{"id":9,"date":"2017-07-11T11:06:51","date_gmt":"2017-07-11T15:06:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/salonsyria.com\/?p=9"},"modified":"2017-12-24T13:17:39","modified_gmt":"2017-12-24T18:17:39","slug":"the-disappointments-of-de-escalation-and-decentralization","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/the-disappointments-of-de-escalation-and-decentralization\/","title":{"rendered":"The Disappointments of De-escalation and Decentralization"},"content":{"rendered":"

De-escalation<\/a>\u00a0and decentralization may soon disappoint those who see such programs as\u00a0possible solutions for Syria<\/a>. To be sure, Syrians will welcome any reprieve from violence. And\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0and European officials may acquiesce to political proposals that they have long since lost the leverage to shape. Even so, neither de-escalation nor decentralization will work unless Western officials do what they have spent six years not doing: Craft a coherent and comprehensive strategy to guarantee security in, and promote the viability of, autonomous areas in\u00a0Syria.<\/p>\n

While Western states have adopted disjointed initiatives and Syrian rebels have squandered opportunities to secure success, the Assad regime has waged war as part of a comprehensive campaign for control. Although it has lost the complete control it enjoyed before the war, the Assad regime has created and consolidated a \u201cStrategic Syria.\u201d Along with its allies, the regime controls Damascus, most Syrian cities and most of densely populated western Syria. Besides controlling these areas, the Assad regime has increased its influence in \u2013 by intensifying its intertwinement within \u2013 the Syrian state. In turn, it has used state institutions to perpetuate power and keep most Syrians \u201cdependent on its rule<\/a>.\u201d Through the state, the Assad regime controls, regulates and operates most industrial and commercial facilities \u2013 and pivotal land, sea, air and telecom connections \u2013 in Syria. It secures, patrols and resolves disputes in areas that are home to two-thirds of Syrians still in the country. It employs at least 1 million, and maybe as many as\u00a01.5<\/span>\u00a0million, Syrians in state institutions. And it provides millions more people with bread, water, wheat and rice; electricity and fuel; transportation and telecommunications; and other\u00a0services.<\/p>\n

Using the destructive and productive tools of the Syrian state together, the Assad regime has built Strategic Syria through three types of tactical campaigns: consolidation\/concentration, compromise and\u00a0destruction.<\/p>\n

First, the Assad regime has concentrated on delivering services from within \u2013 and mostly to \u2013 areas under its control. Besides drawing more Syrians into areas under its control, the Assad regime has managed to monitor them by embedding Syrian state institutions \u2013 universities, hospitals, courts and schools \u2013 in or near buildings that house its intelligence\u00a0agencies.<\/p>\n

Second, because the Assad regime has lost control of resources and facilities required to deliver many services and subsidies, it has compromised with the self-styled\u00a0Islamic State<\/a>\u00a0(ISIS<\/span>,\u00a0ISIL<\/span>, Daesh) and the\u00a0Kurdish faction\u00a0<\/a>known<\/a>\u00a0as the\u00a0YPG<\/span><\/a>, which\u00a0dominates the\u00a0U.S.<\/span>-cultivated coalition Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF<\/span>)<\/a>.\u00a0ISIS<\/span>\u00a0and the\u00a0YPG<\/span>\/SDF<\/span>\u00a0control most of Syria\u2019s resource-rich provinces \u2013 and the bulk of its domestically sourced foods and fuels. The Assad regime has purchased goods from\u00a0ISIS<\/span>and the\u00a0YPG<\/span>, while providing them with services \u2013 electricity, water, refined petroleum products and the like \u2013 that they cannot produce as effectively. Although the Assad regime has clashed with these entities to shore up Strategic Syria or protect key facilities, it has mostly focused on opposition areas \u2013 especially those that have tried to develop independent\u00a0institutions.<\/p>\n

Third, the Assad regime has destroyed the Syrian opposition\u2019s infrastructure and institutions \u2013 including any infrastructure once controlled, but seized from, the regime itself. Inevitably identifying certain groups as true threats, the Assad regime has worked ruthlessly to prevent them from creating alternatives to the Syrian state. While it has provided regime-held areas with wheat and water, for instance, the Assad regime has\u00a0bombed bakeries<\/a>\u00a0or cut water supplies in rebel-held\u00a0areas.<\/p>\n

Over time, the Assad regime has thus reduced the opposition\u2019s ability to govern, cast a cloud of terror over non-regime areas, and presented Strategic Syria as a functioning, stable home for Syrians \u2013 including those opposed to, but still dependent on, its rule. Faced with yet another false choice, millions have moved to areas under Assad\u2019s thumb. On the whole, by consolidating Strategic Syria and its control over state institutions, the Assad regime has positioned itself as an indispensable provider for Syrians and partner of the international community \u2013 thereby increasing its leverage in negotiations over Syria\u2019s\u00a0future.<\/p>\n

The Assad regime will not abandon its strategy. It will work to ensure that de-escalation and decentralization do not undermine its\u00a0control.<\/p>\n

The regime and its allies will not allow de-escalation zones to evolve into the sort of\u00a0safe zones<\/a>\u00a0that Western officials have been proposing since the war began. Nor will they allow their scheme to serve as some sort of experiment in decentralization. Instead, using de-escalation to redeploy and regroup, they will again engage in the sort of selective conflict that allowed the Assad regime to consolidate Strategic Syria in the first place. Three of four zones are disasters waiting to happen. Zone 1, in Idlib province, has become a \u201cdumping ground\u201d for Syrians still opposed to Assad \u2013 and may soon be the scene of this sordid struggle\u2019s \u201cbloodiest battle<\/a>.\u201d Zones 2 and 3 are zoos. In a patch of land between Hama and Homs and a strip east of Damascus, the Assad regime and its allies are caging up Syrians that still reject its rule. If and when the Assad regime begins its next phase of consolidation, it will blockade and bombard these areas as it has done\u00a0before.<\/p>\n

Western officials have acquiesced to the Astana Agreement because they lack the leverage to do much else \u2013 and because it will, despite its problems, save lives. Unless they adopt a more aggressive approach, however, they will allow the regime and the Russians to do more damage in the long term \u2013 as they have, for instance, by putting in place and manipulating innumerable cease-fires and conferences over the past six\u00a0years.<\/p>\n

Decentralization will not work in the existing environment, either. Yes, the Assad regime has acquiesced to de facto decentralization in parts of Syria that it does not see as necessary for its strategic survival \u2013 or can\u2019t hope to control now anyway. Yes, it may not be able to prevent or undercut Syrians\u2019 independent initiatives or small-scale international programs. And, yes, Syrians will produce fuel from plastic, power homes through single-unit solar panels, access the internet through satellite links, teach their children in bunkers and meet in the shadows to govern the bits of land they still\u00a0hold.<\/p>\n

But while Syrians have been resilient and ingenious, their solutions are not sustainable or scalable. Syria\u2019s struggle began as a battle for a better future \u2013 not a quest to symbolize the survival imperative. Syrians were demanding better schools, not bunkers; transparent governance, not secret societies; and dignity, not depravity. They were questing to be free of the false choices \u2013 bread or freedom, repression or terror, majorities or minorities, or liberty or life \u2013 that still shape their country\u00a0today.<\/p>\n

If they see de-escalation and decentralization as solutions in Syria, then\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0and European officials must make the programs viable. Above all, they must protect people and infrastructure \u2013 so that the Syrian state cannot, as it has through years of Western humanitarian and stabilization assistance, prevent or undo progress with the drop of a barrel bomb. They must also provide financial and in-kind assistance directly to people in autonomous areas. By circumventing the Syrian state, officials would ensure that Assad does not use Western assistance to undermine Western strategic and moral interests. Once they do what is necessary, officials can worry about what is sufficient to develop autonomous\u00a0areas.<\/p>\n

U.S.<\/span>\u00a0and European officials must craft a comprehensive strategy in Syria, using the opportunities afforded by nascent de-escalation and decentralization plans to protect people, invest in infrastructure, and reduce the Syrian state\u2019s power over people. Otherwise, Syrians will suffer more while the West spends billions of dollars \u2013 taxpayer dollars \u2013 to achieve the opposite of what it has set out to do. Otherwise, Assad will win the war he has been waging \u2013 and we have been watching \u2013 all\u00a0along.<\/p>\n

For more original reporting, our own in-depth analysis and thought-provoking expert commentary visit our\u00a0Safe Zones<\/a>\u00a0platform.<\/em><\/p>\n

This article was originally published by\u00a0Atlantic Council<\/a>\u00a0and is reproduced with\u00a0permission.<\/i><\/p>\n

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Syria\u00a0Deeply.”<\/i><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[This article was originally published by\u00a0Syria Deeply<\/a>.<\/em>]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Syrian state will try to ensure de-escalation and decentralization do not undermine its control over a \u201cStrategic Syria.\u201d For these Western strategies to become solutions for Syrians, officials must make programs viable, says lawyer and writer Anthony Elghossain.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":80,"featured_media":10,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[19,14,1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-9","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-cost-of-war","category-reports","category-1"],"yoast_head":"\nThe Disappointments of De-escalation and Decentralization - Salon Syria<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/the-disappointments-of-de-escalation-and-decentralization\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Disappointments of De-escalation and Decentralization - 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