it seems, due to the strains on the White House in election season. Not until 2015 were Syria’s main foreign actors brought into the same room again, in very different circumstances: then, as a result of the reality-check provided by a Russian military intervention.
Unlike the United States, Russia did have a stand-alone partner that it could work with on the ground toward an end state that would be ugly but acceptable to Moscow. That combination allowed for the deployment of untrammeled military power in Assad’s favor, which made all the difference.
The Russian intervention in September 2015 became one of the Syrian war’s decisive turning points. Ever since President Vladimir Putin’s air force went to work against the rebellion, it has slowly and brutally transformed the battlefield.
The intervention also wrought changes on the regional and international stage. Being browbeaten by Russia was what finally forced Turkey to shift its position, in mid-2016, to seek some form of understanding with Assad’s allies. That, too, was a game changer.
History writes itself in a terrible hand, which can take time to decipher. But it seems clear that Syria is now in a new and different phase of the war, which looks to be an endgame of sorts. Barring a regional war or a dramatic upset inside the Syrian, Russian, or Iranian regimes, all of which are structurally unsound in their own ways, the battle for Damascus is over: Assad has won.
What is left is a mostly Russian-piloted contest over Syria’s economic future and independence, including the refugee crisis and the fate of three remaining border enclaves: the US-controlled areas in Tanf and the northeast, and the Turkish-run northwest. Will these areas revert to central government control, or stay propped up by external patronage in a frozen conflict? Again, foreigners will call the shots.
[Other roundtable submissions can be found here]
بواسطة Nikolaos van Dam | أكتوبر 25, 2018 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
Describing critical turning points in the Syrian Conflict, implies giving a very concise survey of some of its most important developments. Of course, there are many more critical turning points than can be described in this short article.
At the beginning of the Syrian Revolution (March 2011), the wall of silence and fear was broken for the first time among large sections of the Syrian population, as they rose and demonstrated massively against the Syrian regime. It was a miracle that the demonstrations generally remained so peaceful for a relatively long time, when taking into consideration the severe repression and atrocities committed by the regime against the peaceful demonstrators. Concurrently with the peaceful demonstrations, however, there was already armed anti-regime violence during the early stages of the revolution, probably committed from the ‘side lines’ by radical Islamists and others.
Many officers and soldiers started to defect, and constituted military opposition groups, first small, but later on a larger scale, big enough to threaten the regime.
By June 2011 violence and counterviolence had increased to such an extent that any peaceful discussions and dialogue between regime and opposition
had become extremely difficult. At this point, the Syrian Revolution had already, to some extent, become overshadowed by radical Islamists. They saw the so-called Arab Spring developments in the region as an excellent opportunity to present themselves as viable alternatives in their efforts to spread the rule of Islam, and many wanted to settle accounts with the regime that earlier had severely suppressed them.
The solidarity visits of US ambassador Robert Ford and his French counterpart Eric Chevallier to the opposition movement in Hama in July 2011, meant the end of the possibility for the United States and France or other countries to play any role as mediator in the conflict. Their visits rather created false hopes among the opposition that essential Western support was forthcoming – but in the end it turned out not to be given as had been expected or suggested.
US President Obama’s demand that President al-Asad should step aside, created an almost irreversible momentum. Many other countries followed suit and demanded the same, without having the intention, will, or capacity to militarily force al-Asad and his regime to do so. Most countries which had turned against the regime, claimed they wanted a political solution. In reality, however, these countries only wanted to consider a solution which implied regime change. It was unrealistic, however, to expect the regime to be prepared to voluntarily give up its own position, and for President Bashar al-Asad to be willing to sign his own death warrant. Various countries created false expectations among the Syrian opposition groups that military intervention was forthcoming, which it was not.
By way of an alternative, the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and others, started to supply huge quantities of financial and military aid to the military opposition groups, but their support was channelled to their respective favourites. Their lack of efficient coordination caused their help to be insufficient to help the opposition in winning the war. Their success in endangering the regime’s military position triggered a large-scale Russian military intervention in September 2015 and onwards, on top of the military support of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah, who all wanted to protect their strategic ally to stay in power. All this, strengthened Russia’s position considerably.
The Geneva Communiqué, adopted on 30 June 2012 by the Action Group for Syria, and endorsed by the permanent members of the UN Security Council, became a cornerstone for any future negotiations between the Syrian regime and the opposition. The Geneva Communiqué described a number of principles and guidelines for a Syrian-led transition. One of the most important guidelines dealt with a political transition that should be made possible through the establishment of a transitional governing body which was to establish a neutral environment in which the transition could take place. The transitional governing body was to exercise full executive powers. It could include members of the Syrian government, the opposition and ‘other groups’ and was to be formed on the basis of mutual consent. Although the Geneva Communiqué did not mention anything about the role of the Syrian president, the position of Bashar al-Asad became a principal point of dispute. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggested that President al-Asad could not take part in such a transitional governing body, whereas Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov denied this. The Syrian opposition, in general, strongly rejected any role for President al-Asad in the ‘transitional period’. For the Syrian regime itself it was President al-Asad who was to decide on such issues, not the opposition, nor foreign countries. The fixation on the departure of al-Asad constituted a serious obstacle in finding a solution to the conflict, the more so as he was in power in most of the country.
A great number of countries officially recognized the Syrian Opposition Coalition. They supported its demand that there was not to be any future role for Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and his supporters with blood on their hands, and that they had to be brought before justice. Most Western and Arab countries supported these demands, without providing the means to implement them. Thereby these demands became little more than declaratory policies, because no real will existed for any direct Western and Arab military intervention in Syria. Such intervention was even officially rejected in the United States and the United Kingdom after parliamentary discussions. The direct foreign military threat against the regime was thereby eliminated.
The war in Syria clearly developed into a war by proxy, with various countries (particularly the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) interfering in the internal affairs of Syria by supporting different armed and other opposition groups. Russia and Iran wanted to militarily maintain their strategic interests in Syria and did not want to lose their Syrian ally.
After the expansion of the Islamic State (IS) from Iraq into Syria in 2013, attention to the fight against the Syrian regime shifted to the fight against IS. Because of the IS terrorist threats in Western countries this came to be viewed with greater priority. The support for the direct struggle against the regime thereby gradually diminished.
As a result, the opposition felt abandoned and betrayed by Western countries, but was left with few, if any, alternatives. With Western countries providing the opposition with insufficient support, the chances for Russia and Iran to get the upper hand increased. The Russian military intervention that started in September 2015 made the prospects for the opposition even worse. Providing more intensive foreign support to the military opposition forces led to an intensification and prolongation of the war, but not enough for a defeat of the regime.
The ability to achieve peace in Syria does not only depend on the Syrians themselves, but also on the various countries involved in the war by proxy, and whether or not they are prepared to give priority to ending the Syrian conflict above their rival regional ambitions. Such a turning point has not yet been reached, and the prospects for real peace in Syria are still far away, even if the Syrian regime would militarily win the war.
[Other roundtable submissions can be found here.]
بواسطة Josephine Lippincott | أكتوبر 25, 2018 | Roundtables, غير مصنف
The Syrian conflict has witnessed seven years of overwhelming violence and death. An endless cycle of confrontation and ceasefire, punctuated by repeated aborted negotiation attempts, have all further complicated and prolonged what we have come to understand as the Syrian Civil War. Every aspect of the conflict, becomes either embroiled in discussion or debate, results in no action, or adds to the hardships faced by the Syrian population. Throughout the conflict, scholars and experts have debated the idea of turning points or critical junctures.
When examining the idea of critical turning points, it is imperative that we consider events not just at the macro-level. What cannot be overemphasized is the fact that each of these turning points, while changing the broader trajectory of the conflict, also had very real, life-altering consequences for local communities. Through merging the idea of the local into the discussion of the macro, we gain a better understanding of the reality of some of the critical junctures within the Syrian conflict.
While there are many potential turning points, I identify three critical turning points in the Syrian conflict. They are as follows: the militarization of the Syrian uprising in early 2011, Obama’s failure to uphold his red-line declaration in 2013, and the 2015 commencement of Russian military intervention. Each of these situations altered the trajectory of the conflict dramatically, not just on a macro-level, but for local communities.
The militarization of the peaceful protests that began in March 2011 transformed the Syrian uprising into a bloody, violent full-scale military conflict. When the protests began in March 2011, Syrians across the country raised their voices in protest against the repression and tyranny of the Assad regime. In response, the government forces employed violence, cracking down on protesters. These events would escalate into more violence from the regime as well as the protesters. This initial event would usher the uprising in a direction that would leave a mark on Syrian history forever. The militarization of the opposition changed Syria from a country facing civil unrest to a country ensnared in conflict. Moreover, the escalating level of violence led to the formation of various opposition groups. These groups would develop different identities, sponsors, and alliances; resulting in a myriad of armed groups which would subsequently fractionalize the opposition and result in further fighting and violence. From this point on, the Syrian uprising had transformed into a civil war.
The escalation from protests to conflict altered the way the international community viewed Syria, but more importantly, it changed and disrupted the lives of Syrians. The militarization of the conflict would lead to the regime tightening its grasp on state services, leading to access challenges for Syrians. The fighting across the Syrian geography would disrupt daily life, prevent children from attending school, create financial problems for families, or lead Syrians to flee their homeland. These disruptions in daily life would be further exacerbated when the international system began to intervene and to strengthen certain parts of the armed opposition.
The second turning point was the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons and President Obama’s subsequent failure to uphold his red-line declaration in 2013. In August 2013, Assad and his forces used Sarine gas near Damascus, killing more than fourteen hundred civilians. The US intelligence assessment asserted that the regime used chemical weapons as a method to push Syrian opposition forces back from rebel-held territory when government forces were unable. With the failure of President Obama and the United States to provide any actionable response, the Assad regime became even less fearful of any foreign intervention. The regime action and the US inaction altered the geopolitics surrounding the Syria conflict. Given the lack of direct military action or an escalation in support to rebel groups by the United States, other countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia also began to disengage. The stalled support created a feeling of abandonment within the armed opposition. The lack of intensified engagement by the United States, prompted bolder action by the Assad regime, Iran, and eventually Russia. However, beyond the macro-level implications, this event also had large ramifications for the Syrian population. The chemical weapons attack signaled that Syrians’ fears would not be limited to airstrikes or gunfire, but would have to also include weapons such as sarine gas.
The third critical turning point that altered the conflict on both the macro and micro level was Russian military intervention. In September 2015, Russia launched airstrikes that were reported to target ISIS, however US intelligence reports argued that the airstrikes targeted key Assad opponents, including US-backed units. On an international level, the Russian-intervention altered the geopolitical dynamics. The Russian intervention solidified the alliance between Assad, Iran, and Russia, but also further demonstrated the lack of heightened support by Western actors. Moreover, as a result of this inaction, it became even more apparent to opposition groups and the Syrian population that they could not expect help or aid from the United States or other western countries. Rather, it would be the Russians who would ultimately guide how the Syrian conflict would unfold and negotiations for the conflict’s termination. Russian actions under the intervention have attempted to restrict the number of Russian casualties, but has led to higher civilian casualties due to less discriminate military tactics. The attempt to restrict Russian casualties raises the level of violence and the number of threats for Syrians. Now they must prepare for a bombing or chemical weapon attack from their own government, as well as attacks from a world superpower.
Following these events and so many other daily tragedies, the Syrian population has remained isolated from the international community. These three critical turning points have contributed to further deterioration of daily life for Syrians and altered geo-politics in the region. While the Assad regime has escalated its attacks through chemical weapons, international powers have delineated new rules and retained new spheres of influence. The failure of US engagement in the conflict, both militarily and diplomatically, along with the Russian-Syrian alliance has allowed for Russia, Iran, and Syria to largely control the results of the Syrian conflict. With the United States continuing its inaction to implement change or alter the status quo, other countries have also taken a less direct approach. As a result, the Syrian conflict continues as the Syrian population faces even more hardship.
[Other roundtable submissions can be found here.]
بواسطة Syria in a Week Editors | أكتوبر 24, 2018 | Media Roundups, Syria in a Week
The following is a selection by our editors of significant weekly developments in Syria. Depending on events, each issue will include anywhere from four to eight briefs. This series is produced in both Arabic and English in partnership between Salon Syria and Jadaliyya. Suggestions and blurbs may be sent to info@salonsyria.com.
US Strategy for Syria
22 October 2018
Informed sources say that President Trump’s administration asked US institutions to develop concrete proposals and a road map to implement the US strategy in Syria.
The current US strategy includes keeping special forces within the international coalition against ISIS east of the Euphrates in the Tanf base on the Syrian-Iraqi-Jordanian border to achieve three goals: eliminating ISIS and preventing its reemergence, getting rid of Iranian forces and militias, and pushing toward a UN-sponsored political solution under UN resolution 2254.
The sources say that US officials and experts are studying how to “use pressure and influence means, including controlling a third of Syrian territory, ninety percent of Syrian oil, and half the Syrian gas, in order to exercise pressure to reach the three goals,” stating that the White House is waiting for these proposals by the end of the year.
White Helmets in Canada
19 November 2018
The Canadian government said on Friday that is getting ready to resettle civil defense volunteers in areas controlled by Syrian opposition factions, also known as the White Helmets, along with their families, however, it did not disclose when they will arrive or where they will be resettled.
In a joint statement, Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland and Immigration Minister Ahmed Hussen said that “Canada is working with a group of international allies on resettling a number of White Helmets members and their families after they had to flee from Syria because they were being specifically targeted by the Syrian government and its Russian ally.”
White Helmets volunteers “witnessed firsthand, as paramedics, some of the most ferocious crimes committed by the criminal Assad government,” the statement said.
On 22 July, Jordan said that it received four hundred and twenty-two members from the White Helmets who fled areas in southern Syria before government forces regained control over them, with the aim of resettling them in Britain, Germany, or Canada.
On Wednesday, the Jordanian foreign ministry said that two hundred members of those had left to be resettled in Western countries.
The world first took notice of the White Helmets after photos appeared with them searching for survivors in the rubble and carrying children covered in blood to the hospital.
The White Helmets emerged in 2013, when the Syrian crisis was coming near to its third year. Since its establishment, more than two hundred of its volunteers have been killed and another five hundred injured.
Four-way Summit on Syria
18 October 2018
Ankara announced a four-way summit on Syria that includes the leaders of Turkey, Russia, Germany, and France to be held in Istanbul on 27 October.
The summit will join Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan with Russian President Vladimir Putin, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, according to Turkish presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin.
The spokesman said that the four leaders will discuss the situation on the ground in Syria, the agreement on the demilitarized zone in Idlib that was reached by President Erdogan and President Putin during their summit in Sochi on 17 September, the political process, and various aspects of the Syria crisis.
The four-way summit is expected to “coordinate joint efforts to find a long-lasting solution to the Syrian conflict,” Kalin said.
Delegations from the four countries met in Istanbul on 14 September to prepare for the summit. The Turkish delegation was headed by Ibrahim Kalin, while the German delegation was headed by National Security Advisor Jan Hecker, Senior Diplomatic Advisor Philippe Etienne for the French delegation, and Senior Presidential Advisor Yuri Ushakov for the Russian delegation.
The three-hour preparatory meeting discussed the Syrian issue, especially developments regarding the de-escalation zone in Idlib, in addition to fighting terrorism and other regional issues.
The delegations included technical teams to arrange for the four-way summit called for by Erdogan in July. The summit was initially planned to be held in September but was then delayed.
An Extended Deadline for Idlib
15 October 2018
On Sunday night, the deadline passed for Tahrir al-Sham, which is mainly comprised of Nusra Front (previously), to evacuate the demilitarized buffer zone in Idlib that was set by the Russian-Turkish agreement in Sochi, without any withdrawal being monitored, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).
Turkey has sought to convince Tahrir al-Sham, which is affiliated with al-Qaeda, to implement the agreement to avoid a Syrian government offensive which Turkey fears might cause a new influx of refugees towards its border.
Turkey has managed to implement the first phase of the agreement by convincing armed factions to hand over their heavy weaponry by 10 October.
Jan Egeland, UN Humanitarian Affairs Advisor said that Russia and Turkey plan to allow for more time to implement their agreement on the de-escalation zone in Idlib, a “great relief” for three million civilians in the area.
But there were still “a million unanswered questions” about how the deal would work, and what would happen if groups designated as terrorists refused to lay down their weapons, Egeland said.
Speaking after a regular Syria humanitarian meeting in Geneva, Egeland said that Russia had confirmed that Damascus had scrapped Law Number 10, a “very concerning” law allowing the expropriation of land and property from refugees.
Idlib and adjacent areas are the last strongholds of the opposition who rose up against President Bashar al-Assad in 2011, and the UN has warned that a battle to restore Assad’s control over the zone could be the worst of the seven-year-old war.
Turkey and Russia set up a buffer zone running between fifteen and twenty kilometers deep into opposition territory that originally had to be free of heavy weapons and fanatics by Monday.
“There will be more time for diplomacy,” Egeland said. “I was heartened to hear both Russia and Turkey say they are optimistic, they can achieve much more through negotiations, and they are generally very positive on the implementation of this deal which is giving a relief, a pause in fighting, to Idlib,” he added.
Egeland said there were twelve thousand humanitarian workers in the area, and Idlib had now gone five weeks without an air raid, something he could not remember in the past three years.
Four Candidates to Succeed De Mistura
18 October 2018
Russian-Western negotiations are underway to choose one of four candidates to succeed UN Envoy Staffan de Mistura who will leave his position at the end of the next month.
De Mistura told the UN Security Council that he will resign from his position at the end of November after four years as the third UN envoy to Syria after the late Kofi Anan and Lakhdar Brahimi. UN Humanitarian Affairs Envoy and Head of the Norwegian Council for Refugees Jan Egeland will also resign.
After de Mistura’s resignation announcement, consultations between UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres and the five permanent UN Security Council countries reached a new level in order to find the fifth envoy to Syria. According to sources, there are four candidates: the first is Nikolai Mladenov, UN Representative for the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process since 2015, who was previously the foreign minister of Bulgaria. It seems that the Russian side objected to his name, considering him “close to the United States and not impartial.” Damascus also informed Moscow of its reservations because of Mladenov’s “political position from Syria which he expressed when he was the foreign minister of Bulgaria.”
The second is UN Envoy in Iraq Jan Kubis, who is the former foreign minister of Slovakia. It has been reported that Washington has reservations against him because of his “proximity to the Russian position,” and because it thinks that his presence is “currently essential in Iraq, which is undergoing the formation of a new government and a political process following the elections.”
The third is the Algerian Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra. Moscow and Arab countries have pushed for Lamamra to succeed de Mistura, however, Western countries expressed their objection based on previous positions that “deny him the status of mediator”, referring to his statement in December of 2016 on the sidelines of the Peace and Security Conference in Africa: “What happened in Aleppo? The (Syrian) government was able to restore its sovereignty and control over the city. These people were hoping that terrorism would prevail in Aleppo and other areas. After terrorism failed there, they think it will be able to succeed in Algeria, which is the first country to strategically win against terrorism.”
The fourth is Geir Pederson, the Norwegian ambassador in China since 2017, former Norwegian UN ambassador between 2012 and 2017, and UN representative in Lebanon between 2005 and 2008. Due to the mutual reservations between Russian and Western countries, sources close to Guterres proposed Perderson as a compromise, although some Russian sources indicated that he “represents one of the NATO member countries.”
Russian Delegation in Damascus
19 November 2018
The official news agency SANA reported the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as saying during his meeting with Russian envoy Alexander Laverntiev on Friday: “Some countries in the area and many Western countries continue to intervene in the political process and exercise pressure to impose their will on the Syrian people. This hinders reaching any progress… Syria is committed to its right, which is guaranteed by international conventions, to prevent any external party from interfering in its internal affairs.”
Laverntiev had visited Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which coincided with a tour to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey by US envoy to Syria James Jeffery.
Laverntiev briefed Assad on the result of his tour, which included a number of Arab countries before he arrived in Damascus, asserting that “his country is seeking to use this diplomatic activity to exchange views on issues in the region, especially the political process in Syria and completing the battle to eliminate terrorism, in order to restore peace and security and preserve the integrity and independence of Syria,” according to SANA.
Elimination of Eighty-eight Thousand Militants
20 October 2018
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu confirmed the death of nearly eighty-eight thousand militants from opposition factions in Syria in the last three years since Moscow intervened in favor of government forces, according to a statement from the Russian defense ministry.
“Throughout the process, more than eighty-seven thousand and five hundred militants were eliminated, in addition to the liberation of one thousand four hundred and eleven towns and more than ninety-five percent of Syrian territory,” the statement reported Shoigu as saying.
“Most of the militants have been liquidated,” added Shoigu.
The London based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said that around three hundred and sixty-five thousand people have been killed during the course of the seven-year-war.
Russia intervened in the conflict in September of 2015, providing aerial support for President Bashar al-Assad’s government.
Shoigu said that Russian aerial forces executed more than forty thousand missions, striking around one hundred and twenty thousand “terrorist” infrastructure targets.
“Syrian armed forces now control territories where more than ninety percent of the population live,” said the Russian defense minister.
However, fighting has raged in the east of the country near several villages inhabited by fifteen thousand people, including ISIS militants and their families. They were subject to attacks by Syrian government forces and Kurdish forces, forcing seven thousand civilians to flee.
Dispute on Damascus’s Share
18 October 2018
Russian President Vladimir Putin said at the Valdai Conference in Sochi that Moscow helped government forces in gaining control over ninety-five percent of Syrian territory, which was reiterated by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu during his visit to Singapore.
On the other hand, US Special Envoy to Syria James Jeffery said that forty percent of Syria “is not under the control of government forces,” pointing out that Washington allies and Ankara control these areas.
“The Turks agree with our main objectives in Syria, which were clearly laid out by the President (Donald Trump) at the UN National Assembly. That is completely ousting Iran from Syria because it is an accelerant to the whole process. Secondly, de-escalating the military situation in Idlib, where Turks have reached an agreement with the Russians. And revitalizing the political process,” a US statement reported Jeffrey as saying during his visit to Turkey.
“President Trump sent tweets that summarize what we have been telling the Russians and others, which is that any attack in Idlib would be a reckless escalation of the conflict. This is very important because we think that it is time to stop the fighting. There were about three million people – and there are still three million people in Idlib, about half of them are displaced people from other areas in Syria. There is also around fifty to seventy thousand militants. Most of them are part of the opposition we used to work with and the Turks still do. There is also between seven to eight thousand people, or perhaps more, who are named terrorist organizations, essentially Tahrir al-Sham, which is the offshoot of Nusra, which in turn is an offshoot of Qaeda. There are also some elements from ISIS, and others associated with Qaeda,” he added.
“So you have got a very mixed situation there, but it would have been a huge mess if anybody had gone in, and it would have been – meant essentially the end of the armed resistance to the Syrian government. The Turks pushed back,” he went on to say.
“This is a major step because what it has done is it has frozen the conflict not only there, but the conflict is also frozen essentially everywhere else. We have forces in the south and in the northeast continuing operations against ISIS, and the Turks also have positions north of Idlib in Afrin and in al-Bab area. So essentially forty percent of the country is not under the government’s control, and we are talking with the Turks on how we can now shift to, again, the President’s words, revitalizing the political process,” Jeffrey added.
بواسطة Ibrahim Hamidi | أكتوبر 19, 2018 | News, غير مصنف
رئيس الوزراء الياباني شينزو آبي يريد خلال سنواته الثلاث في الحكم أن ينفض آثار «الحرب الباردة». الإبقاء على العلاقة الاستراتيجية مع أميركا. حل مشكلة العالقين مع كوريا الشمالية. «تطبيع» العلاقة مع الصين.
لكن الأهم، بالنسبة إلى آبي، هي التركيز على حل «النزاع التاريخي»، أي تطوير العلاقة مع روسيا للوصول إلى «بيئة آمنة ومستقرة» بين طوكيو وموسكو، قوامها الاقتصاد والاستثمار.
في سبتمبر (أيلول)، بادر آبي خلال مشاركته في منتدى روسي إلى دعوته الرئيس فلاديمير بوتين لـ«حل القضايا العالقة». بوتين، كتب بخط يده على ورقه جانبية، ثم قال أمام الحاضرين بأنه مستعد لتوقيع اتفاق سلام قبل نهاية العام لحل مشكلة الجزر الأربع المتنازع عليها منذ سبعين سنة.
منذ ذاك، عكف مسؤولون في البلدين للوصول إلى صيغة لاتفاق السلام، في وقت تجري خطوات بناء ثقة بين البلدين. يسعى دبلوماسيون روس ويابانيون للوصول إلى اتفاق. لن يكون قبل نهاية العام. توقعات طوكيو أن يكون منتصف العام المقبل «لكن النيات الطيبة لا تكفي. لا بد من حل مشكلة الأراضي وقبول السيادة اليابانية ثم توقيع اتفاق سلام».
سوريا، إحدى الساحات: كيف يمكن لطوكيو أن ترضي موسكو في سوريا من دون إغضاب واشنطن؟
وكان وزيرا الخارجية والدفاع في روسيا ونظيراهما اليابانيان عقدوا اجتماعات في موسكو في يوليو (تموز) الماضي، وجرى الاتفاق على مواصلة حوار الجانبين حول مختلف المواضيع ومنها ملف المساعدات الإنسانية الموجهة إلى سوريا في إطار التعاون الروسي – الياباني في المجتمع الدولي.
زائر اليابان يشعر أنها في محيط متغير في الكثير من التحديات في الجوار: روسيا والصين وكوريا الشمالية وأميركا. الرئيس الأميركي دونالد ترمب وجد مع رئيس الوزراء الياباني علاقة خاصة معه. كما أن آبي وجد علاقة خاصة مع بوتين. ترمب يريد تطبيع العلاقة مع بوينغ يانغ. دخل في «حرب تجارية» مع الصين.
تدرك اليابان أن الصين في صعود. هذا الصعود الاقتصادي على المسرح العالمي يفتح شهيتها في البحر الصيني الجنوبي. هي تواصل استعراض قوتها العسكرية. يلاحظ زيادة موازنة الدفاع. بدأت بتعزيز مواقع عسكرية وغيرها من وصول عدد كبير من السفن الصينية حول جزر سينكاكو اليابانية في بحر الصين الشرقي، وأيضاً قامت بتوسيع سيطرتها في مجال مياهها الإقليمية ومجالها الجوي وقواعد الاشتباك البحري في بحر الصين الجنوبي.
منشور رسمي في طوكيو «يحشد» ضد موقف بكين من جزر سينكاكو في بحر الصين الشرقي. ينتهي: «بصرف النظر عن التحديات التي تفرض نفسها، فإن اليابان ستستمر في تطوير العلاقات مع الصين والدول المجاورة عموماً باعتبارها دولة تقوم بدور مهم في صون السلام والاستقرار في آسيا والمجتمع الدولي».
كان الرئيس باراك أوباما سبق ووضع «خطا أحمر» لمنع الصين من تغيير الوقائع في بحرَي الصين، لكن لم يواجه بكين عندما فعلت. إدارة ترمب تريد بحر الصين الجنوبي «ثنائي القطبية» على أمل إعطاء بكين «دوراً مسؤولاً وبنّاء» في العلاقات الدولية وفي الإقليم. الصين هي «هدف لإدارة ترمب». لذلك، فإن الصين بالنسبة إلى اليابان فرصة وتحدٍ.
هناك الكثير من التاريخ الاستعماري بين البلدين، لكن اليابان تريد أن تنتقل العلاقة من بكين من سيئة إلى «طبيعية». الرهان على «التطبيع». لطوكيو الكثير من الشكوك إزاء نيات كوريا الشمالية ومدى تحويل «كلماتها إلى أفعال». ويقول دبلوماسيون: «من تجربتنا لا بد من التسلح بالكثير من الحذر مع كوريا الشمالية. ونقترح اتباع أسلوب خطوة – خطوة، لأن الطريق المرن لم ينجح في التوصل إلى اختراقات خلال عشرين سنة».
بين هذا وذاك، يسعى آبي لفتح ثغرة من البوابة الروسية. طوكيو تريد أن تتسلح بحل النزاع مع موسكو حول الجزر الأربع المستمر منذ نهاية الحرب العالمية الثانية 1945 والبناء على البيان المشترك في 1956.
لا تبخل الخارجية اليابانية في توزيع منشورات تشرح الموقف الرسمي من الجزر المتنازع عليها. تشرح الموقف القانوني والتاريخي والسياسي وينتهي كل منها بتمسُّك الحكومة اليابانية بالحوار والحلول السلمية والعلاقات الاقتصادية.
الرئيس بوتين زار طوكيو وآبي زار موسكو. يعمل بوتين على استغلال التغير في الميزان الدولي لفرض وقائع جديدة في المحيط الاستراتيجي. تغيير المسار مع موسكو يستند إلى القراءة الواقعية لحكومة «الحزب الليبرالي الديمقراطي» الحاكم التي جعلت رئيس الوزراء يحشد مبكراً لإجراء بعض التغييرات، قد تعتبر «ثورية». قوات الحماية الذاتية اليابانية كانت مقيدة بموجب الدستور بعد هزيمة الحرب العالمية الثانية، بعمليات حفظ السلام فقط وترك الأمور الجدية إلى الأميركيين أمراء القواعد العسكرية، لكن مشت خطوة أبعد في قواعد «الاشتباك العسكري». وفي 17 يناير (كانون الأول) 2013. جرى إقرار أول وثيقة لـ«استراتيجية الأمن القومي» بحيث توفر نقاطاً استرشادية لقضايا الأمن القومي وتطبيق مبدأ «المساهمة الفعالة في تحقيق السلام» ورصدت متطلبات ذلك في موازنة وزارة الدفاع.
اليابان التي كانت مكتفية لسبعة عقود بالتحالف الاستراتيجي مع أميركا، بات عليها توسيع خياراتها في البيئة الآسيوية المعقدة. مبادئ آبي ثلاثة: «على الدول أن تعلن مطالبها بموجب معايير القانون الدولي، وعدم استخدام القوة أو التلويح بها لتحقيق مكاسب، بل استخدام وسائل سلمية لفض النزاعات».
تم نشر هذا المقال في «الشرق الأوسط»
