“After months of defeats, Syria\u2019s opposition is trying to unite under the umbrella of a national army to fight pro-government forces. But internal divisions, the geographic distribution of rebel groups and involvement of foreign powers undermine its chance of\u00a0success.<\/p>\n
BEIRUT<\/span>, LEBANON\u00a0<\/span>\u2013 Dozens of Syrian opposition groups merged last month to form a unified army, at a time when rebel factions are increasingly divided and have suffered a string of defeats at the hands of pro-government and extremist\u00a0forces.<\/p>\n Led by the opposition\u2019s interim government in exile, the Unified National Army (UNA<\/span>)\u00a0aims to boost opposition forces<\/a>\u00a0both on the ground and in negotiations at the eighth round of peace talks set to start within the next month. However, experts and analysts warn that the move is not likely to alter the dynamics of a war that is now tilted in Syrian president Bashar al-Assad\u2019s\u00a0favor.<\/p>\n Since January, rebel factions have lost territory to pro-government forces around Damascus, in the central Syrian province of Homs, and in southern Syria along the border with Jordan. In Idlib, the only opposition-held province in Syria, al-Qaida-linked militants have overtaken many Free Syrian Army (FSA<\/span>)-affiliated\u00a0groups.<\/p>\n The\u00a0U.S.<\/span>\u00a0recently ended its support for rebels and, along with Saudi Arabia,\u00a0allegedly told the opposition<\/a>\u00a0to accept that Assad will remain in power. Even the\u00a0U.N.<\/span>\u2019s special envoy<\/a>\u00a0to Syria has questioned whether the Syrian opposition would \u201cbe able to be unified and realistic enough to realize they did not win the\u00a0war.\u201d<\/p>\n The Turkey-based Syrian Interim Government (SIG<\/span>) and the Syrian Islamic Council (SIC<\/span>), a group of Syrian Muslim clerics,\u00a0proposed the merger in late August<\/a>,\u00a0and within a week, more than a dozen groups had joined, according to\u00a0AFP.<\/span><\/p>\n Overall troop numbers are not available, but at least 44\u00a0FSA<\/span>\u00a0groups operating mostly in Aleppo and Idlib province have signed up to the\u00a0UNA<\/span>\u00a0\u2013 including the Levant Front, 13th Division, Mutasim Brigade and the Nasr\u00a0Army.<\/p>\n Two\u00a0FSA<\/span>\u00a0factions in southeastern Syria have also signed up, but the Southern Front, a coalition of some 50\u00a0FSA<\/span>\u00a0groups based in Daraa and Quneitra provinces, said they want to see signs that the\u00a0UNA<\/span>\u00a0will, in fact, be unified, before\u00a0joining.<\/p>\n \u201cWe are waiting to see some productive steps, and if the brigades in the north really commit to the national army and take it seriously before we take a position on the initiative,\u201d a Southern Front leader told Syria Deeply, requesting\u00a0anonymity.<\/p>\n Jaish al-Islam, a hard-line militant group with a strong base in the Eastern Ghouta suburbs of Damascus, has also joined. As has Ahrar al-Sham \u2013 which was one of the strongest rebel groups in Idlib before the al-Qaida-linked Hay\u2019at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS<\/span>) recently seized its\u00a0positions.<\/p>\n In an attempt to give the force a real military structure, the\u00a0SIG<\/span>\u00a0has sought to create a defense ministry that would preside over the\u00a0UNA<\/span>\u2019s operations. They have also\u00a0appointed<\/a>\u00a0Salim Idris, a defected Syrian army general, as chief of staff and General Mohammad Faris, also a defector, as defense\u00a0minister.<\/p>\n The group\u2019s funding has yet to be officially announced, but opposition\u00a0delegates<\/a>\u00a0met with\u00a0Qatar\u2019s foreign minister in Doha last month<\/a>, as part of a series of visits to \u201cfriendly and sisterly countries,\u201d according to Nizar Haraki, the Syrian opposition\u2019s ambassador to\u00a0Qatar.<\/p>\n Jawad Abu Hatab, prime minister of the\u00a0SIG<\/span>, told Syria Deeply the opposition forces already had money. Better organization, rather than external funding, would be key to its\u00a0success.<\/p>\n The\u00a0UNA<\/span>\u00a0has both military and diplomatic objectives, Abu Hatab said. Militarily, the\u00a0UNA<\/span>\u00a0would form \u201cone command\u201d to help deploy the opposition\u2019s military skills more effectively, he\u00a0said.<\/p>\n \u201cWhen we create a command that includes all of the opposition factions, we will have central decision making and we can use this power in the best way,\u201d he\u00a0said.<\/p>\n \u201cWe can develop them [the factions] from militias into a regular army that has a leader, and rules, and knows its rights and duties,\u201d he\u00a0said.<\/p>\n Diplomatically, military cohesion will help the opposition put up a united front at peace talks held in Geneva and\u00a0Astana.<\/p>\n \u201cThe army will give some weight to the opposition, so it will be stronger in negotiations and impose its respect on the international community,\u201d he\u00a0said.<\/p>\n But even if the armed rebels unite, the opposition is still divided in its approach to resolution. Some elements insist Assad must step down as part of a peace deal, while others are more flexible about other solutions that would bring an end to the\u00a0conflict.<\/p>\n Major Ahmed al-Hassan Abu al-Mundhir, head of the\u00a0UNA<\/span>\u2019s political bureau, is part of the former. He insists that \u201ctoppling the criminal regime\u201d is among the main aims of his fighting\u00a0force.<\/p>\n Although\u00a0SIG<\/span>\u00a0officials maintain that the idea of unified army dates back to at least 2015, Kyle Orton, an analyst at the Henry Jackson Society think-tank, said the suspension of covert\u00a0CIA<\/span>\u00a0aid to\u00a0U.S.<\/span>-allied rebel groups and\u00a0HTS<\/span>dominance over Idlib are \u201cimportant factors in having made this [the creation of the unified army]\u00a0possible.\u201d<\/p>\n Orton said that initiative also partially stems from the opposition\u2019s need to differentiate itself from extremist elements such as al-Qaida and the so-called Islamic\u00a0State.<\/p>\n \u201cPreviously, the rebels, for very good practical (not ideological) reasons, were averse to openly adopting an antagonistic position toward\u00a0HTS<\/span>,\u201d he explained. \u201cThat is not less of a concern and instead, both politically and militarily, there is more incentive for rebels to differentiate themselves from\u00a0HTS.<\/span>\u201d<\/p>\n However, by positioning itself against\u00a0HTS<\/span>, the\u00a0UNA<\/span>\u00a0could run the risk of a fatal\u00a0confrontation.<\/p>\n \u201cWhether the [Unified] National Army could or would stand up to\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0is an open question,\u201d Orton said. \u201cIf\u00a0HTS<\/span>\u00a0demonstrates quickly, it can attack the [Unified] National Army without incurring collective rebel and\/or Turkish reprisals, then the whole idea\u00a0falls.\u201d<\/p>\n The new rebel coalition will likely be focused on northern Syria and would be backed by Turkey, he added. Ankara has yet to comment publicly on the\u00a0project.<\/p>\n \u201cThe [Unified] National Army would be in its essentials a Turkish-backed enterprise,\u201d Orton said. \u201cThere might well be some funding from\u00a0Qatar.\u201d<\/p>\n According to Sam Heller of the Century Foundation, the initiative \u201cwon\u2019t be seen as a major new vehicle for support and\u00a0influence.\u201d<\/p>\n For Heller, this is partially because the idea of a single rebel army does not take into account the geographic distribution of the opposition in\u00a0Syria.<\/p>\n Having lost their major stronghold of Aleppo last December, remaining rebel territory is divided into patches in Syria\u2019s south, southeast and northwest. This makes the prospect of unification\u00a0untenable.<\/p>\n The\u00a0FSA<\/span>-linked Martyr Ahmed al-Abdo brigades and Lions of the East are a prime example of this. Both groups have agreed to form part of the\u00a0UNA.<\/span>However, their bases are far out east in the Badia desert near the Iraqi border in areas isolated from rebel-held\u00a0territory.<\/p>\n \u201cThere is a reality of a fragmented regional opposition versus an opposition united in principle,\u201d Heller\u00a0said.<\/p>\n For Fares al-Bayoush, a former officer with the\u00a0FSA<\/span>-linked Free Idlib Army, the\u00a0UNA<\/span>\u2019s lack of military expertise, in comparison to that of the Syrian army, condemns it to\u00a0failure.<\/p>\n \u201cA military more than 50 years old is different from \u2026 an army still in its infancy,\u201d he told Syria\u00a0Deeply.<\/p>\n He also expressed skepticism over the possibility that rebel groups could unite under one umbrella, given the opposition\u2019s history of\u00a0divisions.<\/p>\n Divisions within Syria\u2019s opposition groups are potentially the greatest roadblock for the success of the deal. Jaish al-Islam, for example, has been\u00a0heavily involved<\/a>\u00a0in rebel infighting in Eastern Ghouta, primarily with\u00a0FSA<\/span>\u00a0group Faylaq al-Rahman, over territorial control in the besieged area. Even within the\u00a0FSA<\/span>, there have been\u00a0divisions<\/a>\u00a0throughout the conflict over coordination with Salafi rebel groups who extol more hard-line religious ideologies, such as Ahrar\u00a0al-Sham.<\/p>\n \u201cI have no intention of participating in this project,\u201d Bayoush, who was a member of the opposition\u2019s military delegation at the Astana talks in January, said. \u201cThe participants in the project lack seriousness, and it represents a repeat of previous errors, and it lacks\u00a0longevity.\u201d<\/p>\nThe Unified National\u00a0Army<\/b><\/h2>\n
Objectives<\/b><\/h2>\n
Timing<\/b><\/h2>\n
Rebel\u00a0Divisions<\/b><\/h2>\n