“Turkey\u2019s discussions with al-Qaida-linked militants ahead of its deployment in Syria\u2019s Idlib province indicate that a wide-scale offensive against the militant group may not be Ankara\u2019s primary objective, according to Charles Lister of the Middle East\u00a0Institute.<\/p>\n
BEIRUT<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>\u2013 Turkey on Saturday\u00a0announced<\/a>\u00a0the start of its second major cross-border military operation in Syria, and Turkish troops are now\u00a0preparing<\/a>\u00a0to deploy alongside Syrian opposition groups in a province controlled largely by al-Qaida-linked\u00a0militants.<\/p>\n The campaign aims to enforce the so-called de-escalation zone agreement in territory currently held by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS<\/span>) alliance in Idlib province, but phase one of the Turkish-led operation may not involve an all-out confrontation with the militant group, according to Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute. While later phases may see more concerted action against the extremists, for now, a negotiated settlement seems to have taken shape, he told Syria\u00a0Deeply.<\/p>\n \u201cI am told that\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0and Turkey reached a final agreement to establish a Turkish protected buffer zone from the Idlib border village of Atme through Darat Izza to Anadan into western Aleppo,\u201d Lister said. \u201cFrom what I\u2019m told,\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0agreed at most to leave these areas and agreed at minimum not to interfere with Turkey\u2019s operations in that\u00a0zone.\u201d<\/p>\n Syria Deeply spoke with Lister, who has spent the past week meeting with Syrian opposition groups in southern Turkey, about Ankara\u2019s strategy in Idlib, the sentiment among participating rebel groups and what this upcoming operation could mean for the Syrian\u00a0war.<\/p>\n Charles Lister: So far, it seems to be largely a combination of Euphrates Shield forces and a collection of\u00a0FSA<\/span>\u00a0[Free Syrian Army] groups from Idlib, who were previously victims of\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0aggression. Groups like the\u00a0Free Idlib Army<\/a>, the remnants of the\u00a013th Division<\/a>\u00a0brigade, and potentially some former members of the\u00a0Hazzm Movement<\/a>. But my impression is that this is really a Turkish-led campaign and that opposition group involvement will only be secondary. They will primarily be there for\u00a0support.<\/p>\n Lister: So far, I don\u2019t think there is any intention to go as far south as Idlib city. I think this would require a much more significant military operation than what Turkey is able and willing to do. At the moment, I think we are looking at phase one, which is for Turkey to pursue its own interests: to protect its borders, deter Kurdish threats, minimize further refugee flows and eventually [\u2026] establish some territory in Syria that refugees in Turkey could move back into. In a sense, what we are looking at is Turkey trying to secure its own internal national security interests and to potentially contribute toward further stabilizing at least some parts of\u00a0Idlib.<\/p>\n Turkey and some of the opposition\u2019s secondary intention in this first phase is to establish a Turkish protected area in northern Idlib, which can be used to start a slow and gradual campaign to undermine\u00a0HTS.<\/span>\u00a0Some of Turkey\u2019s long-term partners in Syria, groups like Failaq al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham, are on board with this strategy. They don\u2019t want to enter a full-scale confrontation with\u00a0HTS.<\/span>\u00a0Instead, they want to more methodically undermine the extremist wings of\u00a0HTS<\/span>, particularly to try to encourage defections and divisions within\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0to make it a more manageable competitor rather than an\u00a0adversary.<\/p>\n From what I\u2019m told, Turkish intelligence has been working on this for some time already, in cooperation with opposition groups previously close to\u00a0HTS.<\/span>\u00a0A spate of recent assassinations are apparently linked to this subversion campaign and, perhaps more importantly, so are a number of recent audio leaks of\u00a0HTS<\/span>internal\u00a0communications.<\/p>\n Lister: Every single group that I have met with [in Turkey] over the past week, which spans all the Euphrates Shield groups, all the main\u00a0FSA<\/span>\u00a0groups across Syria, Failaq al-Sham, Nour al-Din al-Zinki brigades and Ahrar al-Sham, have expressed support for Turkey\u2019s intentions in Idlib. The one key area of difference is that groups within the Euphrates Shield and within the\u00a0FSA<\/span>\u00a0seemed more determined to initiate a conflict with\u00a0HTS<\/span>, whereas groups like Failaq al-Sham, Zinki and Ahrar al-Sham strongly opposed the idea of a full-scale confrontation because they thought it might potentially strengthen\u00a0HTS.<\/span>\u00a0They advocated instead for a slow and methodical campaign of undermining\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0from the\u00a0inside.<\/p>\n But, these groups unanimously agreed on [their] suspicion, opposition and hostility toward\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0and particularly toward [HTS<\/span>head Abu Mohammad] al-Julani. Over the three or four years that I\u2019ve met with all of Syria\u2019s opposition, this was the first time not a single group expressed some element of defense or support of\u00a0HTS.<\/span>This definitely struck me over the past few days. Al-Julani appears to have burned a lot of the bridges he built earlier in the conflict but he does still hold several advantageous\u00a0cards.<\/p>\n Lister: As far as I am aware, there have been around three or four meetings, including one that took place yesterday (Sunday). In yesterday\u2019s meeting,\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0and Turkey reached a final agreement to establish a Turkish protected buffer zone from Atme through Darat Izza to Anadan into western Aleppo. From what I\u2019m told,\u00a0HTS<\/span>agreed at most to leave these areas and agreed at minimum to not interfere with Turkey\u2019s operations in that zone.The idea here would be to replicate what Euphrates Shield looked like at the beginning of the Euphrates Shield operation, which was also preceded by a full Nusra Front withdrawal from areas of Turkish\u00a0operations.<\/p>\n Lister: I think we need to draw a distinction between what\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0says for its public audience, and what is being done behind the scenes, which is much more murky and political. Al-Julani is not only fearful of an all-out confrontation with Turkey and the opposition, his biggest fear is something catalyzing internal defections from the original Nusra core of Syrian fighters now within the larger\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0alliance.<\/p>\n This core is almost entirely composed of local Syrians who have been recruited into the Nusra Front, which later rebranded into Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and later formed the\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0alliance. Throughout this process, the Nusra core has become even more heavily Syrian, which for al-Julani is an invaluable source of local credibility that protects his forces from attack by most rival opposition groups \u2013 as we have seen in 2017. If Turkey or any other opposition faction \u2013 working by themselves or together \u2013 managed to create an alternative reality somewhere in Idlib, I\u2019m told al-Julani\u2019s biggest fear is that some of those Syrians will jump ship and join them, thereby weakening al-Julani\u2019s credibility on the ground and creating opportunities to isolate him from the revolutionary street. So his greatest fear is internal defections and I think this is why he has channeled so much energy into negotiating with Turkey to prevent a full-blown\u00a0confrontation.<\/p>\n Lister: The major big loss was the al-Zinki movement. I was told Turkey had some kind of role, potentially with some opposition support, in making this happen. But there have been some other smaller defections from within the\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0core \u2013 small\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0sub-factions and local units. The latter are more concerning to al-Julani than anything else, as they represent the partial or possible disintegration of Nusra\u2019s core Syrian\u00a0structure.<\/p>\n Lister: For Turkey, the [Syrian Kurdish]\u00a0YPG<\/span>\u00a0is just as much of a concern and perhaps an even more critical concern than\u00a0HTS.<\/span>\u00a0The fact that Turkey is looking to establish a lookout post or a launching-pad base on Mount Barakat, which overlooks Kurdish-held Afrin, speaks to\u00a0that.<\/p>\n At the moment, however, I don\u2019t think there is a prospect for a military operation in Afrin. But there is a Turkish effort to exert some kind of influence and a potential deterrent threat on the area to discourage the\u00a0YPG<\/span>\u00a0from moving further into opposition territories. Russia seems to have lent its support to this, which is\u00a0intriguing.<\/p>\n Lister: I was actually sitting with all the Euphrates Shield leadership when Erdogan gave this statement. None of them expected this apparent comment of Russian air support and they were all opposed to it. They were genuinely incensed by the idea that Russia could be providing them with support from the air. Let\u2019s see how that plays out. If Russia does provide air support, I think that may cause some\u00a0problems.<\/p>\n Lister: It could potentially be a deal breaker. All the armed groups, who don\u2019t already have a presence in Idlib, would lose credibility there if they entered into an alliance with Russia. It\u2019s pretty well known that the Russians have been bombing Idlib on and off for a long time. So I think active Russian military involvement could be a deal breaker. But I\u2019m not sure if that is going to end up being the\u00a0case.<\/p>\n The answers have been edited for length and\u00a0clarity.”<\/i><\/p>\nSyria Deeply: Do we know which opposition groups are part of the Turkish-led\u00a0alliance?<\/b><\/h3>\n
Syria Deeply: What is the scope and aim of the Turkish-led\u00a0operation?<\/b><\/h3>\n
Syria Deeply: What is the sentiment among rebel groups in\u00a0Idlib?<\/b><\/h3>\n
Syria Deeply:\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0militants allegedly escorted a Turkish reconnaissance unit into Idlib on Sunday, implying that there have been talks between Turkey and\u00a0HTS.<\/span>\u00a0Have there been any negotiations and do we know what their focus\u00a0was?<\/b><\/h3>\n
Syria Deeply: Why would\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0agree to a deal with Turkey considering that it has been a vocal critic of the de-escalation zone\u00a0agreement?<\/b><\/h3>\n
Syria Deeply: Reports circulated of a series of defections from\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0in the weeks leading up to the campaign, as part of a larger Turkish effort to isolate\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0in Idlib. Which groups have defected and what is the scale of\u00a0defection?<\/b><\/h3>\n
Syria Deeply: There has been a lot of focus on\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0being the primary target of this campaign. What about the\u00a0Kurds?<\/b><\/h3>\n
Syria Deeply: Turkish officials, including the president and\u00a0<\/b>prime minister<\/a><\/b>, said that Turkey will cooperate with Russia on the Idlib campaign. What does this mean for the\u00a0FSA<\/span>?<\/b><\/h3>\n
Syria Deeply: Could it be a deal\u00a0breaker?<\/b><\/h3>\n