{"id":2568,"date":"2018-05-02T08:54:29","date_gmt":"2018-05-02T12:54:29","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/salonsyria.com\/?p=2568"},"modified":"2018-05-02T08:55:15","modified_gmt":"2018-05-02T12:55:15","slug":"eastern-ghouta-x-20","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/","title":{"rendered":"Eastern Ghouta x 20"},"content":{"rendered":"

“After several days of calm, the battle in Eastern Ghouta enclave seems to have picked up again as President Bashar al-Assad\u2019s government launched a new round of\u00a0air strikes on Douma<\/a>, the only city still left in insurgent hands. Leaders of the Islam Army, the opposition militia that rules the city, have insisted that they will stay in Douma come what may, but they do not have the military muscle to pull that off if Damascus and Moscow decide otherwise.<\/p>\n

Should regime-rebel talks break down and end in a renewed, full-scale offensive, local civilians will be at risk.<\/p>\n

UN sources recently estimated that as many as\u00a078,000\u2013150,000<\/a>\u00a0people may remain in Douma alongside the Islamist fighters, though such figure are unreliable and have historically\u00a0erred on the high side<\/a>. Whatever the actual number, it is clear that many civilians in Douma have been forcibly\u00a0prevented from fleeing<\/a>\u00a0by Islam Army rebels, who seem to want to exploit their presence as a card in negotiations, and that all are suffering from callous government siege tactics, with loyalist forces\u00a0refusing<\/a>\u00a0to permit the entry of aid workers, medicine, and humanitarian supplies.<\/p>\n

It remains to be seen what form Douma\u2019s capitulation will ultimately take, and how much death, destruction, and displacement will accompany it. But when the city folds, as at some point it will, seven years of opposition rule in Eastern Ghouta are going to come to an end.<\/p>\n

Other parts of the enclave have already been retaken since the offensive began in February, with rebels from Failaq al-Rahman, Ahrar al-Sham, and Tahrir al-Sham either killed, forced to surrender, or sent to\u00a0northwestern Syria<\/a>\u00a0along with many civilians\u2014according to the most recent UN numbers, as many as\u00a049,000<\/a>\u00a0people. Meanwhile, some 123,000 inhabitants of Eastern Ghouta are thought to have come under government control, either living inside retaken neighborhoods like Erbeen and Harasta or having fled to Damascus and a series overcrowded IDP shelters near the city.<\/p>\n

The retaking of Eastern Ghouta seems almost an afterthought to Assad\u2019s December 2016 victory in\u00a0Eastern Aleppo<\/a>, but this is in fact the bigger battle. It is being fought over a larger area, on the doorstep of the Syrian capital, with many more fighters involved and more civilians at risk. Whether more people died in Ghouta than in Aleppo, I don\u2019t know\u2014but many, many people have died.<\/p>\n

* * *<\/p>\n

Over the past few years, I have spent an unholy amount of time trying to understand the politics of Eastern Ghouta\u2019s rebel movement. I have also written a lot about the area. Sifting through my archives the other day, I found that I had penned no less than twenty English-language articles, reports, and blog posts on the topic, for Syria Comment, the Carnegie Endowment, The Century Foundation, IRIN News, and others. The first one was published in February 2013, as pro-Assad forces prepared to put the region under siege, and the last one is less than a week old.<\/p>\n

That\u2019s a lot of text. Although in hindsight I can spot plenty of errors and misunderstandings, and there is still very much that I still don\u2019t understand, there\u2019s also a lot of material in there that seems like it could be useful to people trying to follow the crisis now unfolding near Damascus. Therefore, I have compiled all twenty pieces here, with a short introductory comment about each.<\/p>\n

The latest publication is first on the page, so read from bottom to top if you want all five years in chronological order. If not, just pick and choose as you please.<\/p>\n

\u2013\u00a0Aron Lund<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0Trapped Between Rebels and Air Strikes, Civilians in Eastern Ghouta Face Chaos<\/a><\/strong>(IRIN, Mar. 2018)
\nWith only Douma left in rebel hands by late March, I tried to investigate what became of Eastern Ghouta\u2019s civilian population in more than a month of fighting. UN numbers are all over the map, but it\u2019s clear that many ended up in shelters erected around the area while others stayed put despite the fighting, and that they will now come under Assad\u2019s rule once again. Still others have joined the opposition as it was driven off to Idleb and Aleppo, where some will now be resettled in Afrin. Yet civilians also remain trapped inside insurgent-held Douma, as the clock ticks toward either a rebel surrender or a renewed military offensive.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0Assad\u2019s Divide and Conquer Strategy Is Working<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(Foreign Policy<\/em>, Mar. 2018)
\nBrute military force was certainly the main ingredient in Assad\u2019s victory in Eastern Ghouta, but his government also reached its objectives using more sophisticated means, including by exploiting insurgent divisions to punch where their defenses were weakest, negotiating separate deals through well-connected siege merchants, and rallying supporters inside the enclave to work behind rebel lines. Among other things, this piece looks at the curious case of Sheikh Bassam Difdaa, a pro-government Sufi preacher who helped crack Failaq al-Rahman\u2019s defenses in Kafr Batna.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0Aleppo Again? A Plea to Save Lives in in Eastern Ghouta<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(TCF, Mar. 2018)
\nAs the final, brutal offensive in Eastern Ghouta got under way, it was obvious that loyalist forces were going to win\u2014they were overwhelmingly superior and faced no risk of outside intervention. In other words, the best time to think about what that meant for civilians was before the battle was over. The pro-Assad side had clearly advertised that defeated rebels and activists would either have to submit to government rule (but some would not; some could not) or head to rebel-held northern Syria. But what about the larger civilian population? Varied in their allegiances and circumstances, some civilians would undoubtedly want to follow the opposition to Idleb, while others would just as undoubtedly want to stay in their homes after government forces returned. To my mind, this was a moment for the international community to push for and facilitate individual choice by, among other things, promoting an orderly handover once rebels surrendered and by dispatching monitors to gauge the voluntariness of civilians staying or leaving, in the hope of minimizing the amount of forced displacement and hostage-type situations. Also, regardless of all political dimensions, humanitarian aid needed to be rushed to relief organizations on the ground quickly, before IDP numbers grew unmanageable. In the end, not a lot of that happened, but many of these suggestions remain just as relevant as when I wrote this\u2014now in Douma.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0Understanding Eastern Ghouta in Syria<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(IRIN, Feb. 2018)
\nA short but fairly comprehensive pre-battle backgrounder on Eastern Ghouta as it was in spring 2018, in which I attempt to map out who controlled what while also describing the issues at stake as Assad\u2019s government readied itself to retake the enclave.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0The Man-Made Disaster in Syria\u2019s Eastern Ghouta<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(IRIN, Dec. 2017)
\nOn how the siege on Eastern Ghouta was tightened in September 2017, in preparation for the offensive that would follow early next year. The humanitarian effects of the siege had always been severe, but with smuggling tunnels now blocked, private food sales banned, and UN convoys prevented from entering, what had been a simmering crisis boiled over into full-scale disaster\u2014hurting civilians much more than rebels, who controlled all levers of the economy. It was a war crime right out in the open, a very effective one.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0East Ghouta Turns on Itself, Again<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(TCF, May 2017)
\nIn April 2017, the Islam Army and Failaq al-Rahman went back to fighting each other, one year to the day after their mini-civil war in 2016. Drivers this time around included the de-escalation deals being rolled out by Russia, the recent loss of the rebel smuggling tunnels, and a whole lot of pent-up anger.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0The Syrian Rebel Who Tried to Build an Islamic Paradise<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(Politico Magazine<\/em>, Mar. 2017)
\nA long feature on Zahran Alloush and his attempts to unite the enclave under his own iron-fisted rule. Though capable and ruthless enough, the Islam Army leader\u2019s grand project was ultimately frustrated by his failure to control the war economy and the resistance of rival factions. This article covers some of the same ground as the \u201cInto the Tunnels<\/a>\u201d report, but has more storytelling and a tighter focus on Alloush\u2019s role.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0Going South in East Ghouta<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(Carnegie, Feb. 2017)
\nBy spring 2017, things were looking pretty hopeless for the rebels. The Syrian government had seized a lot of territory after Alloush\u2019s death and it had just pocketed Eastern Aleppo. It looked as if Eastern Ghouta would be next, with Damascus pulling together troops and seizing the smuggling tunnels in Qaboun and Barzeh. But then fighting petered out, possibly because Russian-brokered de-escalation deals clicked into place during exactly this time, which shifted Assad\u2019s attention to the Islamic State. The Russian military then cleverly played Eastern Ghouta\u2019s factions off against each other, in particular by goading the Islam Army to go after Failaq-friendly jihadis. A new round of infighting would begin in April 2017.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0Into the Tunnels: The Rise and Fall of Syria\u2019s Rebel Enclave in the Eastern Ghouta<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(TCF, Dec. 2016)
\nA detailed history of the Eastern Ghouta enclave and its political economy, this report attempts to chart the rise of the main rebel groups and their shifting rivalries, up to the point when they finally split the enclave in May 2016. It includes sections on the 2014 joint institutions, the 2015 wars over frontline crossings and smuggling tunnels, and some discussion of the ideology of the major factions. A shortened and slightly updated version of this report was later printed as a chapter in The Century Foundation\u2019s\u00a0Arab Politics After the Uprisings<\/em><\/a>, an edited volume that I assume you\u2019ve already bought and read many times over, since it is just that good.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0Showdown in East Ghouta<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(Carnegie, May 2016)
\nMy quick take Eastern Ghouta\u2019s just-beginning internal breakdown. Ending in a Qatari-brokered truce later in May, the infighting ended up splitting the enclave into two or three parts, depending on how you count them. The Islam Army took sole control over the northern and eastern parts stretching from Douma to Nashabiyeh; Failaq al-Rahman seized the Damascus suburbs; and Harasta remained in the Failaq-friendly hands of Fajr al-Umma. Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham Islamists were also part of the mix. Nusra had formally joined forces with Fajr to smash the Islam Army, but they were mostly floating around inside Failaq-land. Ghouta\u2019s small Ahrar branch was fragmenting: some members backed the Islam Army, others fought the Islam Army alongside Nusra, still others tried to remain neutral.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0After Zahran: Rising Tension in the East Ghouta<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(Carnegie, Apr. 2016)
\nThis was written alongside \u201cAn Islamist Experiment<\/a>,\u201d when Eastern Ghouta was on the verge of major internal conflict. After Zahran Alloush\u2019s death, factions outside Douma had merged into two loosely allied blocks that sought to cut his successor down to size. The Islam Army had lashed out in response with preemptive arrests and assassinations, which didn\u2019t improve the mood much. Right after publication, the Ghouta insurgency blew itself apart with a big, nasty bang.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0An Islamist Experiment: Political Order in the East Ghouta<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(Carnegie, Apr. 2016)
\nWith infighting on the way, this article looks at the cross-factional institutions set up by Eastern Ghouta\u2019s rebels to contain internal conflicts. Starting in 2014, Alloush had pushed for the creation of a joint military command and a sharia-based governance apparatus. At the peak of his power in early 2015, these institutions had seemed like they could potentially transform into a new political order of a sort. But the joint institutions frayed and hollowed quickly, with factional anarchy resurfacing to a greater extent than is clear in this article. I got a somewhat better understanding of the system later, with more detail presented the \u201cInto the Tunnels<\/a>\u201d report.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0The Death of Zahran Alloush<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(Syria Comment, Dec. 2015)
\nOn December 25, 2015, Zahran Alloush died in an air strike. Within weeks of his funeral, rival rebels in Failaq al-Rahman, Ajnad al-Sham, Fajr al-Umma, and the Nusra Front were ganging up on a shell-shocked and sullenly aggressive Islam Army in order to claim his mantle, with violence finally erupting on a large scale in late April 2016.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0Is Zahran Alloush in Amman?<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(Syria Comment, June 2015)
\nYes, he was. Having somehow snuck out of besieged Eastern Ghouta, the Islam Army leader was taking a trip around the region, to Turkey and Jordan, where he met with Syrian rebel and religious allies as well as foreign fundraisers, agents, and diplomats, at a sensitive moment in the opposition\u2019s history. But when I wrote this, it wasn\u2019t yet very clear what was going on.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0Damascus Preachers and the Armed Rebellion<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(Carnegie, Mar. 2014)
\nThis one takes a brief peak at the capital\u2019s Ashaarite-traditionalist and Sufi networks, which had long dominated Syria\u2019s state-approved Sunni Islamic establishment and would play a huge but under-studied role in the opposition after 2011. Today, their influence remains keenly felt through the Turkey-based Syrian Islamic Council. It is a companion piece to the article about\u00a0Ajnad al-Sham<\/a>, which grew out of exactly this clerical milieu and had visible ties to Damascene Sufism and less visible ones to exiled Ikhwani networks.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0The Ajnad al-Sham Islamic Union<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(Carnegie, Mar. 2014)
\nI look at the creation of Ajnad al-Sham, a group backed by local Sufi clerics and Muslim Brotherhood members. Later bolstering its ranks by absorbing aggrieved former Umma Army members, Ajnad al-Sham operated as one of Eastern Ghouta\u2019s top three factions for nearly two years. In spring 2016, it merged into the other second-tier faction, Failaq al-Rahman, and launched a devastating attack on the Islam Army.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0The Greater Damascus Operations Room, part 1<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(Carnegie, Nov. 2013)
\n\u2022\u00a0The Greater Damascus Operations Room, part 2<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(Carnegie, Nov. 2013)
\nThis two-parter is for the real nerds. With limited success, I tried to read the tea leaves of a major, foreign-funded rebel unity project in the wider Ghouta region. In particular, I was looking for clues about how it related to Brig. Gen. Salim Idriss\u2019s hapless Free Syrian Army HQ in Turkey, to Ghouta\u2019s Nusra and Islamic State jihadis, and to the unending internecine feuds in Douma, where Zahran Alloush was still struggling to establish himself as capo di tutti capi. I didn\u2019t reach much clarity on any of these issues at the time, but some additional details had seeped out by the time I wrote the \u201cInto the Tunnels<\/a>\u201d report.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0A Dispute in Douma<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(Carnegie, Oct. 2013)
\nIn this one, I did my sorry best to make sense of rebel rivalries in Eastern Ghouta, whose internal functioning under a half-year old siege had yet to be hashed out. Though at the time this was only vaguely visible in local coalition politics, Zahran Alloush\u2019s just-created Islam Army was drifting into conflict with a set of pugnacious, Free Syrian Army-flagged commanders and contraband kingpins united by their shared rejection of his dominance and the Islamist rule that came with it. A year later, they made a desperate, last-ditch attempt to kneecap the Islam Army and push it out of the smuggling economy by entering into an alliance known as the Umma Army. Zahran promptly dropped a piano on them. For more about that grim story, check the \u201cInto the Tunnels<\/a>\u201d report or my piece for\u00a0Politico<\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n

\u2022\u00a0The Islamist Mess in Damascus<\/a><\/strong>\u00a0(Syria Comment, Feb. 2013)
\nThis old Syria Comment blog post was written just before Assad\u2019s forces managed to place Eastern Ghouta under siege. It looks at how rebel coalition-building around Damascus had clicked with the major national-level insurgent alliances of the time, and we get an early glimpse of the headstrong ways of a certain Zahran Alloush.”<\/p>\n

[This article was originally published by Syria Comment<\/em><\/a>.]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

“After several days of calm, the battle in Eastern Ghouta enclave seems to have picked up again as President Bashar al-Assad\u2019s government launched a new round of\u00a0air strikes on Douma, the only city still left in insurgent hands. Leaders of the Islam Army, the opposition militia that rules the city, have insisted that they will […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":63,"featured_media":2570,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[205,251,172,186],"class_list":["post-2568","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-1","tag-assad","tag-ghouta","tag-opposition","tag-regime"],"yoast_head":"\nEastern Ghouta x 20 - Salon Syria<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Eastern Ghouta x 20 - Salon Syria\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"“After several days of calm, the battle in Eastern Ghouta enclave seems to have picked up again as President Bashar al-Assad\u2019s government launched a new round of\u00a0air strikes on Douma, the only city still left in insurgent hands. Leaders of the Islam Army, the opposition militia that rules the city, have insisted that they will […]\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Salon Syria\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/salonsyria\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2018-05-02T12:54:29+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2018-05-02T12:55:15+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.salonsyria.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/05\/Ghouta.jpg?fit=1217%2C681&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1217\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"681\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Aron Lund\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@salonsyria\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@salonsyria\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Aron Lund\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"13 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Aron Lund\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/#\/schema\/person\/c7204795f52bf018998e73a471bf883c\"},\"headline\":\"Eastern Ghouta x 20\",\"datePublished\":\"2018-05-02T12:54:29+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-05-02T12:55:15+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/\"},\"wordCount\":2588,\"commentCount\":0,\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.salonsyria.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/05\/Ghouta.jpg?fit=1217%2C681&ssl=1\",\"keywords\":[\"Assad\",\"Ghouta\",\"Opposition\",\"Regime\"],\"articleSection\":[\"\u063a\u064a\u0631 \u0645\u0635\u0646\u0641\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/\",\"name\":\"Eastern Ghouta x 20 - Salon Syria\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#primaryimage\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.salonsyria.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/05\/Ghouta.jpg?fit=1217%2C681&ssl=1\",\"datePublished\":\"2018-05-02T12:54:29+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-05-02T12:55:15+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/#\/schema\/person\/c7204795f52bf018998e73a471bf883c\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.salonsyria.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/05\/Ghouta.jpg?fit=1217%2C681&ssl=1\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.salonsyria.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/05\/Ghouta.jpg?fit=1217%2C681&ssl=1\",\"width\":1217,\"height\":681,\"caption\":\"https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:Ghouta_Arbin_27-2-2018_(4).jpg\"},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"\u0627\u0644\u0631\u0626\u064a\u0633\u064a\u0629\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Eastern Ghouta x 20\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/\",\"name\":\"Salon Syria\",\"description\":\"\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/#\/schema\/person\/c7204795f52bf018998e73a471bf883c\",\"name\":\"Aron Lund\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/debeb15cd139ba57eb32d05232efccacbb9da578f07a7cd30f4f76ccb786d2cd?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/debeb15cd139ba57eb32d05232efccacbb9da578f07a7cd30f4f76ccb786d2cd?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Aron Lund\"},\"description\":\"Aron Lund is a fellow with The Century Foundation and the Swedish Institute for International Affairs. In 2018, his work is supported by a research grant from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/author\/aron-lund\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Eastern Ghouta x 20 - Salon Syria","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Eastern Ghouta x 20 - Salon Syria","og_description":"“After several days of calm, the battle in Eastern Ghouta enclave seems to have picked up again as President Bashar al-Assad\u2019s government launched a new round of\u00a0air strikes on Douma, the only city still left in insurgent hands. Leaders of the Islam Army, the opposition militia that rules the city, have insisted that they will […]","og_url":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/","og_site_name":"Salon Syria","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/salonsyria\/","article_published_time":"2018-05-02T12:54:29+00:00","article_modified_time":"2018-05-02T12:55:15+00:00","og_image":[{"width":1217,"height":681,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.salonsyria.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/05\/Ghouta.jpg?fit=1217%2C681&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Aron Lund","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@salonsyria","twitter_site":"@salonsyria","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Aron Lund","Est. reading time":"13 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/"},"author":{"name":"Aron Lund","@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/#\/schema\/person\/c7204795f52bf018998e73a471bf883c"},"headline":"Eastern Ghouta x 20","datePublished":"2018-05-02T12:54:29+00:00","dateModified":"2018-05-02T12:55:15+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/"},"wordCount":2588,"commentCount":0,"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.salonsyria.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/05\/Ghouta.jpg?fit=1217%2C681&ssl=1","keywords":["Assad","Ghouta","Opposition","Regime"],"articleSection":["\u063a\u064a\u0631 \u0645\u0635\u0646\u0641"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/","url":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/","name":"Eastern Ghouta x 20 - Salon Syria","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.salonsyria.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/05\/Ghouta.jpg?fit=1217%2C681&ssl=1","datePublished":"2018-05-02T12:54:29+00:00","dateModified":"2018-05-02T12:55:15+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/#\/schema\/person\/c7204795f52bf018998e73a471bf883c"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.salonsyria.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/05\/Ghouta.jpg?fit=1217%2C681&ssl=1","contentUrl":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.salonsyria.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/05\/Ghouta.jpg?fit=1217%2C681&ssl=1","width":1217,"height":681,"caption":"https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:Ghouta_Arbin_27-2-2018_(4).jpg"},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/eastern-ghouta-x-20\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"\u0627\u0644\u0631\u0626\u064a\u0633\u064a\u0629","item":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Eastern Ghouta x 20"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/","name":"Salon Syria","description":"","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/#\/schema\/person\/c7204795f52bf018998e73a471bf883c","name":"Aron Lund","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/debeb15cd139ba57eb32d05232efccacbb9da578f07a7cd30f4f76ccb786d2cd?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/debeb15cd139ba57eb32d05232efccacbb9da578f07a7cd30f4f76ccb786d2cd?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Aron Lund"},"description":"Aron Lund is a fellow with The Century Foundation and the Swedish Institute for International Affairs. In 2018, his work is supported by a research grant from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation.","url":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/author\/aron-lund\/"}]}},"jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.salonsyria.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/05\/Ghouta.jpg?fit=1217%2C681&ssl=1","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2568","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/63"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2568"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2568\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2572,"href":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2568\/revisions\/2572"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/2570"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2568"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2568"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.salonsyria.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2568"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}